

KYIV "ST. VOLODYMYR" UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF HISTORY:
SKETCHES FOR A CREATIVE PORTRAIT OF VOLODYMYR TSYKH
(1805–1837)

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Abstract: *The article brings to the readers' attention aspects of the life and work of Vladimir Tsykh, Ukrainian historian, university professor, rector, one of the founders of the "St. Vladimir" University School of History. His life, pedagogical and scientific work, as well as his work were analysed and presented on the basis of historiographical sources from the second third of the nineteenth century to the beginning of the 21st century.*

Keywords: *historian, Volodymyr Tsykh, Kharkiv University, Kyiv "St. Volodymyr" University, education, historiography.*

Rezumat: *Școala de istorie din cadrul Universității „Sf. Vladimir” din Kiev: schițe despre personalitatea lui Volodymyr Tsykh (1805-1837).* Articolul aduce în atenția cititorilor aspecte ale vieții și operei lui Vladimir Tsykh, istoric ucrainean, profesor universitar, rector, unul dintre fondatorii Școlii de istorie a Universității „Sf. Vladimir”. Viața, activitatea pedagogică și științifică, precum și opera sa au fost analizate și prezentate pe baza surselor istoriografice din a doua treime a secolului al XIX-lea până la începutul secolului XXI.

Résumé : *L'école historique de l'Université "Saint Vladimir" de Kiev : ébauches sur la personnalité de Volodymyr Tsykh (1805-1837).* L'article ci-joint présente aux lecteurs des aspects de la vie de Vladimir Tsykh, historien ukrainien, professeur universitaire, recteur, un des fondateurs de l'Ecole historique de l'Université "Saint Vladimir". On y analyse et présente sa vie, son activité pédagogique et scientifique, ainsi que son œuvre tout en partant des sources historiographiques du second tiers du XIX-ème siècle jusqu'au début du XXI-ème siècle.

INTRODUCTION

Universities played an outstanding role in shaping the European civilization. In the Russian Empire, in the first half of the 19th century, out of six

universities, which provided highest education degree along with Moscow University (since 1755), Derpt (Yuriev) University (1802), Kazan University (1804), St. Petersburg University (1819), were two Ukrainian universities: Kharkiv University (1805), and Kyiv "St. Volodymyr" University (1834). It is of interest for contemporary history science to research the creation and development of historical education and science at the Ukrainian universities in the 19th century, specifically at the Kyiv "St. Volodymyr" University¹.

The purpose of this article is to analyse the educational and scientific achievements of V. F. Tsykh and the legacy of this Ukrainian historian, on the basis of historiography of the second third of 19th and early 21st centuries. His activity marked the beginning of Kyiv "St. Volodymyr" University School of History, but his legacy rightfully belongs to two universities: Kharkiv and Kyiv "St. Volodymyr". The time spent at Kharkiv University spans for 12 years, from 1822 to 1834; the last three years of Tsykh's life are closely linked by the Kyiv "St. Volodymyr" University, where he gained impressive respect. This research is based on V. Tsykh's works² published in 1824, 1825, and 1835, his Master's dissertation³, his speech at the

¹ Ольга Тарасенко, *Становлення та розвиток історичної освіти і науки у Київському університеті у 1834–1884 рр.* [Formation and development of historical education and science at Kyiv University in 1834–1884], Київ, Логос, 1995, 276 с.; О. О. Тарасенко, *З історії становлення та розвитку історичної освіти в Київському імператорському університеті Св. Володимира (до 175 річчя від дня заснування)* [From the history of the formation and development of historical education at Kyiv "St. Volodymyr" Imperial University (to the 175-th anniversary)], in "Історична думка" [Historical thought], Київ, 2010. №1 (2). 59 с., http://elibrary.kubg.edu.ua/6385/1/O_Tarasenko_IS.pdf (Accessed on 30.10.2017).

² В. Ф. Цых, *Речь Гая Мария к римскому народу: (Из Криспа Саллюстия: Bellum Iugurthinum) Пер. с лат. В. Цыха* [Speech of Gaius Maria to the Roman people: (From Crispus Sallust: Bellum Iugurthinum) Transl. From the lat. V. Tsykh], in "Украинский журнал", Харьков, 1824, Ч. 3, № 15, с. 115–123; В. Ф. Цых, *Тит Ливий с присовокуплением отрывка из его истории* [Titus Livius with the addition of a passage from his history], in "Украинский журнал", Харьков, 1824, No 11, с. 224–234; No 12, с. 279–293; В. Ф. Цых, *Несколько слов о величии духа* [A few words about the greatness of the spirit], in "Украинский журнал", Харьков, 1825, Ч. 7, № 16, с. 223–239; В. Цых, *Взгляд на историческую жизнь народа эллино-македонского* [A glance at the historical life of the Hellenic-Macedonian people] in "Журнал Министерства народного просвещения", 1835, Ч. 6, с. 148.

³ В. Ф. Цых, *[О способе преподавания истории]. Решение вопроса: По причине беспрестанно умножения массы исторических сведений и распространения объёма истории, а не оказывается ли нужным изменить обыкновенный способ преподавания сей науки и какой он должен быть именно, как вообще, так и особенно в университетах?* [About the way of teaching history. Solution of the question: Due to

Kyiv “St. Volodymyr” University opening ceremony⁴, the speeches at his funeral in 1837⁵, and memoirs about him⁶.

In 1860, V. Shulgin studied the life and works of V. Tsykh⁷. In 1884, F. J. Fortinsky submitted an article about him⁸, and M. F. Vladimirsky-Boudanov described his activity at Kyiv “St. Volodymyr” University⁹. At the beginning of the 20th century, in 1901, V. V. Roudakov published an article about the scientific work of Tsykh¹⁰, and seven years later, A. S. Viazigin wrote a paper¹¹, which was reprinted

the continuous growth of the quantity of historical information and the spreading of the volume of history, is not it necessary to change the ordinary way of teaching of this science and what should it be exactly, in general, and especially at the universities?], Харьков: Тип. ун-та, 1833, 128 с.

⁴ В. Цых, *О цели и пользе высших учебных заведений* [On the purpose and benefits of higher education institutions], in *Записки и речи, читанные при открытии Императорского Университета св. Владимира, 15 июля 1834 года* [Notes and speeches, read at the opening of the Imperial University of “St. Vladimir”, July 15, 1834], Киев, 1840, с. 85–119.

⁵ *Речи, произнесенные при погребении ректора и профессора всеобщей истории в Императорском университете Св. Владимира Владимира Францевича Цыха, 21 апреля 1837 года* [Speeches at the burial of the Rector and Professor of World History at the Imperial University of “St. Vladimir”, Vladimir Frantsevich Tsykh, April 21, 1837], Москва, 1837, с. 16–22.

⁶ *Из воспоминаний студента Н.* [From the memories of student N.], in *Харьковский университет XIX - начале XX века в воспоминаниях его профессоров и воспитанников* [Kharkiv University of XIX – the beginning of XX centuries in the memories of its professors and students], Т. 1. Харків, 2008, с. 101–102; С. Л. Геевский, *Из автобиографии (1813-1862)* [From the autobiography (1813-1862)], in *ibidem*, с. 143; Д. П. Хрущев, *Из воспоминаний* [From memories], in “*ibidem*”, с. 166.

⁷ В. Шульгин, *История университета Св. Владимира* [History of “St. Vladimir” University], СПб., 1860, 230 с.

⁸ Ф. Я. Фортинский, *Цых Владимир Францевич* [Tsykh Vladimir Frantsevich], in *Биографический словарь профессоров и преподавателей Императорского университета Св. Владимира (1834–1884) под ред. В.С. Иконникова* [Biographical Dictionary of professors and teachers of the Imperial University of “St. Vladimir” (1834-1884). Ed. V.S. Ikonnikov], Киев, 1884, с. 724-728.

⁹ М. Ф. Владимирский-Буданов, *История Императорского Университета Св. Владимира* [History of the Imperial University of “St. Vladimir”], Киев, Тип. Имп. ун-та св. Владимира, 1884, Т. 1, с. 107-113.

¹⁰ В. Рудаков, *Цых Владимир Францевич* [Tsykh Vladimir Frantsevich], in *Русский биографический словарь* [Russian Biographical Dictionary], СПб., 1901, Т.19, с. 496–497.

¹¹ *Историко-филологический факультет Харьковского университета за первые 100 лет его существования (1805-1905) под ред. М. Г. Халанского, Д. И. Багаля*

in 2007¹². In 1913, V. P. Buzeskul analysed the Volodymyr Tsykh's lectures¹³, restating his personality in 1929¹⁴. We also presented his character and scientific work, in 1995¹⁵ and 2010¹⁶, and described, in 2017, the contribution of V. Tsykh and O. Stavrovsky to the initial stage of creation of Kyiv "St. Volodymyr" University School of History¹⁷. In 2004, on the 170-th anniversary of Kyiv "St. Volodymyr" University, V. Tsykh was remembered in the monograph about the Faculty of History¹⁸; in 2006, he was mentioned as a Rector¹⁹. S. Stelmakh analysed V. Tsykh's

[Historical and Philological Faculty of Kharkov University, at the first 100 years of its existence (1805-1905)], eds. M.G. Khalansky, D.I. Bagalei], Харьков, 1908, 558 с.

¹² А. С. Вязигин, *Цых Владимир Францевич* [Tsykh Vladimir Frantsevich], in *ibidem*, с. 257-259.

¹³ В. Бузескул, *О лекциях В. Ф. Цыха, профессора Харьковского университета в 30-х годах прошлого века* [About the lectures of V. F. Tsykh, Kharkov University Professor in the 30s of the last century], in *Сборник Харьковского историко-филологического общества* [Collection of the Kharkov Historical and Philological Society], 1913, Т. XIX, с. 188-190.

¹⁴ В. П. Бузескул, *Всеобщая история и ее представители в России в XIX – начале XX вв.* [World history and its representatives in Russia in the XIX – the beginning of the XX centuries], Ленинград: Изд-во АН СССР, 1929. Ч. 1., 218 с.

¹⁵ Ольга Тарасенко, *Становлення та розвиток історичної освіти і науки у Київському університеті у 1834–1884 рр.* [Formation and development of historical education and science at Kyiv University in 1834–1884], Київ, Логос, 1995, 276 с.

¹⁶ О. О. Тарасенко, *З історії становлення та розвитку історичної освіти в Київському імператорському університеті Св. Володимира (до 175 річчя від дня заснування)* [From the history of the formation and development of historical education at Kyiv "St. Volodymyr" Imperial University (to the 175th anniversary)], in http://elibrary.kubg.edu.ua/6385/1/O_Tarasenko_IS.pdf (Accessed in 30.10.2017)

¹⁷ О. О. Тарасенко, *До становлення школи істориків Університету Св. Володимира: В. Ф. Цих та О. І. Ставровський* [The foundation of the School of historians of "St. Volodymyr" University: V. F. Tsykh and O. I. Stavrovsky], in "Науково-теоретичний альманах «Грані»", 2017; no. 7 (147), с. 15–31; Eadem, *Школа істориків Університету Св. Володимира у середині 30-х – кінці 40-х років XIX ст. (до історіографії питання)* [School of Historians of "St. Volodymyr" University in the middle of the 30's – the end of 40's of the 19th century (to the historiography of question)], in "Науковий огляд", 2017; no. 10 (42), с. 84–103; Eadem, *Викладачі школи істориків Університету Св. Володимира у спогадах сучасників (середина 30-х – початок 60-х років XIX ст.)* [Teachers of School of Historians of "St. Volodymyr" University in the memoirs of contemporaries (the middle of the 30's – the beginning of the 60's of the 19th century)], in "ЕМІНАК: науковий щоквартальник", 2017; no 4 (20), Т. 1, с. 10–27.

¹⁸ Г. Д. Казьмирчук (ред.), *Історичний факультет Київського національного університету (1834–2004)* [Historical Faculty of Kyiv National University (1834–2004)], Київ, Прайм-М, 2004, 354 с.

¹⁹ В. В. Скопенко, В. А. Короткий, Т. В. Табенська, І. І. Тіщенко, Л. В. Шевченко (ред.),

scientific legacy, in 1997²⁰, 2005²¹, and 2009²². In her turn, in 2009, Y. Kiseleva examined the problems of historiographical research in V. Tsykh's writings²³. In the last five years, S. Liman studied V. Tsykh's view on the Middle Ages (2012)²⁴, and E. Zamysova investigated the decision of Nikolai Gogol and Volodymyr Tsykh to chair the World History Department of Kyiv "St. Volodymyr" University (2015)²⁵.

THE LIFE AND WORKS OF VOLODYMYR TSYKH

Volodymyr Tsykh was born in 1805, in the Governorate of Kharkiv. From 1822 to 1825 he studied at Kharkiv University. His writings from that period were analysed by O. Ruchinska²⁶. V. Tsykh published two articles on the Roman history in the Kharkiv University Journal. One of them was devoted to the ancient Roman general and statesman Gaius Marius, containing his own translation of the abstracts from the historical work *The Jugurthine War* by Gaius Sallustius Crispus²⁷.

Ректоры Киевского университета 1834–2006 [Rectors of the University of Kiev 1834–2006], Киев, Лыбидь, 2006, с. 60.

²⁰ Сергій Стельмах, *Історична думка в Україні XIX – початку XX ст.* [Historical thought in Ukraine in 19th – the beginning of 20th centuries], Київ, ВЦ «Академія», 1997, 175 с.

²¹ Idem, *Історична наука в Україні епохи класичного історизму (XIX – початку XX століття): Монографія* [Historical science in Ukraine in the era of classical historicism (19th – the beginning of 20th centuries): Monograph], Київ, 2005, 378 с.

²² Idem, *Цих Володимир Францович* [Tsykh Volodymyr Frantsovych] in В. А. Смолій (ред.), *Енциклопедія історії України: у 10 т.* [Encyclopedia of the History of Ukraine], Київ, Наукова думка, 2013, Т. 10: Т–Я, с. 480.

²³ Юлія Кісельова, *Історіографічна проблематика у наукових працях В. Ф. Циха* [Historiographic problems in the scientific works of V. F. Tsykh], in *Актуальні проблеми вітчизняної та всесвітньої історії: Збірник наукових праць* [Actual problems of national and world history: Collection of scientific works], Харків, ХНУ імені В. Н. Каразіна, 2009, Вип. 12, с. 276–282.

²⁴ С. І. Лиман, *Історія середніх віків у творчості та навчальних курсах Володимира Францевича Циха (1805–1837)* [History of the Middle Ages in the works and training courses of Volodymyr Frantsovych Tsykh], in "Вісник Харківської державної академії культури" [Bulletin of the Kharkiv State Academy of Culture], 2012, Вип. 38, с. 15–24.

²⁵ Е. Е. Замыслова, *Н. В. Гоголь – историк и его «соперник» В. Ф. Цых* [N. V. Gogol as a Historian and His "Rival" V. F. Tsykh], in "Электронный научный журнал «Медиа-скоп»", 2015, Вып. №3., <http://www.mediascope.ru/1816> (Accessed on 30.10.2017).

²⁶ Оксана Ручинська, *Біля витоків харківського антикознавства: Володимир Францевич Цих* [Near the origins of Kharkov science of antiquities: Volodymyr Frantsevich Tsykh], in *Україна: Історія, культура, мистецтво: українсько-сербський збірник* [Ukras: History, Culture, Art: Ukrainian-Serbian Collection], Харків, Темпора, 2009, Випуск 4, с. 49–58.

²⁷ В. Ф. Цых, *Речь Гая Мария к римскому народу...*, с. 115–123.

In the other paper he focused on the Titus Livy's monumental *History of Rome from its Foundation*²⁸, submitting a translation from this famous Roman writer's work and calling him the "greatest historian"²⁹.

In his paper from 1825 entitled *Several words About the Glory of Human Spirit*, Volodymyr Tsykh emphasized the "greatness of the spirit" – or the individual's moral – that is the basis for historical development³⁰. An example of someone important from the period of Antiquity was Pericles as opposed to Appius Claudius Cicerones and others, who, according to the young historian, were great individuals, but lacked "greatness of the spirit"³¹. In 1825, after graduation from Kharkiv University, with a Candidate of Science degree, V. Tsykh was assigned to the position of senior lecturer in French translation and Geography at Kharkiv Institute of Noble Maids. In 1831 he was invited as a "person who qualifies for this job" to teach the World History at Kharkiv University³². At the age of 28 he successfully defended the Master's dissertation in philology³³ and earned the title of "Adjunct of the World History Chair"³⁴. From 1831 to 1834 V. Tsykh taught Ancient History, Medieval History, and Modern History (up to mid-18th century) at Kharkiv University. One of his students, D. Krhushev, noted later that V. Tsykh was their favourite teacher who knew his lectures by heart³⁵.

In April 1834, the promising scientist and teacher V. Tsykh was transferred to the new Kyiv "St. Volodymyr" University as an "Extraordinary Professor of the World History Chair"³⁶, who felt also comfortable with historiography³⁷. At the opening ceremony, he delivered a brilliant speech about the importance and determining role of Universities in the state's life and culture. He underlined the useful role of science, in general, and of historical science, in particular, for the public morality and for the benefits of the state³⁸. On May 23, 1835, V. Tsykh was confirmed "Ordinary Professor of the World and Russian History Chair"³⁹ and Dean of the newly created "History and Philology Department" of the Faculty of

²⁸ Оксана Ручинська, *op. cit.*, с. 51.

²⁹ В. Ф. Цых *Тит Ливий с присовокуплением отрывка из его истории*, с. 279–293.

³⁰ В. Ф. Цых, *Несколько слов о величии духа*, с. 223–239.

³¹ *Ibid.*, с. 225; Оксана Ручинська, *op. cit.*, с. 51.

³² Ф. Я. Фортинский, *op. cit.*, с. 724.

³³ В. Ф. Цых, *О способе преподавания истории*, 128 с.

³⁴ *Ректоры Киевского университета 1834–2006*, с. 60.

³⁵ Д. П. Хрущев, *Из воспоминаний*, с. 166.

³⁶ Ф. Я. Фортинский, *op. cit.*, с. 724.

³⁷ Е. Е. Замыслова, *Н. В. Гоголь-историк и его «соперник» В. Ф. Цых*, <http://www.mediascope.ru/1816> (Accessed on 06.07.2017).

³⁸ В. Цых, *О цели и пользе высших учебных заведений*, с. 85–119.

³⁹ Ф. Я. Фортинский, *op. cit.*, с. 725.

Philosophy. The deep knowledge of the subject, his extraordinary memory and talent to lecturing made the contemporaries to consider V. Tsykh a teacher of the "European standard". On December 11, 1835, V. Tsykh was appointed Pro-Rector, and one year later, by the Emperor's decree of December 15, 1836, he became Rector of Kyiv "St. Volodymyr" University⁴⁰. Unfortunately, an early death from tuberculosis cancelled all his ambitious plans as a scientist, teacher, and administrator. V. Tsykh died on May 1, 1837 in Kyiv, at only 32⁴¹.

V. Tsykh left a rather small scientific legacy: a Master's dissertation⁴², his speech at the opening of Kyiv "St. Volodymyr" University⁴³, and several articles⁴⁴. He lectured on Ancient, Medieval and Modern history up to mid-18th century.

Basing his Ancient History course on the works of the German historian Arnold Hermann Ludwig Heeren (1760–1842), V. Tsykh advised his students to study those writings, as well as the texts of Barthold Georg Niebuhr (1776–1831)⁴⁵, the founder of the historical-philological sources' criticism; in this respect, he also encouraged the students to read all 3 volumes of the *Roman History* by Niebuhr (1811–1832)⁴⁶. Tsykh's lectures in medieval history were influenced by the ideas of Francois Pierre Guillaume Guizot (1787–1874)⁴⁷, Augustin Thierry (1795–1856), and Friedrich Ludwig Georg von Raumer (1781–1873)⁴⁸.

V. Shulgin stated that V. Tsykh was "the star of the University"⁴⁹, who in his teaching preferred German textbooks to French for their systematism, throughout justification by facts and a wide variety of the sources⁵⁰. The same author declared that the historical perspective of V. Tsykh was formed on the basis of religion and idealistic German philosophy and history, as a romantic trend of European historiography. The scientist followed the ethical concept of the historical process of

⁴⁰ Ректоры Киевского университета 1834–2006, с. 60–61.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² В. Ф. Цых, [О способе преподавания истории], 128 с.

⁴³ В. Ф. Цых, О цели и пользе высших учебных заведений, с. 85–119.

⁴⁴ В. Ф. Цых, Речь Гая Мария к римскому народу..., с. 115–123; Idem, Тит Ливий с присовокуплением отрывка из его истории, с. 279–293; Idem, Несколько слов о величии духа, с. 223–239; Idem, Взгляд на историческую жизнь народа эллино-македонского, с. 148.

⁴⁵ С. П. Стельмах, Нібур Бартольд Георг [Niebuhr Barthold Georg], in В. А. Смолій (ред.), *Енциклопедія історії України*: Т. 7: Мі–О., Київ, 2010, 728 с.: in http://www.history.org.ua/?termin=Nibur_B (Accessed on 30.10.07.2017).

⁴⁶ В. Бузескул, *op. cit.*, с. 188–190.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ В. Шульгин, *op. cit.*, с. 70.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, с. 125.

“moral development of individuals, as well as nations”⁵¹.

An important role in shaping up the historical outlook of V. Tsykh played the universal concept of history of the German philosopher, folklorist, writer, linguist, and thinker Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803)⁵², whose ideas represented the foundation of the 19th century classical historicism and of the German school of history. Adopting his opinions, V. Tsykh considered the historical process as a “single flow” or as an “organic combination of singular and universal”⁵³. The scientist identified “history of whole world events, which described the events of all mankind” and “internal history”, which was a “political history”⁵⁴.

V. Tsykh believed that “historical development of individuals, nations, peoples, states, and mankind – as a whole – occurs through progress in moral self-improvement”⁵⁵. The historian defined the role of an individual in the history based on the individual’s contribution to spreading the ideas of humanism, justice, and universal human morale: “The prejudices that distort humankind, rude ignorance that for centuries suppressed peoples, low desires of egoism that humiliate humankind, disappear and soften with the spread of humanism, justice, and universal human morale”⁵⁶. The “moral state of the peoples determines their further progress – the presence of such features as nobility, patriotism, self-giving, honours, religiousness; the decline of the morale leads to the regress of the peoples”, stated the scientist⁵⁷. According to V. Tsykh, the moral self-improvement of an individual and the humankind as a whole is the ultimate goal of progress. Therefore, history “depicts the fate of the kingdoms and people, follows the gradual development and successes of the human mind, and points out the events that demonstrated the influence of human moral force, the most”⁵⁸. The same history “occupies a special place in upbringing of the state leaders since it permits to understand the reasons for the rise and fall of nations, penetrates into intricacy of politics, demonstrates the pros and cons of different forms of government, based on the outcomes of specific events”⁵⁹.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, с. 124-125.

⁵² С. П. Стельмах, *Гердер Йоган Готфрід* [Herder Johann Gottfried], in *Енциклопедія історії України: Т. 2: Г–Д*, Київ, 2004, 688 с, http://www.history.org.ua/?termin=Gerder_Y (Accessed on 30.10.2017).

⁵³ В. Цых *О цели и пользе высших учебных заведений*, с. 94.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, с. 88.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, с. 89.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, с. 94–95.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

V. Tsykh suggested an original periodization of the World History without its division into Ancient, Medieval and Modern. He proposed a civilizational - geographical approach: 1) the History of Asian and Eastern Peoples; 2) the History of Peoples of Italy and Greece; 3) the History of Central Northern Europe⁶⁰. Unfortunately, his early death interrupted his work on this periodization.

S. Stelmakh highlighted the main elements of V. Tsykh's theory of history: rendering the historical process as an "organic flow"; combination of general, universal and individual, both in nations and in individuals; emphasizing the determining role in history of an individual whose genius and high moral principles are the locomotive of the progress; singling out the benevolence in the historical process, certain valour in history; giving the history didactic function of moral improvement of the contemporary citizens⁶¹. In the moral-ethical concept of V. Tsykh, progress meant a moral self-improvement on the basis of the common human values⁶². Since the historical studies must rely on historical facts, V. Tsykh believed that "historian must feel the spirit of that time and concentrate on studying the facts, and since only facts, only objectiveness gives life to description the historian must determine the interconnections and reasons of the historic events"⁶³.

The students of V. Tsykh stressed that his teaching helped them to understand the real scientific importance of history: "Clearly, distinctively, vividly and concisely, he taught the factual part of the history. [...] As a gifted professor, he carried us away with his lectures, familiarizing us with the works of contemporary writers and researchers"⁶⁴. Honest and having of high moral principles, V. Tsykh was believed to be a pride of both Kharkiv University and "St. Volodymyr" University. "Tsykh was a students' idol" and imposed the "respect for him [...] bordered with fear, since he dominated in his erudition and enormity of his teaching", noted his students⁶⁵. V. Tsykh taught lectures on various periods of Ancient, Medieval, and Modern History – which was a common practice in both Russian and foreign universities at that time. S. Liman stressed that in "historiosophical" sense, V. Tsykh could be considered a romanticist⁶⁶. The analyses of works by V. Tsykh as a historian-medievalist shows that he was one of the most professional historians of the 1830s, when the medievalism in Russian universities was yet to be evolved as a branch of the historical science⁶⁷. In her turn,

⁶⁰ В. Шульгин, *op. cit.*, с. 126–127.

⁶¹ Сергій Стельмах, *Історична наука в Україні епохи класичного історизму*, с. 145–149.

⁶² В. Цых *О цели и пользе высших учебных заведений*, с. 88.

⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ *Из воспоминаний студента Н.*, с. 101–102.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, с. 3.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, с. 21–22.

Y. Kiseleva stated that he laid a prominent milestone in creation and development of historiography in the first third of the 19th century Russia⁶⁸.

It was obvious for V. Tsykh that changing the scientific image of history must make corrections in the very process of its teaching⁶⁹. According to him, a university history teacher must be aware of the state of each field of science, of every subject. He or she needs to seek new ways in science, getting rid of past mistakes⁷⁰. Among the teachers of Kharkiv University, V. Tsykh was the first to address the issues of history to historical science⁷¹. Therefore he is considered as one of the founders of Kharkiv School of Historians, which characteristic feature was the development of history's theoretical problems⁷².

After his relocation to Kyiv, the Professor of the "St. Volodymyr" University, V. Tsykh preserved his interest to the works of historians. His students recollected that he had no favourite historical events of persons; "he expressed sympathy not to historic figures, but to their historians, whom he valued for writing the history"⁷³. He also managed to utilize his knowledge and lift the level of his lectures to the level of a European professor⁷⁴, understanding the importance of changes in historical science and the role of historiography in his academic lectures⁷⁵.

CONCLUSIONS

Volodymyr Tsykh occupies a respectful and honourable place among the Ukrainian professors and scientists of the first third of the 19th century. He was the first who fruitfully addressed the history and theoretical problems of historical science, leaving a good lasting memory for his teaching and research methods, for his innovative critical approaches to working with sources, and for his justification of many definitions and notions in history and philosophy. The scientific legacy of Tsykh confirms his extraordinary contribution to the development of education and science in the 1830s.

⁶⁸ Юлія Кісельова, *op. cit.*, с. 280.

⁶⁹ В. Ф. Цых, *О способе преподавания истории*, с. 104.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, с. 116.

⁷¹ Юлія Кісельова, *op. cit.*, с. 276–282.

⁷² С. П. Стельмах, *Історична думка в Україні XIX – початку XX ст.*

⁷³ В. Я. Шульгин, *op. cit.*, с. 128.

⁷⁴ С. Л. Геевский *Из автобиографии (1813-1862)*, с. 143.

⁷⁵ Юлія Кісельова, *op. cit.*, с. 281–282.

UKRAINIAN ENCYCLOPAEDIC TRADITION OF THE 20th CENTURY

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Abstract. *The article deals with the history of the most important and iconic (for the Ukrainian national identity) encyclopaedic projects of the 20th century. The author compares the stages of creation of the synthetic editions in the pre-Soviet and Soviet period, analysing the experience of the Ukrainian diaspora in the West preoccupied with this enterprise. A particular attention is paid to the methodological issues, approaches, tools, and methods of organizing, structuring, and integrating the encyclopaedic materials. The use of historical, synthetic, and comparative methods leads to the conclusion that none of the analysed encyclopaedias is ideal, each of them being marked by the pressure of political regime and significant ideological commitment.*

Keywords: *Encyclopaedia, "Taras Shevchenko" Scientific Society, Academy of Sciences, USSR, Ukraine, Soviet Encyclopaedia, Ukrainian Studies*

Rezumat. *Tradiția enciclopediilor ucrainene în secolul XX.* Articolul se referă la istoria celor mai importante și iconice (pentru identitatea națională ucraineană) proiecte enciclopedice din secolul XX. Autorul compară etapele de creare a edițiilor sintetice în perioada pre-sovietică și sovietică, analizând experiența diasporei ucrainene din occident preocupată de această întreprindere. Se acordă o atenție deosebită problemelor de natură metodologică, abordărilor, instrumentelor și metodelor de organizare a materialelor enciclopedice, structurării și integrării acestora. Folosirea metodelor istorico-sinetice și comparative conduce la concluzia potrivit căreia niciuna dintre enciclopediile analizate nu este ideală, fiecare dintre ele fiind marcată de presiunea regimului politic și de semnificativul angajament ideologic.

Résumé : *La tradition des encyclopédies ukrainiennes au XX-ème siècle.* L'article ci-joint fait référence à l'histoire des plus importants et iconiques (pour l'identité nationale ukrainienne) projets encyclopédiques du XX-ème siècle. L'auteur compare les étapes de création des éditions synthétiques de la période pré-soviétique et soviétique, tout en analysant l'expérience de la diaspora ukrainienne de l'Occident, préoccupée par cette entreprise. On y accorde une attention tout à fait particulière aux problèmes de nature méthodologique, aux abords, aux instruments et aux méthodes d'organisation des matériaux

encyclopédiques, à leur structuration et intégration. L'utilisation des méthodes historiques-synthétiques et comparatives mena à la conclusion qu'aucune des encyclopédies qu'on y analysa n'est pas idéale, chacune étant marquée par la pression du régime politique et par le significatif engagement idéologique.

INTRODUCTION

The most authoritative editions, which contain a brief summary of the most important information from all branches of human knowledge, are called encyclopaedias. The National Encyclopaedia is so called a business card of the state, a sum of knowledge about its history, economy, politics, culture, life, population, and the most prominent representatives of its people. At present, there is a permanent need of studying the historical preconditions in Ukraine and a general civilization origin context, development and probable outlooks of the national encyclopaedic tradition. After the collapse of the USSR and the restoration of Ukraine's state independence, the former ideological limits have disappeared, creating the opportunity to reconsider the historical problems, which for a long time were under the title "secretly".

The encyclopaedic tradition of Ukraine is represented by such projects at the beginning of twentieth century (*Ukrainian people in its past and present, Ukrainian General Encyclopaedia, Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopaedia, Encyclopaedia of Ukrainian Studies*), branch editions of the second half of the twentieth century multi-volume edition (*History of the Cities and Villages of the Ukrainian SSR*) and the four-volume edition of the *Soviet Encyclopaedia of the History of Ukraine*. The publication of each era due to the difficult history of Ukrainian lands had its own peculiarities, the nature of content creation, the work of the editorial board, authors, and reviewers.

The appearance of scientific studies according to the development of Ukrainian encyclopaedic projects took place almost synchronously with the release of this or another encyclopaedia. Among the scientific works at the beginning of twentieth century, in which the content analysis of encyclopaedic editions of early modern and modern times is presented, we distinguish articles by Pavlo Stebnitskiy in the scientific and popular Ukrainian magazine "Ukrainian Life"¹. The author highlighted a number of specific features of the first Ukrainian

¹ П. Я. Стебницький, М. М. Ковалевский и украинство: Воспоминания [М. М. Kovalevsky and Ukrainian: Memoirs] in "Українська життя", 1916, № 4-5, с. 65-69.

encyclopaedias, showed the personal contribution of individual scientists in their creation. The appearance of the first works of Ukrainian Soviet historiography according to the encyclopaedic affair in the USSR (in the period 1920–1991) is synchronized with the development of work in the republic on the implementation of the project *Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopaedia* from 1927–1934. The self-reflexion of the editorial team of the Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopaedia was the article by its chairman Isai Falkevych *The Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopaedia (before its publication)* (1930), in which it dealt not about the scientific significance of the publishing project, but about the role of the Communist Party in its creation². During the 1930–1980s, encyclopaedic thematic for a long time disappeared from the field of historiography of the USSR. Only a few references about the Ukrainian encyclopaedic tradition have occurred in the introductory parts of the encyclopaedia of the Soviet era.

Significantly more representative during the second half of the twentieth century was the historiography of Ukrainian emigration. Foreign Ukrainian scholars and historians submitted critical reviews on Ukrainian Soviet encyclopaedic projects, pointing out their ideological engagement, not the objectivity of showing of various topics³.

Since 1991, the former ideological limitations have disappeared, research interest in the issue of Ukrainian encyclopaedic projects has increased considerably.

² І. Фалькевич, *Українська Радянська Енциклопедія (до її видання)* [Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopaedia (before its publication)], Харків: Акційне т-во «Українська Радянська Енциклопедія», 1930, 32 с.

³ М. Антонович, *Рецензія на книгу: Радянська Енциклопедія Історії України. Академії наук УРСР, Том 1 (Абазин – Державець). Київ, 1969, 552 с.* [Review of the book: Soviet Encyclopaedia of History of Ukraine. Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, Volume 1 (Abazin - Holder). Kyiv, 1969, 552 p.], in “Український історик”, Нью-Йорк – Мюнхен, 1970, Ч. 4 (28), с. 105–107; Б. Винар, *Рецензія на книгу: Енциклопедія Народного Господарства Української РСР, том 1: А–Е. Київ, Головна редакція Української Радянської Енциклопедії АН УРСР, 1969, 598 с.* [Review of the book: Encyclopaedia of the National Economy of the Ukrainian SSR, volume 1: AE. Kyiv, The main editorial board of the Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopaedia of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, 1969, 598 p.] in “Український історик”, Нью-Йорк–Мюнхен, 1970, Ч. 4 (28), с. 100–105; М. Ждан, *Рецензія на книгу: Радянська Енциклопедія Історії України. Академія наук УРСР, т. 2 (Державін – Лестригони), К., 1970, 580 с.* [Review of the book: Soviet Encyclopaedia of History of Ukraine. Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, Vol. 2 (Derzhavin–Lestrygony), K., 1970, 580 p.] in “Український історик”, Нью-Йорк–Мюнхен, 1971, Ч. 3–4 (31–32), с. 114–116.

The general historical context in which the encyclopaedic four-volume “Ukrainian people in its past and present” and the encyclopaedic projects of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences at the beginning of 1920's were taking place, as well as the peculiarities of everyday life and communication of the leaders of the Ukrainian intellectual community of the last decade of 19th and the first two decades of the 20th century are found in the monography and articles of Inna Starovoytenko⁴. An attempt to reconstruct the unsuccessful project of preparing the “Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopaedia” 1944–1947 is made in the article by Tamara Demidenko⁵.

In a series of previous articles, we have already presented the peculiarities of creating and content filling of the Encyclopaedia of Ukrainian Studies (1949–1985), “The Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopaedia” of the 1950–1980s, and analysed the content filling of modern encyclopaedic projects that were completed in Ukraine⁶. At the moment, we consider it expedient to submit a general scheme of development of the Ukrainian encyclopaedic tradition, having pointed out the social and political peculiarities of the periods during which certain Ukrainian encyclopaedias took place.

⁴ І. Старовойтенко, *Євген Чикаленко: людина на тлі епохи: Монографія* [Eugene Chykalenko: A man Against the Background of the Age: A Monograph], Київ, 2009, 544 с.; Eadem, “...Це життя було одним суцільним подвигом неустанної праці”: Про Петра Стебницького і його служіння українській справі [“... This life was one continuous pursuit of tireless work”: About Peter Stebnicki and his serving to the Ukrainian cause], Київ, 2009, с. 11–28.

⁵ Т. Демиденко, *Маловідомі сторінки з історії української енциклопедистики: Спроба відродження проекту Української радянської енциклопедії у 1944–1947 рр.* [Little-known pages on the history of Ukrainian encyclopaedistics: An attempt to revive the Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopaedia project in 1944–1947], in “Український історичний збірник”, Київ, Інститут історії України Національної академії наук України, 2009, Випуск 12, с. 215–224.

⁶ С. Борчук, *Українська радянська енциклопедистика: скрипниківська доба (1927–1934 рр.)* [Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopaedistics: The Skripnik Period (1927–1934)], in “Вісник Прикарпатського університету”, Івано-Франківськ, 2010, Випуск 18: Історія, с. 55–60; С. Борчук, “Украинский народ в его прошлом и настоящем” – перший вітчизняний енциклопедичний проект ХХ ст. [“Ukrainian people in its past and present” – the first national encyclopaedic project of the twentieth century.], in “Науковий вісник Чернівецького університету: Історія. Політичні науки. Міжнародні відносини”, 2010, Випуск 514–515, с. 83–86; С. Борчук, «Радянська енциклопедія історії України» – перша історична енциклопедія в УРСР [“Soviet Encyclopaedia of the History of Ukraine” – the first historical encyclopaedia in the Ukrainian SSR], in “Українській історичний журнал”, 2013, № 4, с. 170–192.

The available source base stored in the central and some departmental archives of Ukraine, and the published documents, collections of documents and materials, printed epistolary and memory stories of persons involved in domestic encyclopaedic projects of the 20th century, give an opportunity to highlight the problem we have posed with sufficient completeness and exhaustion.

The purpose of this article is the analysis of the national encyclopaedic tradition in the socio-political, cultural and civilization context of the history of Ukraine of the 20th century on the example of the most important encyclopaedic projects.

PREHISTORY OF UKRAINIAN ENCYCLOPAEDIAS

The idea of creating a reference book, which would contain the information about diverse social and natural phenomena, had appeared on Ukrainian lands in the times of Kievan Rus. *Azbukovniki*⁷, as forms of the interpretative dictionary, for a long time served as an encyclopaedia and eventually were replaced by a larger-scale publication: *Lexicon of Slavenoruski* (1627) Pamvo Berinda. It was in print, as well as in many handwritten copies, it was spread to all East Slavic lands, including in its range and other Orthodox territories, in particular, Walachia and Moldavia⁸. This publication was the source for the following encyclopaedic projects on the territory of Ukraine.

By way of amendment of the universal edition (like the *Lexicon* of Berinda) comes the Ukrainian studies theme which was reflected in *Notes about Little Russia, its inhabitants and works* by J. Markovich in 1798, as well as in the unfinished project *Ukrainian people in their past and present*, between 1909 and 1916⁹. Although they are separated from each other for more than a century, these thematic Ukrainian-language encyclopaedias played an important role in the formation of Ukrainian national consciousness, opening the concept of "Ukraine" to the world and contemporaries.

At the end of the 19th and early 20th centuries Ukrainian scientists from

⁷ Л. С. Ковтун, *Азбуковники XVI–XVII вв. Старшая разновидность* [Hornbooks of the XVI–XVII centuries. The older variety], Ленинград, 1989, 293 с.

⁸ В. Німчук, *Памво Беринда і його "Лексиконъ славеноросскій и именъ Тлъкованіє"* [Pamwo Berynda and his "Slavonic-Russian Lexicon and Explanation of Proper Names"], in *Лексикон словенороський Памви Беринди*, Київ, Вид-во АН УРСР, 1961, с. 5–25.

⁹ В. Сарбей, *Праця Я. Марковича "Записки о Малороссии, ее жителях и произведениях"* [Book by Y. Markovich "Notes on Little Russia, its inhabitants and works"], in "Український історичний журнал", 1999, № 1, с. 56–68; № 2, с. 15–27.

both parts of Ukrainian territory separated by the borders of the Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires, participated in Russian encyclopaedic editions, gaining the experience in the implementation of encyclopaedic projects. Examples of such cooperation were the encyclopaedic dictionaries of Brockhaus and Efron, which were printed on the company of Granat brothers, the *Russian Biographical Dictionary* and others *Encyclopaedic Dictionary*. Brockhaus and Efron actually summed up an entire era in the Ukrainian encyclopaedic history. It was the end of the first modern terminology of the “premodern” encyclopaedias, which were mainly not so much encyclopaedias themselves, but encyclopaedic editions. Famous Ukrainian public and political figures and scholars: I. Franko, A. Krymskii, M. Vasilenko, M. Sumtsov, P. Zhitetskii, and others took part in the work on Ukrainian issues¹⁰.

WORK ON THE FIRST MODERN UKRAINIAN ENCYCLOPAEDIA

The preparatory work on the first Ukrainian modern encyclopaedia began in 1909-1911, in the environment of the Ukrainian diaspora in St. Petersburg and the circle of Russian scientists who were committed to the Ukrainian cause. The language of the future edition (5 volumes) was Russian, but the title – *Ukrainian people in their past and present* – declared its Ukrainian orientation for the project. The publication of the first volume was planned for November 1912. The Ukrainian societies of St. Petersburg had to give the expenses for the publication. The preparatory work for the publication of the first volumes lasted several years and ended with a significant delay only in 1914. The second volume of the encyclopaedia *Ukrainian people in their past and present* was published in 1916. It contained two divisions, devoted to issues of geography and ethnography: the first of these – *Essays on the geography of Ukraine* (S. Rudnitskii) included also essays: *Statistics of the Ukrainian population of the European part of Russia* (Author: O. Rusov), *Galicia, Bukovina* (Author: V. Ohrimovich), *Hungarian Rus'* (Author: S. Tomashivskii). Especially this section, in addition to its concrete geographic information, contained certain data on the demographic situation, the territorial limits of ethnic Ukrainians settlement, the presence and distribution in the regions of national minorities: Poles, Jews, Romanians, Hungarians, etc. The second division of the second volume consisted of two large blocks: a) anthropological and b) ethnographic and linguistic.

¹⁰ О. Пархоменко, *Брокгауза и Ефрона Энциклопедический словарь* [Brockhaus and Efron Encyclopaedic Dictionary], in *Енциклопедія історії України*: В 5 т., Київ, Наук. думка, 2003, Т. 1: А–В, с. 381.

F. Vovk, the author of the anthropological and ethnographic bloc wanted not only to demonstrate the peculiarities of Ukrainians and their differences from the Russians, but also to identify all existing types and peculiarities that in the complex create the imagination about Ukrainians¹¹. According to the linguistic part, its author (O. Shakhmatov) presented the history of the Ukrainian language in accordance with his own scientific theory of the “proto-Russian language” as the basis of the Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian languages¹².

The greatest difficulties were connected with the preparation for the third volume of the *Encyclopaedia*. In accordance with the plans of the initiators of the project, it was supposed to be devoted to economy and management. Due to the popularity of the first volume of the *Encyclopaedia* and the authority of the editor of the future economic volume (M. Tugan-Baranovskii), the project was managed to attract a number of well-known Russian scientists. Although this reduced the “national spirit” of the project, it increased its scientific level.

The delays that began during the work on the third volume soon led to the failure of a promising project. The beginning of the First World War and especially the defeat of the Russian army in 1915 were determined not only by the economic decline of the country, but also by the political repression which affected the authors' staff of the encyclopaedic project. Due to the financial and economic crisis, there were no economic grounds for the profitability of publishing new volumes of *Ukrainian people....* The consequence was the refusal to print the materials that had already been prepared and paid.

The fourth part of this encyclopaedia, which had to be devoted to contemporary Ukrainian culture and public life, came to a similar fate. The preparation of the materials was carried out quite successfully, but the lack of interest of the publishing house in the continuation of cooperation led initially to a delay, and then to refusal from publishing the volume by itself. Thus, despite the considerable work which was done by the organizers, authors and editors of the project *Ukrainian people in its past and present*, the world saw only two of its volumes from the four planned. All the materials that were held in the personal library of M. Slavinsky were lost in 1918 during the civil war in Russia¹³.

¹¹ *Український народ в его прошлом и настоящем* [Ukrainian people in its past and present], Петроград, 1916, с. 427–454.

¹² *Ibid.* с. 681.

¹³ Г. Герасимова, “Український народ в его прошлом и настоящем” [“Ukrainian people in its past and present”], in *Енциклопедія історії України: У 10 т., Київ, 2013, Т. 10: Т–Я*, с. 221.

UKRAINIAN ENCYCLOPAEDIC PROJECTS IN SOVIET UKRAINE DURING THE 1920'S AND 1930'S

The tradition of the encyclopaedic dictionaries, combined with the Ukrainian-language subjects, determined the format and first attempts of Ukrainian editions of encyclopaedic dictionaries initiated by the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences: *The Biographical Dictionary of the People of Ukraine* and the *Encyclopaedic Dictionary*. All these attempts to create a Ukrainian encyclopaedia in one form or another, although they failed in a number of objective reasons (World War I, revolutions, the invasion of the Russian Bolsheviks and their occupation of Ukraine, economic crisis and political pressure), however, had a significant positive effect on the next generation of Ukrainian encyclopaedists. The previous projects not only provided posterity with experience, but also offered material that was used in the preparation of the first national project of Soviet Ukraine, the multi-volume *Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopaedia*.

Unlike all the previous attempts to create in 1927-1934 a proper Ukrainian encyclopaedia, the project of the *Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopaedia* was initiated by the supreme state leadership of the republic, which, in the person of the Chief Editor – M. Skrypnyk, put a lot of significant efforts for its realization. A stable editorial structure was created¹⁴. The *Encyclopaedia* was considered to be one of the most ambitious measures initiated by the Ukrainian Soviet leadership and aimed at achieving several goals: the spread of Ukrainization and the educational level of the population of the USSR; the neutralization of attempts to create a non-Marxist Ukrainian encyclopaedia in the western, Polish part, of Ukraine; to prove in the scientific and intellectual plane the status of Ukraine as the second among equal Soviet republics.

The material support for the publication of the first *Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopaedia* was entrusted to the highest bodies of state power of the republic: The Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic, in general, and the People's Commissariats, in particular. It had to ensure the continuity of funding, but the rejection of the policy of Ukrainization (in most cases only decorative) caused by a change in the course of national policy of the Stalinist leadership of the USSR, crossed out this attempt to create a Ukrainian Soviet encyclopaedic product¹⁵.

¹⁴ С. Борчук, *Українська радянська енциклопедистика: скрипниківська доба (1927–1934 рр.)*, с. 58.

¹⁵ "Бюлетень УРЕ: Орган редакції Української Радянської Енциклопедії: Виходить

The persecution of representatives of the Ukrainian national revival of the 1920s and early 1930s, and first of all, of the spokesman of the Ukrainianization processes (the People's Commissar for Education of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic and the Editor-in-Chief of the *Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopaedia*) directly hit the encyclopaedia that was originally declared as "a refuge for the nationalist elements", and soon and generally the work on it was stopped¹⁶. Most employees were repressed.

The second project of the creation of the *Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopaedia* lasted almost three years: 1944–1947. The fact of the renewal of the work on the preparation of a multi-volume Ukrainian encyclopaedic publication was evidenced by the constant interest of the representatives of Ukrainian science and culture and the highest communist party nomenclature of the republic; the last one continued to consider the *Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopaedia* as a propaganda tool designed to spread the Marxist-Leninist ideology among the population and to present the achievements of Soviet Ukraine in an encyclopaedic format¹⁷. This edition of the *Encyclopaedia* was scheduled to be conducted in 20 volumes with a focus, mainly on the contingent [readers] with secondary education. It is noteworthy that the second project of the *Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopaedia* appeared on the wave of conjuncture and temporary liberalization of the Kremlin's national policy, which was declaratively presented outside as "the expansion of the rights of the Union republics"¹⁸.

This attempt to prepare the *Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopaedia*, like the previous project of 1927–1934, was failed. The reasons for the failure of these projects were similar. Both attempts to create a multi-volume republican encyclopaedia began at the time of a certain liberalization of the national policy of the totalitarian regime and the actualization of the national question, but eventually faced a sharp change in the course of Moscow in the direction of centralization

неперіодично" [Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopaedia bulletin: The editorial board of the Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopaedia: appears irregularly], Харків, 1931, вересень, № 2, 44 ст.

¹⁶ О. Рубльов, *Долі співробітників «Української радянської енциклопедії» на тлі репресивної політики 1930-х років* [The fate of the contributors to the "Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopaedia" against the background of the repressive 1930s] in 3 архівів ВУЧК-ГПУ-НКВД-КГБ, 2000, № 2/4 (13/15), с. 207–251.

¹⁷ *Про видання Української Радянської Енциклопедії: Постанова РНК УРСР і ЦК КП(б)У* [About the publication of the Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopaedia: Resolution of the CPC of the UkrSSR and the Central Committee of the CP(b)U], in "Радянська Україна", 1944, 15 листопада, № 224 (7545), с. 1.

¹⁸ С. Борчук, *op. cit.*, с. 63.

and increased repression.

However, between two unsuccessful attempts to create the *Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopaedia* there were also several differences. So, despite the limited human resources of the apparatus of the editorial board of the *Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopaedia* of 1944–1947, essentially presented only by the academic secretary F. Babenko, the results of his activity deserved respect. The material was processed, card files and dictionaries were prepared, and the most important, all of this was registered and deposited in the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic¹⁹. Subsequently, the accumulated material and the experience of this project greatly contributed to the success of the third attempt to create a *Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopaedia*. Due to the project of 1944–1947 gained the necessary experience and a number of Ukrainian figures, primarily M. P. Bazhan who, in 1957, headed the next edition of the *Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopaedia*.

ENCYCLOPAEDIC PROJECTS OF “TARAS SHEVCHENKO” SCIENTIFIC SOCIETY AND UKRAINIAN EMIGRATION

The desire to create a venerable encyclopaedic project had been inherited in the Galician Ukrainian elite since the nineteenth century. The need for such work, caused not only by the progress of science, but also by the desire to help increase the national consciousness of Ukrainians, was well understood by Ukrainian scientists and politicians on both sides of Zbruch river. And if in Russian Empire attempts to create the Ukrainian encyclopaedia were very often (the most successful project was *Ukrainian people in their past and present*), but Western Ukrainian scientists were forced to confine themselves of publishing only highly specialized Ukrainian studying collections and to write articles in foreign encyclopaedias, especially Russian or Polish.

By the idea of publishing their own Ukrainian encyclopaedia, Galician scholars returned after the restoration of the work of “Taras Shevchenko” Scientific Society, in the early 1920's. In his article *What will be our first encyclopaedia?*, published at February 4, 1930, in Lviv, in the magazine “Dilo” I. Rakowskiy figured out the concept of the publication²⁰. He stated on “general” character of *Encyclopaedia*: “According to its volume our book will contain the most important data

¹⁹ Центральний державний архів вищих органів влади та управління України [Central State Archives of Supreme Bodies of Power and Government of Ukraine; hereinafter: ЦДАВО України], ф. 4750, оп.1, спр.10, 25 арк.

²⁰ І. Раковський, *Яка буде наша перша енциклопедія?: 1. Потреба і засоби* “Книги

from all fields of human knowledge with a special place for Ukrainian study and needs of our educated public”²¹.

In April 1930 came the *Ukrainian General encyclopaedia* (UGE) first model. Simultaneously, the Editorial Board of the UGE emphasized that the publication was not supposed to be processing or compilation, but self-employment, in which the emphasis was made on the life of Ukrainian people²². Work on the publication of the encyclopaedia (in three volumes) lasted for five years. During this time, not only material was prepared, but also all subscribers received their copies of UGE. The last one was the most important factor, because the lack of external financing (“Taras Shevchenko” Scientific Society could not fully finance the project) needed quick incomes from readers.

Financial problems affected the activity of employees of the Editorial Board. At the beginning of the project, its members Ivan Rakowski, Volodymyr Doroshenko, Mykhailo Rudnytsky, Vasil Simovich and the permanent secretary Ivan Bedrylo worked fairly smoothly, but then friction between them began. Financial problems have repeatedly threatened the project, but thanks to the spirit of initiative of the Editor-in-chief of I. Rakowski, the publication of *Ukrainian General Encyclopaedia* got the completeness. The newly created encyclopaedia inherited the most famous contemporary European counterparts in structural way. Despite the small total, it included almost 34 thousand of articles and over 136 authors worked at them. Some of them represented the Ukrainian political emigration in Europe (Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, etc.)²³.

To the better fulfilment of its function was informing the greatest circle of readers about UGE, which was structurally divided into thematic sections on which different scientists worked: Anthropology; Archaeology; Astronomy; Life Sciences; Veterinary medicine; Military affairs; Geography; Geology; Economy; Ethnology; History (World History, Cultural history, the History of Ukraine, Ukrainian liberation struggle history, the History of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, the History

знання” [What will be our first Encyclopaedia?: 1. The need for and means “Book of Knowledge”], in “Діло”, 1930, 4 лютого, с. 3.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² Редакційна колегія Української загальної енциклопедії. *Вступне слово* [Editorial Board of the Ukrainian General Encyclopaedia. Introduction], in Українська Загальна Енциклопедія: Книга знання: В 3 томах, Львів – Stanisławów – Коломия, 1930, Том 1: А – Ж, с.1-2.

²³ *Співробітники загальної частини УЗЕ та гасла “Україна”* [Contributors of the general part of Ukrainian General Encyclopaedia and the slogan “Ukraine”], Львів; Stanisławów; Коломия, 1935, Т. 3, с. 1423–1426.

of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church); Cooperation; Literature; Math; Medicine; Art; Mineralogy; Linguistics; Music; Pedagogy; Law; Psychology; Religion; Physical training and Sport ("Training and Competition"); Agriculture; Social sciences; East study; Theatre; Technical studies; Physics and Chemistry; Philosophy. The purpose of encyclopaedia moderators was also to submit detailed information about Ukraine and Ukrainian people. This information of UGE was contained in both in alphabetic form of articles and in a particular part *Ukraine*, which was full of detailed monographs viewing of known domestic scientists. Its editor was Vasil Simovich. Only in the preparation of the first volume of *Ukrainian General Encyclopaedia* took part 76 authors of articles. Unfortunately, authorship under the dictionary slogans was not mentioned, because with few exceptions, we can only speculate, and taking into consideration the specialization of scientific experts.

Despite some flaws, the *Ukrainian General Encyclopaedia* was a huge success of Ukrainian science. The project of UGE was informative; it covered almost all the major known facts at the time and academic attainment. Section *Ukraine* in the third volume not only showed "unity" of its author's part, but also incorporates the latest (at that time) Ukrainian achievements. Moreover, the *Encyclopaedia* became a "work of art", supplemented by many maps (some of them, including maps of I. Krypyakevych are unique), drawings, photographs, reproductions and more. For a long time, the series of illustrations from the *Ukrainian General Encyclopaedia* represented the only source for learning Ukrainian uniforms and Ukrainian money in the period of Liberation competitions (1917–1921).

The completion of the edition of the *Ukrainian General Encyclopaedia* in 1935 did not end with an interest in the field of Ukrainian studies. The passing of Western Ukrainian territories under the jurisdiction of the Soviet Union negatively affected the fate of "Taras Shevchenko" Scientific Society (TSSS) and its scientists. Much of the Western Ukrainian scholars, including TSSS, who wanted to pursue independent research, moved to a territory controlled by the German administration, the so-called General Governorate. V. Kubyovych was able to agree with Governor-General G. Franko on the opening of "Taras Shevchenko" Scientific Institute in Krakow with the subsequent move to Lviv (this plan was never implemented because of the resistance of Berlin)²⁴. The editor-in-chief of the *Ukrainian General Encyclopaedia* prof. I. Rakowskii (who, together with Yevgeny-Julius Pelensky, director of the Ukrainian publishing house in Krakow), initiated the preparation of a new five-volume *Encyclopaedia of Ukrainian Studies*. The collection of material for printing began, and many Ukrainian scholars who

²⁴ ЦДАВО України, ф. 3864, оп. 1, спр. 47, 183 арк.

were in the German occupation zone were connected to the work²⁵.

The editors of *Encyclopaedia of Ukrainian Studies* (EUS) managed to collect the material for the first volume of EUS rather quickly, but later, the work was slowed down, again because of political reasons. The relations of Ukrainian scientists with the Nazi administration have not been “dark” for a long time. Despite all the previous promises, the German authorities were not in hurry to provide the necessary funds, and to complete such a large-scale project alone, in the period of war, it was impossible. Frustrated by failures and ill, prof. I. Rakowskii soon departed from the cases, in fact handing them to young and active V. Kubyovych²⁶. The collected materials were preserved and eventually exported from Ukraine to emigration, where a project of *Encyclopaedia of Ukrainian Studies* was soon implemented.

A practical step towards the creation of the *Encyclopaedia of Ukrainian Studies* was the establishment in September 1947 of a separate structural unit of the “T. Shevchenko” Scientific Society – the Institute of Encyclopaedia, headed by Zenon Kuzel, simultaneously appointed as the chief editor of the project²⁷. This project of three volumes of the general part (1949-1952), which is conditionally called *Encyclopaedia of Ukrainian Studies – 1*, and 10 volumes of the vocabulary part (1955-1989) – *Encyclopaedia of Ukrainian Studies – 2*, which contains more than 20000 articles, about 1600 printed sheets²⁸.

Practical work on the *Encyclopaedia of Ukrainian Studies – 1* began already in the spring of 1948. The two editors – Professor V. Kubyovych and Professor Z. Kuzel – led the work on the project. The main burden relied on V. Kubyovych, who was the compiler of programs, the organizer of the editorial board, the bureau, the team of authors. He also predominantly carried out the initial processing of material that came from the authors. Work on the project «*Encyclopaedia of Ukrainian Studies-1*» lasted until 1952 and ended with the release of the three-volume Ukrainian-language publication. The promptness of preparation and publication was explained by the concentration of most highly-qualified Ukrainian scientists of that time in Munich²⁹.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ В. Кубійович, *Наукове товариство ім. Шевченка у 1939–1952 рр.* [Scientific Society named after Shevchenko in 1939-1952], in “Український історик”, Нью-Йорк – Мюнхен, 1973, Ч. 1-2 (37–38), с. 8–42.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ В. А. Старков, “*Енциклопедія українознавства*” [Encyclopaedia of Ukrainian Studies] in *Енциклопедія історії України*: В 5 т., Київ, 2005, Т. 3, с. 40.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

The work on the *Encyclopaedia of Ukrainian Studies-2* began immediately after the completion of the general part of the *Encyclopaedia* of 1952. An important factor which helped in the early start-up was the presence of already formed editorial staff that quickly switched to another area of activity. A difficult loss for the Editorial Board was the death in May 1952 of one of the two Chief Editors Z. Kuzeli. Since then, all management, organizational and editorial work has concentrated in the hands of V. Kubyovych. He was also the editor of the whole vocabulary section of the project. There were also some changes in the staff of the editorial team³⁰. In comparison with the *Encyclopaedia of Ukrainian Studies-1*, the staff of authors and reviewers who worked on the encyclopaedia sections has considerably increased. In addition to experienced staff, known for their scientific achievements and proven work on the first part of the project, younger employees were involved. A large number of specialists who were involved in the *Encyclopaedia of Ukrainian Studies-2* project is explained by many factors. First and foremost, they should mention the much larger amount of knowledge that the vocabulary of the encyclopaedia had to cover.

The emphasising of attention on the national values and peculiarities, in contrast to the class principle and the Marxist-Leninist focusing of the Soviet encyclopaedic, was making Western Ukrainian projects acceptable to the reader and technologically easier for the compilers, since the latter had to check only the objectivity and authenticity of information provided by the authors, and not its conformity/non-conformity with certain dominant ideological canons and changing ideological conjuncture.

The work on the English-language (essentially cut) version of the general part of the *Encyclopaedia of Ukrainian Studies* began in 1952 and was, according to the compilers, in the qualitative translation of the corresponding encyclopaedic texts in English, with some clarifications. However, it soon became clear that the correction of inaccuracies and updating information would not be enough. There was also a lack of skilled personnel who would fluently speak both languages and were specialists in a certain field of Ukrainian studies. Therefore, the work on the English version of the *Encyclopaedia of Ukrainian Studies* soon stopped and restored only after ten years³¹.

³⁰ А. Жуковський, *Енциклопедія українознавства* [Encyclopaedia of Ukrainian Studies], in М. Г. Железняк (голов. ред.), *Енциклопедичний вісник України: Збірник наукових праць*, НАН України. Інститут енциклопедичних досліджень, Київ, 2009, Ч. 1, С. 14–22.

³¹ *Ibid.*

Only in 1963 appeared the first volume of the *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopaedia*, and in 1970 – the second. However, the time spent on preparing this project was not wasted. *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopaedia* has become not an ordinary translation of the *Encyclopaedia of Ukrainian Studies* – 1, but its full-fledged second edition, supplemented and corrected, proven statement to the newest times. *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopaedia* has 2579 pages. (bigger font than *Encyclopaedia of Ukrainian Studies* – 1), including 219 pages of the index missing in the Ukrainian version. Significantly more cards and illustrations were also made. Thus, English *Encyclopaedia of Ukrainian Studies* by V. Kubiyovych can be considered a full-fledged scholarly project that enabled the English-speaking population to familiarize themselves with Ukrainian culture, history, ethnography, and also allowed to preserve and convey this knowledge and besides to demise it to the younger generations of the Ukrainian diaspora, who have largely lost their parental language.

The preparation of the translation and its publication by the Publishing House of the University of Toronto in two large volumes *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopaedia* (1963, 1970) was funded by the Ukrainian People's Union in the United States³².

In Ukraine, in the first years of independence, reprinting *Encyclopaedia of Ukrainian Studies* was made at once in two publishing houses – in Lviv and in the Kyiv publishing house “Globus”. In 1984–1993 the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Alberta Faculty of Arts with the help of the Canadian Foundation of Ukrainian Studies and the “Taras Shevchenko” Scientific Society in Europe prepared the English version of encyclopaedia which was published by the University of Toronto Press. It consists of five volumes, almost 4000 pages and some 12500 alphabetical entries³³.

Having considered the main encyclopaedic projects realized by Ukrainian scientists outside the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic during the 1930s-1980s, it should be noted the effectiveness of the work on the creation of encyclopaedias, which belong to the main scientific institution of Galicia, and later on the domestic emigration – “Taras Shevchenko” Scientific Society, which provided editorial boards with highly qualified specialists and a sufficient scientific basis for the creation of two full-fledged publications: the *Ukrainian General Encyclopaedia*

³² *Ibid.*

³³ О. Романів, *Довгий тернистий шлях українства до самопізнання* [The long thorny path of Ukrainian language to self-knowledge], in *Енциклопедія Українознавства*, Львів, 1993, с. 19.

coordinated by I. Rakowskii (1930–1935), and the *Encyclopaedia of Ukrainian Studies* structured by V. Kubyovych (1947–1985).

An important feature of both encyclopaedic projects was the Ukrainian orientation, which distinguished them qualitatively from those carried out in the USSR. The emphasis on the national values and peculiarities, in contrast to the class principle of Soviet encyclopaedias, made foreign (according to the USSR) projects more adequate to the challenges of time and less vulnerable in terms of politico-ideological conjuncture.

UKRAINIAN SOVIET ENCYCLOPAEDIA (1957–1965)

The publication of the general part of the *Encyclopaedia of Ukrainian Studies* and the issue of the first volumes of its vocabulary part became a powerful impulse for the development in the USSR of work on its own encyclopaedic project: the *Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopaedia*. This process was also facilitated by changes in the political life of society could not but affect the level of Ukrainian soviet science. The weakening of ideological pressure and the gradual departure from Stalinist methods of management gave impetus to the further development of national science, the centre of which, as in previous years, remained the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.

On February 3, 1956, the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine adopted a decision to resume the publication of the *Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopaedia*, but the immediate work started later. The start of the work of encyclopaedists was hampered by the internal political struggle in the USSR and by a number of other bureaucratic obstacles. In general, to work on the encyclopaedia was involved “thousands of detachments of scientists, the general public of the republic”³⁴. The basis of the author's collective – which at the time of the publication of the first volume of the *Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopaedia* numbered more than a thousand people, and at the time of the completion of the publication more than five thousand people – were scientific workers of the Academy of Sciences of USSR, the professors and lecturers of higher educational establishments of the republic, and domestic writers³⁵.

At the end of 1958, the necessary foundation was created as the basis for practical work on the publication of the first volumes of the *Encyclopaedia*. Later, for almost eight years, the editorial and author's staff, headed by M. P. Bazhan,

³⁴ ЦДАВО України, ф. 166, оп. 9, спр. 16, 93 арк.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

needed to complete such a large-scale project, which became the *Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopaedia*. The main edition of the *Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopaedia* from the third attempt made that failed its predecessors 1927-1934 and 1944-1947. The release in 1965 with the issue of the last, unplanned the seventeenth-volume *Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopaedia* marked the successful completion of a large-scale project. Since then, the Ukrainians have become formally equal with other civilized people who managed to structure and present in their encyclopaedias not only their own achievements throughout history, but also the results of the development of human civilization in general. Undoubtedly, *Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopaedia* was not deprived of numerous shortcomings caused by its ideological focusing and attachment to the Soviet political situation. But the presence of shortcomings does not diminish the significance of this work, which has become a forerunner of the future Ukrainian encyclopaedic movement.

Despite the domination of the classical approach in the Soviet encyclopaedias of the USSR, their basic material, terminological dictionaries and numerous facts became useful when preparing a new generation of encyclopaedias in the conditions of the revived state independence of Ukraine. During the unfavourable conditions of the first half of the 1990s, the domestic encyclopaedic industry managed not only to survive, but also to complete a series of projects begun in the Soviet era. In addition, in spite of the financial crisis, it was possible to save most of the material base that Ukrainian encyclopaedists used in Soviet times, and which is now concentrated primarily in the *Ukrainian Encyclopaedia* "named after M. Bazhan". And the preservation and development of the material base is, as is known, one of the most important steps towards the revival of capacities and the further development of the entire industry, which today has the potential to develop with the joint efforts of the scientists of the "mainland" Ukraine and their colleagues from the diaspora and foreign Ukrainian scientists. An example of such cooperation can be the ten-volume *Encyclopaedia of History of Ukraine* (the project of the Institute of History of Ukraine of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine) and the multi-volume *Encyclopaedia of Contemporary Ukraine* (an ongoing project)³⁶.

³⁶ Від редакційної колегії Енциклопедії історії України [From the editorial board of the Encyclopaedia of History of Ukraine], <http://resource.history.org.ua/cgi-bin/eiu/history.exe?C21COM=F&I21DBN=EIU&P21DBN=EIU>

CONCLUSIONS

There is not only a steady interest in various editions of the encyclopaedic format in the modern Ukrainian state, but also the permanent need for theoretical substantiation of the bases of the preparation of the newest encyclopaedic editions. On the basis of the teaching of encyclopaedic projects of the XX-th century we can state that none of the encyclopaedias created in the past is perfect. At all stages of the development of “domestic encyclopaedias”, the pressure of the political regime and the ideological factors were significant. If the influence of the state and the system of Soviet censorship on the content of encyclopaedic articles in the USSR as a whole is an obvious fact, then the issue of diaspora encyclopaedias should also be important. The encyclopaedic projects of Ukrainian diaspora, although they had a great heuristic potential, still have a lack of hypertrophied anti-Soviet orientation; the authors of articles and editors, despite all the attempts, did not ensure the objectivity and impartiality of the material. At the same time, all encyclopaedic projects, the experience of their preparation can become educational and in modern conditions. In particular, in the focus of future research, it is necessary to study in more detail the organization of the work of major editorial boards, departments, author's collectives, relations with customers, state bodies, etc.

CULTURAL MEGA-EVENTS AS AN INTERNATIONAL, CULTURAL, AND POLITICAL TOOL

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Abstract: *This article is an attempt to offer a conceptual understanding of various kinds of mega-events and to determine their significance as an instrument of the official international cultural policy. The article examines scientific approaches to understanding and classification of mega-events. The case studies focus on such mega-events as international cross-cultural years and cultural forums. The fact that the official foreign policy often defines and shapes the goals of mega-events proves their value in establishing and promoting a positive international image of the country. Recent Russian experience in organizing cross-cultural years is examined to discuss positive and negative socio-cultural impact.*

Keywords: *Mega-event, international cultural politics, international exchange, cultural relations, political tool, image of the country*

Rezumat: *Mega-evenimentele culturale ca instrument internațional, cultural și politic. Acest articol este o încercare de a oferi o înțelegere conceptuală a diferitelor tipuri de mega-evenimente și de a determina semnificația lor ca instrument al politicii culturale internaționale oficiale. Articolul examinează abordările științifice privind înțelegerea și clasificarea mega-evenimentelor. Studiile de caz se concentrează pe astfel de mega-evenimente precum anii interculturali internaționali și forumurile culturale. Faptul că, adesea, politica externă oficială definește și modelează scopurile mega-evenimentelor demonstrează valoarea acestora în stabilirea și promovarea unei imagini internaționale pozitive a țării. Experiența recentă a Rusiei în organizarea anilor interculturali este examinată pentru a discuta impactul socio-cultural pozitiv și negativ a unor asemenea evenimente.*

Résumé : Les méga-événements culturels comme instrument international, culturel et politique. L'article ci-joint représente un essai d'offrir une compréhension conceptuelle des différents types de méga-événements et de déterminer leur signification comme instrument de la politique culturelle internationale officielle. L'article examine les abords scientifiques concernant la compréhension et la classification des méga-événements. Les études de cas se concentrent sur des méga-événements semblables, tels les années interculturelles internationales et les forums culturels. Le fait que, souvent, la politique externe officielle définit et modèle les buts des méga-événements démontre leur valeur dans l'établissement et la promotion d'une image internationale positive du pays. L'expérience récente de la Russie dans l'organisation des années interculturels est examinée pour discuter l'impact socio-culturel positif et négatif des événements semblables.

INTRODUCTION

An increased interest of researchers to large-scale events with a great number of participants and huge publicity is a recent trend of cultural studies that define such events as “mega-events.” Even a simple statistic points to a growing popularity of mega-events. During 2000-2008, there were 47 world mega-events: 33 sports events, 7 business and 7 cultural mega-events. 25 out of 47 mentioned mega-events had positive impact for a host: 79% countries experienced export growth, 77% – import growth, 55% – attracted more investments, 64% – increased a number of Internet users, 56% – increased a number of mobile service users, and majority of counties saw a drop in the unemployment rate.

Successful mega-events increase the attractiveness of the host country as they serve as both an advertising and publicity tool and attract public attention on domestic and global levels. The mega-event creates an opportunity for a host country to show its achievements, to make important political and cultural statements, to promote its image on international arena, and to engage and attract partners and investors.

Even though the image of a country is rather an intangible asset, it has a certain monetary value because it can secure a desirable economic effect in the form of investments and influx of tourists as well as strong international reputation of the country. The mega-event creates favorable conditions for cultural influence of the country and promotes its products to the world markets. These are only a few reasons why countries and cities fiercely compete for the right to host a mega-event.

Despite existing literature on mega-events, there is still a gap in its conceptual understanding as an international cultural phenomenon. The complicated

dynamics between mega-events and media as well as the whole range of the negative and positive effects have yet to be determined and classified. At present, even defining the mega-event is under discussion, let alone the set of exact dimensions or classification.

The main research method applied in the article is an institutional analysis with some tools borrowed from event analysis, comparative analysis, case studies and cross-case analysis of mega-events. The hypothesis suggests that the cultural mega-events perform a significant function in official foreign cultural politics because they have direct impact on the country's image and reputation. A brief contrastive analysis of the events and some official foreign policy documents in the paper proves the hypothesis.

MEGA-EVENTS IN SCIENTIFIC DISCOURSE

A Sociology Professor of the Sheffield University Morris Roche^{1,2} offers a widely used definition of mega-events. He describes them as “parades” and “shows”, “large-scale cultural (including commercial and sporting) events which have a dramatic character, mass popular appeal and international significance.” Another fitting definition is offered by a Sociology Professor of the University of Northern Colorado George Sage³, who characterizes mega-events as global events in the sphere of politics, economy, culture and sport, which act as an integral part of globalization.

Mega-events can be examined from different perspectives with variety of methodological tools. In the context of marketing, Professor of the Tartu University Andrei Makarychev⁴ introduces the term “global mega-event” and explains it as an island of “globalization” processes, a product of expanding international market for promotion of regional and city brands”. Professor of the Kazan Federal University A. V. Yatsyk⁵ studies mega-events in the context of neoliberal theory as an element

¹ M. Roche, *Mega-Events and Modernity: Olympics and Expos in the Growth of Global Culture*, London, Routledge, 2000.

² Idem, *Mega-events and modernity revisited: globalization and the case of Olympics. Sports Mega-Events: Social Scientific Analyses of a Global Phenomenon*, Oxford, Blackwell, 2006.

³ G. H. Sage, *Globalizing Sport. How Organizations, Corporations, Media, and Politics are Changing Sports*, Boulder, London, Paradigm Publishers, 2010.

⁴ A. Makarychev, *The Politics of Sports Mega-Events in Russia: Kazan, Sochi, and Beyond*, in “PONARS: New approaches to Research and Security in Eurasia”, 2013, no. 9, p. 1-6.

⁵ A. В. Яцик, *Спортивные мегасобытия и популярная культура: глобальное и локальное в ландшафтах Универсиады 2013 в Казани* [Sport mega-events and popular

of global culture and public diplomacy. He defines it as “a part of national narrative in the nation-building process that contains cultural and geopolitical meaningful messages about the host country or city”. Yet another approach is cultivated by Harry Hiller⁶, a Sociology Professor of the Calgary University in Canada. He is interested in mega-events and studies to what extent the event was a success and what its failures were. He focuses on the output side of mega-events.

A commonly agreed-on definition belongs to Martin Müller⁷, a Senior Research Fellow at the School of Geography, Earth and Environmental Science of the University of Birmingham. His definition lists the following qualifiers for mega-event: “Mega-events are one-time occasions of a fixed duration that attract a large number of visitors and have worldwide reach. They come with significant costs and long-term impacts on the built environment and the population of the host countries or cities.” Basically, he offers four constitutive dimensions of mega-events: visitor attractiveness, media scope, costs, and transformative impact.

To develop existing terminology⁶, M. Müller⁷ has introduced a category of “giga-event” for mega-events with maximum indicators at least in three above-mentioned dimensions. He lists the following as mega-events: 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing, 2012 Olympic Games in London, and 2014 Football World Cup in Brazil⁸.

The literature review on mega-events suggests that there is still a place for discussions on the unified approach to the definition and dimensions. Most researchers agree that publicity and scale are the most important characteristics of mega-events. As the rest remains fluid, the question of definition remains open. What criteria qualify an event as a mega-event? In our opinion, the major criteria

culture: global and local in the landscapes of the Universiade 2013 in Kazan], Москва, Новое литературное обозрение, 2015.

⁶ H. Hiller, *Toward an urban sociology of mega-events*, in “Research in Urban Sociology”, 2000, no. 5, p. 182-183; L. K. Jago, R. N. Shaw, *Special events: A conceptual and definitional framework*, in “Festival Management and Event Tourism”, 1998, Vol. 5, no. 1-2, p. 21-32; B. M. Mills, M. S. Rosentraub, *Hosting mega-events: a guide to the evaluation of development effects in integrated metropolitan regions*, in “Tourism Management”, 2013, no. 34, p. 238-246. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tourman.2012.03.011> (Accessed on 02.08.2017).

⁷ M. Müller, *What makes an event a mega-event? Definitions and sizes*, in “Leisure Studies”, 2015, Vol. 34, no. 6, p. 627-642.

⁸ В. В. Пасынкова, *Олимпийские игры в процессе глобальной спортизации: сравнительный анализ мега-событий* [Olympic Games in the global sportization process: a comparative analysis of mega-events], in “Журнал социологии и социальной антропологии”, 2013, Том 16, вып. 5, с. 56.

are its global significance and scale that can be measured by number of involved participants, spectators and organizers, by political and economic impact, by growth of domestic and international tourism, by mediated reach and coverage, by cost, investments, budgets for construction and infrastructure projects. Other criteria can reflect its scope and level, long-term impact, economic profitability and media popularity. One more criteria should measure impact on political, cultural, social, and economic areas of a host and improvements of its international standing with other acting partners.

Thus, any mega-event has two levels: internal dimensions (duration and scale that depend on the number of participants and complexity of event organization) and external ones (media, tourist attractiveness, the impact on the development of the host).



Picture 1. The plenary session of the 21st St. Petersburg International Economic Forum on June 2, 2017 (Russia, St. Petersburg).

Source: <http://forumspb.tassphoto.com/album/814##photo%2F12538>

As mega-events vary in nature, it is common to distinguish political, economic, business, sports, and cultural types of mega-events. Summits G8, G20, BRICS are exemplary political mega-events. Petersburg's Economic Forum, and forums of Shanghai Cooperation Organization Economic Forum and Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation are examples of economic mega-events. Among sports mega-

events one can list the Olympic Games, World and Europe Football Championship, Universiades, Formula 1, Asian Games, Francophone Games, and other world and regional sports games⁹.

As the environmental situation in the world worsens, the attention to the mega-events with ecological agenda grows, for example, to international climate conference in Paris (December, 2014) or so-called “Tiger’s Summit” in Petersburg (2010). The examples of scientific mega-events are the Nobel Prize Award Ceremony and Fields Medal Award Ceremony.



Picture 2. Famous American actor Leonardo DiCaprio was a participant of “Tiger’s Summit” in Petersburg (2010).

Source: <http://www.tigerforum2010.ru/results/gallery/>

In the classification of mega-events, cultural mega-events hold a special place for their high value and positive impact for society and culture in general. A

⁹ М. Товкайло, *Олимпиада-2014 и Чемпионат мира по футболу 2018 г. вряд ли окупят* [Olympics-2014 and the 2018 FIFA World Cup are unlikely to pay off], “Ведомости”, 2011, Вып. 2961 (Октябрь 17), с. 4; Т. Absalyamov, *The Influence of Cultural and Sport Mega-events on Sustainable Development of the City*, in “Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences”, 2015, no. 188, p. 197-201; W. Jennings, *Olympic Risks*, Basingstoke and New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.

significant number of research papers on cultural mega-events is focused on a project "The European Capital of Culture"¹⁰. All above-mentioned scientists assign important social and economic significance to cultural mega-events. For example, focused on experience of Guimarães as European Capital of Culture in 2012, Portuguese scientists José de Freitas Santos, Laurentina Vareiro, Paula Remoaldo & José Cadima Ribeiro¹¹ points out to the consistent long-term positive effect of cultural mega-events. Having examined the sports mega-events in Kazan, we can also make a conclusion that business mega-events have only limited impact on socio-economic development of the region compared to sports, cultural and entertainment international events. A recognized authority in the field of mega-event studies, Liverpool University professor Beatrice Garcia and her colleagues¹² describe mega-events as a driving force of cultural economy and production.

CULTURAL MEGA-EVENTS AS AN INTERNATIONAL MEGA-PROJECT

Unlike other mega-events, the cultural mega-events are able to produce a strong emotional appeal. Floris Langen and Beatriz Garcia¹³ characterize cultural mega-events as large-scale cultural festivals with established tradition and solid reputation built over years. Their list of cultural mega-events include international exhibitions (e.g. Manifesta, the European Biennial of Contemporary Art), book fairs (e.g. Paris Book Fair), big international festivals and contests like Cannes, Venice, Berlin Film Festivals, the International Tchaikovsky Competition, Verona Opera Festival, the Oscars and etc. Even though in their studies of mega-events researchers turn to many projects like "European capital of Culture", international EXPOs, Eurovision, MTV Europe Music Awards, they tend to overlook a certain type of mega-events.

¹⁰ J. D. F. Santos, L. Vareiro, P. Remoaldo, J. C. Ribeiro, *Cultural mega-events and the enhancement of a city's image: differences between engaged participants and attendees*, in "Journal of Policy Research in Tourism, Leisure and Events", 2017, Vol. 9, no. 2, p. 129-151, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19407963.2016.1157598> (Accessed on 29.07.2017).

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² N. A. Bergsgard, K. Josendal, B. Garcia, *A cultural mega event's impact on innovative capabilities in art production: the results of Stavanger being the European capital of culture in 2008*, in "International Journal of Innovation and Regional Development", 2010, Vol. 2, no. 4, p. 353-371 <https://doi.org/10.1504/IJIRD.2010.03699> (Accessed on 27.07.2017).

¹³ F. Langen, B. Garcia, *Measuring the Impacts of Large Scale Cultural Events: A Literature Review*, Liverpool, University of Liverpool, 2009.



Picture 3. Pavilion “Nur Alem” at the Expo-2017 (Astana, Kazakhstan)

Source: <https://expo2017astana.com/>

Cultural mega-events differ from other mega-events by their goals, formats, designs, budgets and impact¹⁴. They also vary by genres of classical and modern cultures: music, theatre, arts, dance, literature, cuisine, film, fashion, design, photography and many others¹⁵. From this perspective, mega-events are usually multi-genre cultural festivals and often unfold as a chain of small-scale cultural events during a few days or several years. Moreover, a cultural mega-event can include educational, technological, scientific, industry and economic events. The formats for cultural events are also multiple: tours, concerts, presentations, exhibitions, film screening, conference, seminars, joint theatre and music performances, workshops, book fairs, all kinds of meetings and discussions.

The XXI century witnessed a significant increase in a number and variety of cultural mega-events. What kind of impact do they have? Majority of researchers

¹⁴ J. R. B. Ritchie, D. Beliveau, *Hallmark Events: An evaluation of a strategic response to seasonality in the travel market*, in “Journal of Travel Research”, 1974, Vol. 13, no. 2, p. 14-20.

¹⁵ V. Fokin, S. Shirin, J. Nikolaeva, N. Bogoliubova, E. Eltc, V. Baryshnikov, *Interaction of Cultures and Diplomacy of States*, in “Kasetsart Journal of Social Sciences”, 2017, Vol. 38, no. 1, p. 45-49. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.kjss.2016.05.001> (Accessed on 29.07.2017).

agree that the most important economic impact of cultural event consists of attracting tourists and generating interest from investors. For host countries, regions and cities, a cultural mega-event creates an opportunity for better self-presentation, stronger competitiveness, more popularity and better recognition. Cultural mega-events can be used as a symbolic message to other countries about national achievements, cultural heritage, natural resources and other unique features of the host country. In this way, cultural mega-events give a competitive advantage for a host country by improving its image¹⁶.

It is hard to overemphasize the significance of cultural events as a “soft” instrument of diplomacy. It is often used as a means to strengthen cultural relations and encourage exchanges because it helps to generate attention, positive attitude and interest of a general audience. At the same time, cultural events are used as a PR tool to underline the attractiveness and uniqueness of the country. Wide media coverage offers a convenient way to promote a host country in the world. Despite the obvious positive impact of cultural mega-events, some critics express an opinion that they are beneficent and useful only for developed rather than developing countries.

Unfortunately, mega-events have also negative sides. Mega-events could lead to an overpromising of benefits and an underestimation of costs, the unequal appropriation of resources, the violation of a citizen's rights and the rewriting of urban development priorities to serve the demands of the event. Such events represent an abrupt intervention from outside into host societies, a self-induced shock that reorders economic, political and social relations in a short period of time – often for the benefit of a select few¹⁷.

However, two points must immediately be made. Firstly, and quite evidently, events are not always promoted or staged for the economic benefits that they might generate, and nor can their negative consequences be measured simply in economic terms. Indeed, events may often be staged at an economic ‘loss’ when, for example, their costs are covered not by income from participants but by sponsorship or local government funding. In such cases, the desired benefits of the event might be overtly socio-cultural: strengthening community identity and pride, developing social capital, increasing local participation in community activities, revitalizing local culture, traditions, and so on. Equally,

¹⁶ V. Fokin, V. Baryshnikov, N. Bogoliubova, J. Nikolaeva, I. Ivannikov, M. Portnyagina, N. Ryazantseva, E. Eltc, I. Chernov, *Multiculturalism in the Modern World*, in “International Journal of Environmental and Science Education”, 2016, Vol. 11, no.18, p. 10777-10787.

¹⁷ M. Müller, *How mega-events capture their hosts: event seizure and the World Cup 2018 in Russia*, in “Urban Geography”, 2015, Vol. 38, no. 8, p. 1113-1132. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02723638.2015.1109951> (Accessed on 20.12.2017).

events may be staged for political purposes. Frequently, the hosting of international mega-events may be driven by the pursuit of international prestige or legitimacy whilst other events may seek to highlight specific political issues or causes (as an example "Live Aid" and "Live 8" concerts). Reference should also be made, of course, to the physical or environmental impacts, both positive and negative, of events. As discussed in the next chapter, not only may events provide an environmental benefit (for example, improved infrastructure), but also there is a pressing need to manage the environmental impacts of events within a sustainability framework¹⁸.

Secondly, the impacts of events are neither discrete nor necessarily hierarchical. That is, all events have a variety of impacts, both positive and negative, some being more immediately evident others, some being of potentially greater significance than the intended outcomes. For example, the sense of national pride engendered by the South Korean national team's success at the 2002 FIFA World Cup hosted by that country far outweighed the event's economic returns. Similarly, the annual London Marathon has a major economic impact in terms of the money that participants raise for charity whilst, for the runners themselves, taking part in (and, hopefully, completing) the marathon not only provides a sense of achievement but also is linked to social identity formation¹⁹.

It is also important to notice, that a poorly organized mega-event can become a reason of discontent in local population and have many negative effects like damage to image. For example, for residents of St. Petersburg, and first of all, the Vasiievsky Island, the holding of the International Economic Forum creates certain inconveniences: in the days of the forum, residents of this area, in order to get home, have to show a passport with a registration stamp. They have also the difficulties with the traffic jams and the detours. The holiday "Scarlet Sails", which is organized for graduates every summer in St. Petersburg, often causes a lot of complaints from residents. The main reason of dissatisfaction is the fact that after the holiday there are the garbage mountains in the center of the city. Such consequences of mega-events have a negative impact on the image of the city as a cultural capital. It can discourage tourists and local residents who avoid visiting such events, considering them unsafe.

Thus, a key task for event managers is to not only identify and, as far as

¹⁸ P. R. Stone, R. Sharpley, *Socio-cultural impacts of events: meanings, authorized transgression and social capital* (Chapter 23), in S. Page, J. Connell, *The Routledge Handbook of Events*, London, Routledge, 2011.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

possible, predict the impacts of events, but to manage them in such a way that benefits are optimized and negative impacts are minimized so that, on balance the overall impact of the event is positive²⁰.



Picture 4. Center of St. Petersburg after the “Scarlet Sails” celebration (2007)

Source: https://shkolazhizni.ru/img/content/i15/15534_or.jpg

CROSS-CULTURAL YEARS AND INTERNATIONAL CULTURAL FORUMS AS A TYPE OF CULTURAL MEGA-EVENTS

Bilateral or even multilateral cross-cultural years became very popular at the beginning of XXI century. The goal of such a mega-event is to organize cultural events co-currently in two or several countries to establish and encourage a cultural dialogue.

As an international mega-event, cross-cultural years engage different art genres and encourage educational, technological, scientific, industrial and economic exchanges. The programs can be extremely rich and wide spread with hundreds of events. For example, the Russia-UK Year of Culture (2014) included more than 250 events in the fields of culture, science, education and sports.

²⁰ P. R. Stone, R. Sharpley, *Socio-cultural impacts of events: meanings, authorized transgression and social capital* (Chapter 23), in S. Page, J. Connell, *The Routledge Handbook of Events*, London, Routledge, 2011.

Bilateral cross-cultural years contribute to the cultural image and reputation of the country as well as to the better discussion of political and economic issues. Moreover, years of cultures popularize national culture and language of the participating countries, implementing their foreign cultural policy and developing cultural and public diplomacy. Such events promote understanding and cooperation between participating countries as they reconfirm their mutual interest in development of understanding and cooperation. For this purpose many countries organize the years of culture to boost their tourist, scientific, business potential and to improve national image²¹.

Cross-cultural years are regular events for many countries: France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Great Britain, China, Japan, India, Argentina, and Russia. In France, for example, such cultural events are very popular and are held almost every year: several mega-events can run for several years. For example, France-Japan Years took place in 1997-1998, France-China Year – in 2003-2004, 2004-2005, 2014-2015, France-Brazil – in 2009, and France- South Africa – in 2012-2013, France-South Korea – in 2015-2016, France-Columbia – in 2017²².

For the France-Colombia cross-cultural year, France defined its goals as "to update the picture of the cultural presence of France in Colombia", to modernize the image of France and to develop cooperation. French international cultural policy employs cultural mega-events in accordance with its official diplomatic tasks to promote French culture in the world; to promote works of French artists, musicians, writers etc.; to establish a strong connection among French and foreign cultures and to support cultural diversity²³. The modern French international cultural policy supports the cultural dialogue and exchange as a fundamental principle and the Years of Culture fits well into the official framework²¹.

Many countries follow a similar path. In 2007-2008, Spain-China Years of Culture were organized with the program including more than 250 cultural, economic, political, scientific and educational events. Spain-Japan Years of Culture took place in 2013-2014 to celebrate the 400th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations. Foreign cultural policy of Spain aims to strengthen

²¹ J. Horne, *The four "knowns" of sports mega-events*, in "Leisure Studies", 2007, Vol. 26, no. 1, p. 81-82. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02614360500504628> (Accessed on 02.02.2017).

²² Н. М. Боголюбова, Ю. В. Николаева, *Культурные сезоны как форма внешней культурной политики (на примере России и Франции)* [Cultural seasons as the form of foreign cultural policy (on an example of Russia and France)], "Вестник Санкт-Петербургского государственного университета культуры и искусств", 2011, вып. 2, с. 30-35.

²³ R. Gruneau, J. Horne, *Mega-Events and Globalization: Capital and Spectacle in a Changing World Order (Routledge Research in Sport, Culture and Society)*, Routledge, 2016.

international cultural cooperation. In a way, the official Spanish foreign policy is not unique in its strong commitment to promote Spanish culture and arts in the world, to participate in cultural events, meetings and forums at the international level, and to support cultural tourism. The cross-cultural years organized by Spain reflect its official cultural foreign policy²⁴.

Russia is also very experienced and successful in organization of many cross-cultural years over the last decade. Russia-France year took place in 2010, followed by Russia-Italy and Russia-Spain year in 2011. The next 2012-2013 were devoted to cultural cooperation between Russia and Germany, while 2013 became the year of Russia-Netherlands and 2014 was the year of Russia-United Kingdom. The Russia-Argentina cross-cultural year was held in 2015. Unfortunately, due to political tension, scheduled for 2015 the cross-cultural years of Russia-Turkey and Russia-Poland were canceled. So far, 2018 is planned as a year of Russian and Japanese cultures, while the organization of a cross-cultural year of Russia-Bulgaria is being discussed. Russian foreign cultural policy sets high priority on the development of bilateral cultural ties as both its official documents and implemented projects indicate²⁵.

Lately, cross-cultural mega-events develop and embrace new ideas, methods and principles of organization. There is a trend to focus on a certain genre of arts and culture: e.g., the year of Russian and French literature and language (2012), the year of Russian-Chinese youth exchange (2014-2015), the year of Russian and Chinese media cooperation (2016). Participation of more than two partners also becomes common practice: e.g., Russia, France, Spain and Austria declared a year of tourism in 2017. Perhaps, the near future will see newer formats.

The benefits of cross-cultural years are difficult to overestimate. Cross-cultural years create "privileged cultural connections", contribute to the achievement of the specific goals of the official foreign cultural policy, promote national cultures, and facilitate cultural exchange and cooperation. Cross-cultural years support the policy of cultural diversity because they educate the general public, introduce and promote ideas of tolerance and international friendship, generate interest in foreign cultures. The cross-cultural years show the host countries and regions with emphasis on cultural dialogue, exchange of ideas and cultural cooperation. It is not a surprise that they have become popular projects of the official foreign cultural policy in many countries.

²⁴ N. Bogolyubova, Yu. Nikolaeva, *Actual tendencies of foreign cultural policy of Spain*, in "Latin America", 2013, no. 9, p. 47-57.

²⁵ *Foreign Cultural Policy of Russia – 2000. Conference abstracts*, in "Diplomatic Bulletin", 2000, no. 4, p. 76-84.

CONCLUSIONS

The overarching principle of methodology of event studies recognizes cultural plurality and uniqueness. Researchers advocate the principle of equal rights for all cultures: each culture has the right to independent existence and development. From this point of view, cross-cultural years and international cultural forums fit into the main trends of modern cultural exchange. They help to overcome the negative attitude and public prejudice towards foreign cultures and to develop cultural dialogue and exchange. The key tasks of the foreign cultural policy are to establish a positive image of a country on international arena, to strengthen mutual understanding with foreign countries and to actively participate in international cultural exchange. In this way, cross-cultural years and international cultural forums as mega-events certainly create opportunities for successful implementation of the official foreign cultural policy. They pave avenues for discussing and solving possible international issues and problems, they strengthen the cultural image of their country abroad and promote its status. Considering impacts of mega-events, experts usually tend to focus on economic effect. However, in case of cultural mega-events the intangible effect is much more prominent even though it is hard to express it in numbers. As long as cultural mega-events generate a "feel-good effect", they contribute to a positive and attractive image of the host country, attract attention to its culture and thus strengthen its international reputation.

The above-mentioned examples of cultural mega-events do not offer an exhaustive list to reflect their diversity but invite preliminary conclusions. It is obvious that mega-events due to their global nature can have a significant positive impact on the development on the hosting city or country. By attracting attention of mass audience through wide media coverage, mega-events promote their host countries as desirable destinations for traveling and studying, work or leisure. Cultural mega-events contribute to the development of society as they form a positive international image of a host city or country. The last explains the popularity of cultural mega-events as an efficient diplomatic tool. However, a poorly organized mega-event can become a reason of discontent in local population and have many negative effects like damage to image. Keeping the possibility of those risks in mind might help to avoid negative repercussions in the process of planning and organization.

Without a doubt, cultural mega-events can create both positive and negative consequences for host cities, regions and states. Yet, their main value is to serve as a vivid indicator of the country's success and stability and to be a sign of its strength and readiness to develop international dialogue. That is why many countries increasingly add mega-events in the arsenal of foreign cultural policies.

FROM TOTALITARIAN TO DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY IN THE POST-SOVIET SPACE: MANAGEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS OF GENDER POLICY IN UKRAINE (1991-2017)

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Abstract. *The article reveals the development of gender relations in contemporary Ukraine. The author admits that since gaining independence, the Ukrainian society passed various stages in the legal management of gender issues: from practically total indifference to an extremely open approach. Special attention paid to gender issues has led to the diminishing of the gender gap in the bodies of public authority. Despite the fact that Ukraine has not yet fully aligned with European standards, the progress can be noted in the field of gender policies.*

Keywords: *gender, policy, sex, feminism, gender methodology, gender equality*

Rezumat: *De la societatea totalitară la democrație în spațiul post-sovietic: procesul de management și de implementare a politicilor de gen în Ucraina (1991-2017).* Articolul analizează dezvoltarea relațiilor de gen în Ucraina contemporană. Autorul constată că, de la obținerea independenței și până în prezent, societatea ucraineană a parcurs diferite etape în gestionarea legislativă a problemelor de gen: de la practic totală indiferență până la o abordare extrem de deschisă. Atenția deosebită acordată chestiunilor de gen a condus la diminuarea disparității dintre femei și bărbați în organismele autorității publice. În pofida faptului că Ucraina încă nu s-a aliniat integral standardelor europene în domeniu, totuși pot fi remarcate progrese în domeniul politicilor de gen.

Résumé : *De la société totalitaire à la société démocratique dans l'espace post-soviétique : processus de gestion et de mise en œuvre de la politique de genre en Ukraine (1991-2017).* L'article révèle le développement des relations de genre dans l'Ukraine contemporaine. L'auteur admet que depuis l'indépendance, la société ukrainienne a franchi différentes étapes dans la gestion juridique des questions de genre : de l'indifférence quasi totale à une approche extrêmement ouverte. Une attention particulière accordée aux questions de genre a conduit à la réduction de l'écart entre les sexes dans les organes de l'autorité

publique. Malgré le fait que l'Ukraine ne s'est pas encore entièrement alignée sur les normes européennes, les progrès peuvent être notés dans le domaine des politiques de genre.

INTRODUCTION

The place of women in public life has evolved from feminism to gender. Such changes have brought results. Because they gave rise to the concept of equality and women's solidarity. Historiography on this topic covers a wide range of researchers. The basic theoretical foundations of the influence of women's issues on the socio-political processes on formation of feminism and its transformation into the concept of gender. In social sciences, "gender" means socially determined roles, identities and spheres of activity of men and women, which depend not on biological differences, but on the social organization of society. This position is reflected in the definition of gender as the everyday world of interaction between men and women, embodied in practice, imagination and customs. Foreign and Ukrainian researchers agree that the process of society genderization of has taken three ways¹. An important principle of gender studies is giving a special perspective to the analysis of democracy, the essence of which is determined by the freedom of expression of group interests at the national and international levels. In this context, the problem of transition from the hierarchical principle of power organization in the world to the network principle of various forms of political governance coordination is particularly important, leading to changes of level and forms of the national states – carriers of modern democracy – control in

¹ Н. В. Кушнір, *Історико-правова еволюція визнання рівності чоловіків і жінок* [Historical and Legal Evolution of the Equality of Men and Women Recognition], in "Науковий вісник Міжнародного гуманітарного університету", Харків, 2016, № 22, с. 95-98; Rosalind Delmar, 'What is Feminism?', in Juliet Mitchell, Ann Oakley (eds.), *What is Feminism?* in Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986, p. 8-33; Elaine Showalter (ed.), *The New Feminist Criticism: Essays on Women, Literature and Theory*, New York, Pantheon, 1985, 403 p.; О. А. Воронина. *Соціокультурні детермінанти розвитку гендерної теорії в Росії і на Заході* [Socio-Cultural Determinants of the Gender Theory Development in Russia and in the West], in "Общественные науки и современность", 2000, № 4, с. 9-20; Lucy Delap, *Feminist and Anti-Feminist Encounters in Edwardian Britain*, in "Historical Research", vol. 78, 2005, No. 201, p. 377-399; Дж. Скотт, *Отголоски феминизма* [Echoes of Feminism], in "Гендерные исследования", ХЦГИ, 2004, № 10, с. 7-36; К. Уэст, Д. Зиммерман, *Создание гендера* [Doing gender], in "Гендерные тетради", Санкт-Петербург, 1997, Вып. 1, С. 94–124.

the most important human problems: employment, migration, income, interest representation etc. Another problem which development the gender representatives are interested in is the problem of various precise forms of democracy at various stages of its development, which raises the question of democracy quality and the internal process of developing democracy and the need to develop the semantic field of democracy theory. At the same time, the transition went somewhat differently during Soviet times, through the prism of communist ideology and the specifics of the state system did not allow women to go through the same path of change as in the West. That is why the gender issue in the post-Soviet countries has become one of the leading issues in the socio-political processes. Various countries in different ways pass this stage of standard stereotypes and patriarchal thinking. Research of the gender issue in Ukraine is reoriented from the study of statistical factors to thinking by strategic definitions, which in turn provides an opportunity to clearly understand the main trends in society and the possibility of reaching the European standards².

The idea of the article is concentrated on the analysis of theoretical foundations of the gender concept. The standard vision of a woman as guardian of the family, which prevailed till the end of the 19th century, began to change. With the notion of the right of women to vote and the evolution towards the concept of a woman – an equal politician. Conceptually, the principles of gender sensitivity policies were formulated by combining the legal framework and the dual strategy of gender mainstreaming and positive actions / positive discrimination, operating in the EU's political and legal space. The strategy of gender mainstreaming focuses on the transformation of public institutions and organizations that create barriers to achieving gender equality in society. The strategy of effective gender main-

² Оксана Ярош, *Жіночі об'єднання України як суб'єкти державотворення кінця ХХ століття: проблеми і перспективи* [Women's Associations in Ukraine as Subjects of State-Building in the Late 20th Century: Issues and Perspectives], Київ, ІПіЕНД, 2000, Вип. 10, с. 243-245; Т. О. Марценюк, *Жінки в українській політиці: виклики і перспективи змін* [Women in Ukrainian Politics: Challenges and Prospects of Change], Київ, Міжнародний центр перспективних досліджень, 2015, с. 19-20; Юлія Біденко, Валентина Кисельова, *Гендерна політика в Україні: складний шлях від декларацій до позитивних дій* [Gender policy in Ukraine: a complex path from declarations to positive actions], in <http://hvylya.net/analytics/society/genderna-politika-v-ukrayini-skladniy-shlyah-vid-deklaratsiy-do-pozitivnih-diy.html>, (Accessed on 02.11.2017); *Цілі Розвитку Тисячоліття: Україна 2015* [Objectives of Millennium Development: Ukraine 2015], <http://www.ukraine2015.org.ua/tsil6> (Accessed on 02.11.2017).

streaming should be formed by the synthesis of four components, presented in the form of sequential actions:

- The preparatory stage – organization and implementation of a structural and cultural base for the principles of equal opportunities implementation (the target group is defined, goals, tasks and mechanisms of achievement are developed taking into account the specifics of a separate group).

- The stage of characters' examination (the study of gender differences) is an examination of the current situation of gender (in) equality and identification of priority areas (monitoring observation in order to identify trends or prevent gender inequality manifestations).

- The stage of assessing effectiveness of gender policy - an analysis of the potential impact of gender policies on participation (assessing both quantitative and qualitative indicators), resource allocation, norms, values (including targeting men to domestic unpaid work) and rights.

Rebuilding policy stage – defining problem areas and their elimination/replacement according to an integrated approach.

EVOLUTION OF THE WOMEN'S ISSUE IN CIVILIZATION DIMENSION

Today, all aspects of society functioning have gained a gender dimension. That is why the phenomenon of gender discourse, being interdisciplinary in its basic characteristics, is of great interest for representatives of social philosophy, sociology, history, political science, social psychology, cultural studies, economics and law. If the feminists of the middle of the 19th and early 20th centuries demanded equality of rights and usually based it on the views that there were no significant differences between sexes that would allow legitimate inequality to be created, then feminists of the second wave of 1960-1970s demanded recognition of an independent female personality and promoted the development of collective women's self-awareness, stressing differences between women and men, the specificity of 'female' in relation to 'male'. Unlike the term 'gender', feminism is primarily an ideological movement that studies and tries to solve the issue of women inequality³. The concept of 'gender' is wider because within the framework of the system of values offered by it the relationship of men and women from both positions is considered, whereas feminist culture places the woman, her issues and interests first.

³ Н. В Кушнір, *Історико-правова еволюція визнання рівності чоловіків і жінок* [Historical and Legal Evolution of the Equality of Men and Women Recognition], in "Науковий вісник Міжнародного гуманітарного університету", Харків, 2016, № 22, с. 95.

Researchers understand feminism in different ways giving it a unique spin. In the broadest sense, feminism is 'an active desire of women to change their position in society'⁴. But feminism can also consider the ideology of equality of women's rights, social changes of femininity depriving women of stereotyped social roles, etc.⁵. "A feminist," says S. Elaine, "is any person, man or woman whose ideas and actions meet three criteria: 1) they recognize the possibility of interpreting by a woman her life experience ; 2) they are not satisfied with the situation where institutional inequality of women exists; 3) they seek to do away with this inequality"⁶. According to O. Voronina, feminism is primarily "an alternative philosophical concept of socio-cultural development" today although for quite some time it has existed as the ideology of women's equality and socio-political movement for women's rights⁷.

It is worthy of note that if individual feminist views for the first time begin to sound like a protest against patriarchal attitudes in the classical tradition of philosophizing, then the feminist movement propagandizing the struggle for equal political, social and other rights with men is becoming massive by the middle of the 20th century. Sometimes the views of extreme orientation are clearly distinguished in the feminist movement: militant propaganda, calls for an open gender war with the irreconcilable confrontation of two genders⁸.

In the 1960s, three main trends of feminism were formed: liberal, radical and socialist ones. In our opinion, the concept of 'subjective diversity' is basic for post-feminism and it is important for understanding gender policy in conditions of political transformation. J. Scott remarked on this, "Modern feminist theories do not involve fixed relations between entities but treat them as inconsistent effects of temporary, cultural or historical specifics, and the dynamics of power. Neither individual nor collective identity exists without the *Other*; inclusiveness does not exist without exception, universal – without a rejected private, there is no neutrality that would give preference to any of the points of view that have someone's interests. Power plays a significant role in any human relationship. For us the differences mean a fact of human existence, a tool of power, an analytical tool."⁹ Thus, the recognition of "subjective diversity undermined the classical

⁴ Rosalind Delmar, 'What is Feminism?', p. 9.

⁵ Lucy Delap, *Feminist and Anti-Feminist Encounters in Edwardian Britain*, p. 382.

⁶ Elaine Showalter, *The New Feminist Criticism...*, p. 69.

⁷ О. А. Воронина. *Социокультурные детерминанты развития гендерной теории...*, с. 9.

⁸ Lucy Delap, *op. cit.*, p. 391-392

⁹ Дж. Скотт, *Отголоски феминизма*, с. 11.

liberal notion of the universal public policy subject existence, proving that 'the subject's story is the story of his/her identities'¹⁰.

The term *gender* was first introduced in the middle of the 20th century by psychoanalyst R. Stoller, and in the late 1960s and early 1970s the final delineation of the concepts of *gender* and *sex* took place: the term *sex* is used to understand the biological sex, while *gender* is understood as recognition of the social sex. According to T. Melnyk, introduction of the term 'gender' into scientific discourse became "quite a good technique capable of revising conceptually established ideas about the mechanisms of sexual inequality reproduction, the mechanisms of the power implementation, the gender-role structure of society which main features were patriarchal character and heterosexuality."

In social science, *gender* means socially determined roles, identities and spheres of activity of men and women, which depend not on biological differences but on the social organization of society. This position is reflected in the definition of gender as the everyday world of interaction between men and women embodied in practice, representations, customs; as a phenomenon that exists in the system of interpersonal relations, through which male and female as the basic categories of social order are created, approved and reproduced¹¹; as an element of the sex – gender system, a set of mechanisms that helps society to transform "biological sexuality into the results of human activity and within which these transformed sexual needs are met"; as a social category that to a large extent "determines realization of human life aspirations, determines its place in social life and economy"; as a social structure rather than a stable biological characteristic, therefore "its characteristics are relations depending on time and circumstances," it is not only a component of an individual identity, but also "an aspect of a political and social system"¹².

J. Scott called the 'social sex' or gender "the primary way of identifying power relations." J. Scott's publications contributed to overcoming the split between traditional (male) and new (female) history. Thus, not only the norms, stereotypes and identities but also the most important institutions of social control that

¹⁰ Ш. Муфф, *Феминизм, гражданство и радикальная демократическая политика*, [Feminism, Citizenship and Radical Democratic Policy], in *Введение в гендерные исследования: Хрестоматия*, Санкт-Петербург, Алетейя; Харьков, Изд-во ХЦГИ, 2001, Часть II, с. 216.

¹¹ Н. И. Абубакирова, *Что такое гендер?* [What is Gender?], in "Общественные науки и современность", 1996, № 6, с. 123.

¹² *Ibidem*, с. 124.

regulate unequal distribution of material and spiritual wealth, power and prestige in the whole society, class, group, etc., were the gender theorists' focus of attention. A historian-gender theorist unlike a psychoanalyst and sociologist places emphasis on the general socio-cultural and historical-cultural context in which a hierarchy of genders is formed. Therefore, she definitely highlights such issues as the relationship between the social and gender hierarchy, social and gender mythology and, consequently, between social and gender history¹³.

The critics of structural functionalism believed that the society needed reforms that would liberate women for genuine self-realization, not limited to gender-role theory, and this theory leaves behind the analysis aspects of social inequality, domination and suppression. From the point of view of criticism, the feminist movement will cause a change in the social and cultural plan that will lead to a system-wide reassessment of expressiveness

Consequently, the strategy of gender mainstreaming can be defined as an instrumental part of the consistent implementation of gender policies. Based on more in-depth indicators and standards, it provides an opportunity to consider more widely than feminism standards.

PROCESS OF INTRODUCING GENDER STANDARDS IN INDEPENDENT UKRAINE

At the turn of the 1980-1990s Ukraine was in a situation of historical uncertainty, looking for a choice of development path. The Soviet model of the gender order was based on the principles of state paternalism that provided for support of the formal norm of gender equality on the one hand, and on the other one – on the hidden discrimination of women¹⁴.

The proclamation of democratic ideals in the early 1990s was accompanied by the spread of the 'women's rights' and gender equality discourse in Ukraine, primarily, among the activists of independent feminine organizations. Democratization processes that began in the post-Soviet space required a profound internal

¹³ Наталія Пушкарьова, *Від «Жіночих студій» до «Гендерних досліджень», від історичної фемінології до гендерної історії* [From Female Studies to Gender Studies, from Historical Feminology to Gender History], in *Гендерний підхід: історія, культура, суспільство*, Львів, ВНТЛ-Класика, 2003, с. 16-18.

¹⁴ О. Здравомыслова, *Российская семья в 90-е годы: жизненные стратегии мужчин и женщин* [Russian Family in the 1990s: the Men and Women Life Strategies], in *Гендерный калейдоскоп. Курс лекций*, Москва, Academia, 2001, с. 475.

restructuring of relations between the authorities and citizens based on the recognition of human rights, in particular, the rights of men and women. As part of these changes, women should have an equal social status with men defending three groups of rights for themselves: political, socio-economic, and reproductive ones. At this very time gender outstrips feminism by making parallels between them.

Analysing contemporary gender relations in Ukraine it should be noted that their implementation takes place against the background of comparative analysis and reference to European models of gender policy institutional provision¹⁵.

Over the past decades, significant changes have taken place in the Ukrainian society in understanding and legitimizing gender relations, and steps are being taken to establish an institutional mechanism for ensuring gender equality. The gender is increasingly penetrating the sphere of political governance and management, becoming a real political power for development equality and peace. Such approach to politics implies its gender dimension – “the application of quantitative and qualitative assessments of men and women activities in politics, the characteristics of their masculinity and femininity, relations to determine the degree and level of political culture of their socio-sexual self-expression and self-realization, the effectiveness of political influence on all spheres of organization, management and planning of private and public life, effectiveness of influence on all directions of socio-political development, modelling and forecasting socio-political processes using the principles of justice, equality, peace and progress.” Women's involvement in politics can take place in two forms: firstly, it is integration, which involves women's mass participation in the political process that removes unnecessary tension not only between the sexes, but also in normative interaction between the spheres of public and private; and secondly, it is a marginalization in which women are not adequately represented in the power institutions, they are excluded from the decision-making process, forced to adapt to political decisions, anticipating patronage or affiliation¹⁶.

¹⁵ See: Михайло Корюкалов (Укладач), *Гендерна політика та інституційні механізми її реалізації в Україні. Національний огляд виконання Україною Пекінської декларації та Платформи дій і заключних документів Двадцять третьої спеціальної сесії Генеральної Асамблеї ООН* [Gender policy and institutional mechanisms of its implementation in Ukraine. National review of Ukraine's implementation of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action and the final documents of the 23rd Special Session of the UN General Assembly], Вересень 2014 р. https://www.uwf.org.ua/files/genderna_politika_ukr_web.pdf (Accessed on 12.10.2017).

¹⁶ К. Уэст, Д. Зиммерман, *Создание гендера* [Doing gender], с. 94.

Women's involvement in politics and gender policies are not identical concepts. T. Miller points out that gender policy is “the determination by the international bodies and states, political parties of the main gender priorities and fundamental values, principles and directions of activity, the corresponding methods and ways of their implementation aimed at establishment of equal rights, freedoms, creation of conditions, opportunities and chances, guarantees of equal social and political status of men and women, on the development of gender democracy and the formation of gender culture in the society.” Summarizing this approach, O. Yarosh points out that gender policy is “a set of legal and managerial measures aimed at ensuring equal legal and practical opportunities for women and men in society”¹⁷.

Ukraine has ratified the major international documents on equal rights and opportunities for men and women: the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the United Nations Millennium Development Goals, defining gender equality as the important component of further development and as one of the priorities of state policy. The democratic society should provide women and men with equal opportunities to participate in all spheres of life, including access to power. At the national level, gender equality is guaranteed, first of all, by the Constitution of Ukraine, the Labour Code of Ukraine, as well as by the Law of Ukraine “On Ensuring Equal Rights and Opportunities for Women and Men” (2005), the State Program for Equal Rights and Opportunities for Women and Men for the Period by 2016 and other legislative acts. But despite legislative regulation, the access of women to ‘big’ politics is still unsatisfactory¹⁸. According to the 2016 Global Gender Gap Report presented by the World Economic Forum, Ukraine occupies the 69th place on the Gender Equality Index (ranked among 142 countries)¹⁹.

In Ukraine, despite high educational and professional potential of women and the absence of direct contradictions with the UN Convention “On the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women” in the country's legislation, the quantitative representation of women in power structures is very low. The International Centre for Advanced Studies carried out an analysis to determine

¹⁷ Оксана Ярош, *Жіночі об'єднання України...*, с. 243.

¹⁸ Т. О. Марценюк, *Жінки в українській політиці: виклики і перспективи змін*, с. 19.

¹⁹ Юлія Біденко, Валентина Кисельова, *Гендерна політика в Україні: складний шлях від декларацій до позитивних дій*, in <http://hvylya.net/analytics/society/genderna-politika-v-ukrayini-skladniy-shlyah-vid-deklaratsiy-do-pozitivnih-diy.html> (Accessed 02.11.2017).

correlation between the number of men and women represented at all levels of public administration in Ukraine (see Table 1). If women are present in the central organs of power, then the situation is close to the critical one in the regions²⁰. For example, there is only one woman as a head of the regional state administration in Ukraine (Yulia Svitlychna, head of the Kharkiv regional state administration).

Table 1, Ensuring Gender Equality in Ukraine (1990-2015)
(Share of women and men)²¹

Ratio	1990	2001	2004	2007	2011	2015
The gender ratio among deputies of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine	3/97	7/93	5/95	9/91	10/90	13/87
The gender ratio among deputies of the local councils	38/62	42/58	42/58	43/57	44/56	45/55
The gender ratio among deputies of the regional councils	9/91	11/89	15/85	19/81	20/80	30/70
The gender ratio among deputies of the district councils	18/82	21/79	24/76	27/73	28/72	30/70
The gender ratio among deputies of the city councils (regional level)	21/79	22/78	25/75	28/72	29/71	30/70
The gender ratio among deputies of the village councils	42/58	47/53	47/53	48/52	48/52	50/50
The gender ratio among deputies of the small village councils	42/58	47/53	48/52	49/51	50/50	50/50
The gender ratio among Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine members	n.a.	0/100	10/90	15/85	20/80	30/70
The gender ratio among high rank civil servants, (position ranks 1-2)	n.a.	15/85	17/83	20/80	25/75	30/70
The average salary ratio of women and comparing with general average salary, %	73	71	73	76	85	85

²⁰ О. В. Ковальова, *Гендерне квотування як напрям реалізації державної гендерної політики в адміністративно-політичній сфері* [Gender quotation as a direction of implementation of the state gender policy in the administrative and political sphere], "Південно-український правничий часопис", 2015, № 3, с. 6-9.

²¹ *Цілі Розвитку Тисячоліття: Україна 2015* [Objectives of Millennium Development: Ukraine 2015], <http://www.ukraine2015.org.ua/tsil6> (Accessed 02.11.2017)

The number of women in the Verkhovna Rada increased to some extent during a transition period. After the 1994 elections there were 5.7% of women – members of the Ukrainian parliament, after the 1998 elections their share was 8.1%. However, according to the 2002 elections, the share of women among deputies even decreased to 5.1%.

Among 450 deputies of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine after the 2002 elections, men made up 94.9%, and women – 5.1%. The share of women and men elected by the party lists was 1:14. The ratio between women and men who were candidates for parliament varied considerably depending on the region: in Donetsk – 1:3; in the Kirovograd region – 1: 2.7; while in Lviv – 1:14; in the Transcarpathian region – 1:12 and in Vinnytsya region – 1: 9.65.

In 2002-2003, no woman was appointed a minister in the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. The lower is the level of public administration, the more open it is for women (the share of women among deputy ministers was 8%, among the state committee deputy heads – 4%, only some women were appointed chairpersons of state committees).

Among the civil servants, the share of women was decreasing in line with the increase of official positions (81% of female specialists and 52.5% of women who held positions of middle level executives). The share of women among senior civil servants (1-2 positions of managers) was only 14.7%, which indicated a low level of women involvement in the process of taking responsible state decisions²².

Only the Verkhovna Rada of the 8th convocation has the largest number of women in the history of independent Ukraine. Thus, 47 women were elected to the parliament, or 11.1% of the total number of deputies, during the 2014 elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. To put this in perspective, there were 9.9% of women (44) in the Verkhovna Rada of the previous convocation, and only 2.3% (11) in the Verkhovna Rada of the first convocation. Although the representation of genders in the parliament of the 8th convocation became more balanced comparing to the parliaments of previous convocations, in accordance with the UN Millennium Goals, Ukraine should ensure representation of women in the legislature at the level of not less than 15% of the members of parliament.

The issue of electing women starts with the party lists and political activity of women themselves. According to the survey data, the recent elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in 2014 showed: among 139 female members - 16 members were from the Petro Poroshenko Bloc that numbered 12%; 12 of 81 presented the People's Front (15%); 8 of 26 deputies – political party Samopomich

²² Т. О. Марценюк, *op. cit.*, с. 20.

(Self Reliance) (31%); 5 of 19 – from the Batkivshchyna (26%); 3 of 21 from the Lyashko's Radical Party (14%); 3 out of 50 were Independent deputies (6%); there were no deputies from the political parties Volya Narodu (The will of the people) and Vidrodzennya (Renaissance)²³. Thus, only one political part Samopomich fulfilled the 30% quota of women in political party lists.

There are two women in this convocation of the Verkhovna Rada leadership - First Deputy Chairman Iryna Gerashchenko and Deputy Chairman Oksana Syroid – which a great achievement in solving gender issues. There was no woman in the parliament leadership before.

Four women are represented in the faction leadership, namely: Yulia Tymoshenko, head of the Batkivshchyna faction, Oksana Prodan and Iryna Lutsenko, deputy chairperson of the Petro Poroshenko Bloc faction and Viktoriya Syumar, deputy chairperson of the People's Front faction. There are no women in the eight Committees out of 21 (including the Budget Committee, Committee on Preventing and Combating Corruption, Financial Policy and Banking Committee). The largest number of female deputies is in humanitarian Committees.

There are six women in the Committee on Health Care and the Committee on European Integration. The women head the Committee on European Integration, Science and Education Committee, Health Care Committee, Freedom of Speech and Information Policy Committee, Committee on Social Policy, Employment and Pension Coverage, and Committee on Foreign Affairs. Six women are deputy chairpersons of the committees, and five are the first deputy chairpersons. Six more women are heads of the parliamentary subcommittees.

Having analysed the activities of female and male members of the Ukrainian parliament as of January 17, 2015, the OPORA public network concluded that women had participated in law-making two times more than men. Thus, on average, one woman was the author or co-author of the 15 bills, while the men – 7²⁴.

But despite a number of issues and obstacles faced by women in politics, in recent years, several party associations were set up to raise awareness of gender equality. Thus, on December 6, 2011, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine announced creation of the Inter-faction association Equal Opportunities, which included 15

²³ У новій Верховній Раді найбільше жінок за всю історію - КВУ [The New Verkhovna Rada Has the Largest Number of Women in History – CVU], <https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2014/11/12/7044034/> (Accessed 13.09.2017).

²⁴ В українському парламенті жінки працьовитіші за чоловіків [Women in the Ukrainian Parliament are more Industrious than Men], <http://www.civicua.org/news/view.html?q=2390965> (Accessed 13.09.2017).

female deputies and deputies of various parliamentary factions. They believe that the topic of gender equality is important for Ukraine, including the issue of its perceptions by the society and various political forces. Furthermore, in pursuance of the Law of Ukraine "On Ensuring Equal Rights and Opportunities for Women and Men" 38 central executive bodies have the working expert groups on implementation of gender approaches. Advisers of the heads of regional state administrations have been appointed and they work on a voluntary basis in 20 regions of Ukraine. In the 17 regions of Ukraine, 21 gender centres have been established and operate now: in Vinnytsya (2), Volyn, Dnipropetrovsk, Zhytomyr (2), Transcarpathian (2), Kirovograd, Luhansk, Lviv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Poltava, Sumy (2), Ternopil, Kharkiv, Kherson, Khmelnytskyi, and Chernivtsi regions²⁵.

The Ukrainian women every year more actively apply for the positions in the National Police, in the volunteer corps and sign contracts to serve in the Ukrainian Army. The First Ukrainian Women's Congress was attended for the first time by the representatives of various spheres of life in November 2017. This kind of convention, in turn, gives hope for a greater opportunity to implement gender issues and to dispel the stereotypes of past years.

Thus, the evolution of gender issues in Ukraine has undergone a serious path to progress. The activity of public initiatives and promotion of this issue among politicians has given an opportunity to raise gender awareness.

CONCLUSIONS

Consequently, the historical development of the vision of the women's position in society has gone the way from the struggle for rights to the advocacy of equality. This policy can be divided into three types: (1) a gender neutral policy uses knowledge of gender differences to overcome stereotypes about men and women and leaves the existing division of resources and responsibilities unchanged; (2) a gender-specific policy distinguishes between the practical needs of women and men and keeps the status-quo of gender inequality without change; (3) gender-transformation policy recognizes the specific needs of women and

²⁵ Центр адаптації державної служби до стандартів Європейського Союзу, *Реалізація гендерної політики на місцевому рівні* (19 березня 2013 р.) [Center for Adaptation of the Civil Service to the Standards of the European Union, *Implementation of gender policy at the local level* (19 March 2013)], <http://www.center.gov.ua/component/k2/item/761-реалізація-гендерної-політики-на-місцевому-рівні> (Accessed on 06.10.2017).

aims to change the imbalance in gender relations towards equality. It is clear that changes are important for achieving equality, but they do not change the meaning and essence of gender inequality. The transformation of inequality into equality occurs as a result of the transition to a new quality of gender policy with sufficient quantitative changes. As a rule, these are radical and irreversible changes. The history of gender standards implementation in Ukraine began giving its results. And if a woman in power was an exception in the previous years, then in the upper echelons of power women's representation has significantly increased recently. Although the obvious progress is noticeable, the average European indicators are still a long haul ahead.

HABSBURG BUKOVINA AT THE BEGINNING OF THE GREAT WAR. LOYALISM OR IRREDENTISM?

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Abstract. *Modern historiography often presents Austrian Bukovina (1775-1918) as a model for the management of a multi-ethnic and multi-confessional territory. Many researchers have noted that, due to the policies promoted by the House of Habsburg, this province of the empire did not record religious and ethnic conflicts between national communities. On the other hand, at the end of World War I, all ethnic groups, except the German and Jews, adopted hostile positions against maintaining the integrity of Austria-Hungary. This has also been noticed by other historians to highlight the irredentism of non-German nationalities in Bukovina. This study attempts to analyse whether the dominant mood in the province at the end of the Great War was specific to non-German elites around and in the beginning of World War I, or it is the result of population adapting to the aftereffects of the world conflagration. The analysis is based on unpublished archival sources, testimonies of contemporaries and 1913-1914 local press articles.*

Keywords: *Ethnic groups, Bukovina, First World War, loyalism, administration, war, irredentism, Germans, Jews, Poles, Romanians, Ukrainians*

Rezumat. *Bucovina habsburgică la începutul Marelui Război. Loialism sau irredentism? Istoriografia modernă adeseori prezintă Bucovina austriacă (1775-1918) drept model de gestionare a unui teritoriu multiethnic și multiconfesional. Numeroși cercetători au remarcat că, grație politicilor promovate de Casa de Habsburg, în această provincie a imperiului nu s-au înregistrat conflicte cu substrat etnic sau religios între comunitățile naționale. Pe de altă parte, la sfârșitul Primului Război Mondial, toate grupurile etnice, cu excepția celui german și celui evreiesc, s-au situat pe poziții ostile menținerii integrității Austro-Ungariei. Acest aspect a fost scos în evidență de alți cercetători pentru a sublinia irredentismul înrădăcinat al grupurilor etnice negermane din Bucovina. Studiul își propune să analizeze în ce măsură comportamentele dominante în provincie la finele Marelui Război au fost specifice elitelor negermane în preajma și la începutul Primului Război Mondial. Studiul se întemeiază preponderent pe izvoare de arhivă inedite, mărturii ale contemporanilor și articole din presa vremii.*

Résumé : La Bucovine habsbourgeoise au début de la Grande Guerre. Loyalisme ou irrédentisme ? *L'historiographie moderne présente assez souvent la Bucovine autrichienne (1755-1918) comme modèle de gérer un territoire multiethnique et multiconfessionnel. De nombreux chercheurs remarquèrent que, grâce aux politiques promues par la Maison de Habsbourg, on n'enregistra pas dans cette province de l'empire de conflits à nuance ethnique ou religieux entre les communautés nationales. De l'autre partie, à la fin de la Première Guerre Mondiale, tous les groupes ethniques, à l'exception de celui allemand et juif, se situèrent sur des positions hostiles au maintien de l'intégrité de l'Autriche-Hongrie. Des autres chercheurs mirent en évidence cet aspect afin de souligner l'irrédentisme enraciné des groupes ethniques pas allemands de la Bucovine. L'étude ci-jointe se proposa d'analyser en quelle mesure les comportements dominants en province à la fin de la Grande Guerre ont été spécifiques aux élites pas allemandes autour et au début de la Première Guerre Mondiale. L'étude est fondée surtout sur des sources d'archives inédites, des témoignages des contemporains et des articles de la presse contemporaine.*

INTRODUCTION

In approaching the problems of the past there is a temptation to interpret events in terms of accomplished facts, while data and tendencies that do not fit into this vision are likely to be ignored or presented superficially. Regarding Bukovina, a territory separated from Moldavia that came into the possession of the House of Habsburg in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, the past is usually analysed by focusing on the moments that decisively marked the destiny of this region: the year 1775, when the north-west of Moldova became Austrian province; 1918, when Bukovina was united with the Kingdom of Romania; 1940 (1944), when the province was divided and the north was included in the (Soviet) Ukraine. In this regard, the course of Bukovina was, during the First World War, embedded in the November 1918 moment, when ethnic groups in this province have become extremely vocal, claiming the separation from Austria-Hungary (except for the Germans and the Jews) and advocating for a future of ethno-national orientation, while the Peace Conference in Paris (by the Treaty of Saint Germain, November 1919) committed the transfer of the province from the dualistic empire to the Kingdom of Romania. To this point, Romanian historiography emphasizes the facts and processes that led to the unification, the Ukrainian historiography highlights the failed efforts of the Ruthenian Bukovinians to include the whole province or a part of it in a Ukrainian state, while German historiography focused on aspects which ensured the progress of society and the Austrian administration efforts to ensure the

balance of interests between the centre and the province and between different ethnic communities or political groups.

Starting with the year 1775, once with the incorporation of the north-western Moldova to the Austrian Empire, the smallest country of the Habsburg Monarchy – Bukovina – experienced a sinuous but continuous evolution of integration in Central European patterns. After the 1848-1849 revolution, modernization effects could be seen in all fields, without exception. From a community organized according to medieval patterns, with loyalties structured on a few hierarchical levels, with only a few literates, with time Bukovina's society turned into a modern one, with multiple loyalties, with a significant number of literates. The progressive democratization of the Austrian society, mass literacy, the formation of national elites and their involvement in the political and administrative life of the empire were among the internal factors that led, however, to the manifestation of irredentist tendencies that marked the collapse of the Dualist Empire, in the autumn of 1918.

The conclusion according to which rejecting the authority of the House of Habsburg by non-German nationalities was a natural and continuous process can be easily detached from some works dedicated to the history of the province¹. The study of archive documents, media of the time and testimonies of contemporaries leads us to a more complex picture of trends and attitudes, of historical alternatives which, at times, became stronger or less obvious. Despite some separatist political aspirations cherished by some Bukovinians, during the year 1915 the inhabitants of the province had to cope with extremely violent events and identify survival solutions during war and change of administration.

Traditionally for the Romanian historiography, Bukovina is seen as a territory where the Austrian government has pursued denationalization of the local Romanian population, and the other ethnic groups were instruments of this policy. The focus was on the downward demographic evolution of the Romanian community and spectacular growth of the other ethnic groups, which made Romanians represent around 1/3 of the total population of the province in the first decade of the twentieth century. On the other hand, the Ukrainian historiography sustained that the 38% Ruthenian population of the province in the year 1910 has virtually always been there, and the demographic evolution during the Austrian administration was characterized by a Romanianization of

¹ Ion Nistor, *Istoria Bucovinei* [History of Bukovina], Bucharest: Humanitas, 1990; Аркадій Жуковський, *Історія Буковини. Частина друга після 1774 р.* [History of Bukovina. Part II (after 1774)] Чернівці: Видавнича спілка «Час», 1993; etc.

the land population. Habsburg administration was aware of the fact that the absence of a non-majority ethnic group simplified the management matter of non-German population, and the ethnic mosaic of Bukovina in which people attached to either the Romanian, Ukrainian or German third, made impossible the presence of a hegemony leadership to generate an irredentist trend. In this context, the Austrian authorities assumed their moderator position on the political scene of Bukovina, putting pressure on the more active factions and supporting the manifestations of the passive groups. In these circumstances, the ethnic communities in the province saw the Habsburg administration as either a protector of their own interests, or an advocate of the interests of other groups, either way the local elites shared a joint interest in obtaining a favourable attitude from the imperial structures.

In the present paper, we aim at presenting the responses of Bukovina's ethnic groups in the context of World War I outbreak and identifying to what extent the 1918's fall centrifuges options could have been observed or predicted in the first months of the Great War. Also, we will try to determine whether the volunteers' mobilization was due to aware and assumed civic obligations, was one generated and directed by the authorities or was the result of local leaders' manoeuvres, in order to gain political capital?

ETHNO-DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC PICTURE OF AUSTRIAN BUKOVINA

For the general public, the Habsburg Empire - which on the eve of WWI came third in Europe by demographic potential after the Russian and the German² Empire - is synonymous for a "German" state. Statistics shows, however, that out of the almost 52 million inhabitants of Austria-Hungary, nearly 50% were Slavs, about 23% were Germans, and the rest were Hungarians, Romanians and Italians³. The Vienna Court was aware of this ethnic mosaic and knew how to face pressure from nations either by force (in the first half of the nineteenth century) or by means of political compromise and democratic society.

Before drafting the general image of the Bukovinians' reactions when the outbreak of war was announced and the population was mobilized, we must describe the political and economic situation and the ethno-demographic profile

² Geoffrey Wawro, *A Mad Catastrophe. The Outbreak of World War I and the Collapse of the Habsburg Empire*, New York: Basic Books, 2014, p. 23.

³ A. J. P. Taylor, *Monarhia Habsburgică, 1809-1918. O istorie a Imperiului austriac și a Austro-Ungariei* [The Habsburg Monarchy, 1809-1918. A History of the Austrian Empire and of Austria-Hungary], București: ALLFA, 2000, p. 225.

of the province on the eve of the Great War. It should be noted that after 1860 all areas of the Habsburg Monarchy, including Bukovina, experienced an intense process of modernization in all fields. The socio-economic and political transformations from the second half of the nineteenth century significantly changed the ethno-demographic structure of Bukovina's population. In terms of ethnic structure, in 1875 the Austrian researcher V. F. Klun mentioned: "When the land was occupied by Austria, 100 years before, in Bukovina there were approx. 50 000 Romanians and approx. 20 000 Ruthenians. The 50 years exemption from military service and the official colonization contributed to the immigration of Ruthenians from Galicia and Maramures, of the Lipovans, Armenians, Jews, Hungarians and Germans to the land. Gradually, Romanians' preponderance disappeared in favour of the Ruthenians"⁴. The 1910 Austrian census recorded a population of 794 945 people. Of these, 273 216 (34.4%) were Romanians, 305 222 (38.4%) Ukrainians, 95 706 Hebrews (12%), 73 073 (9.2%) Germans and 47 728 (6%) of other ethnicities.⁵ The population was also very diverse in terms of religion: 547 603 Bukovinians declared themselves to be Orthodox, 102 919 Mosaics, 98 565 Roman Catholics, 26 182 Greek Catholics, 20 029 Lutherans, 3 232 Lipovans, 657 Armenian Catholic, 341 Orthodox Armenian, 484 Reformed etc.⁶

Nationalities had their own cultural institutions (associations, reading houses, etc.), that along with schools, where the study was done in the mother language, contributed to the preservation and development of group identity. Simultaneous with increasing literacy (the Czernowitz University was founded in 1875 and Bukovinians acceptance to study had a special contribution to this plan) it developed a viable media with news magazines and newspapers in many languages: Romanian, Ukrainian, Polish, Yiddish, German and relative to the total population of the province, it ranked among the most developed in South Eastern Europe.⁷ The policy of mass literacy, together with that of modernization of society and the economy, resulted in the crystallization of the national identities.

⁴ V. F. Klun, *Statistik von Oesterreich-Ungarn*, Wien, 1876, p. 333.

⁵ Rudolf Wagner, *Vom Moldauwappen zum Doppeladler. Ausgewählte Beiträge zur Geschichte der Bukowina*, Augsburg: Hofmann-Verlag, 1991, p. 4.

⁶ See: Ганна Скорейко, *Поліконфесійність як складова толерантності буковинського суспільства* [Multiconfessional as a component of the tolerance in the bukovinian society], in Zbigniew Kowalski et al. (ed.), *Bukowina. Tradycje i współczesność*, Pila-Czerniowce-Suczawa: 2006, p. 137-140.

⁷ Sophie A. Welisch, *The History of Bukovina*, Posted on the World-Wide Web March 2002. Accessed August 17, 2016. url: <http://www.bukovinasociety.org/Welisch-2002-1.html>

Therefore, in the two decades preceding the Great War, Bukovina's ethnic groups gained distinct and robust political and cultural individualities.

One of the most important changes achieved during the Austrian administration was the urbanization of the province. If in 1775 the three urban settlements totalled 3 200 inhabitants (less than 5% of the total population), in 1910 in the 10 cities and 6 towns lived 23.9% of the Bukovinians.⁸ The urban development and the intensive immigration and colonization processes have transformed the cities of Bukovina in ethno-cultural and religious conglomerates. The last Austrian census (1910) recorded in urban areas a great ethnic diversity and the absence of a majority both in habitation environments and in the total of Bukovina's population. Therefore, of all the inhabitants of towns and cities, Germans represented 15%, Jews 32.7%, Romanians 22.9% Ukrainians 17.9%, Poles 11%, others 0.4%.⁹

Bukovina's economy experienced rapid growth and diversification, especially in the second half of the nineteenth century. In 1912, in Bukovina were operating 112 factories, half of these in the forestry industry. The industrialization accomplished throughout the entire Austro-Hungary was successful in Bukovina as well, because in 1895-1896 the first electric power station was built (Czernowitz). On February 5th, 1896, in the province's capital, the first light bulb lit and on July 18th, 1897 the first tram line was inaugurated. In 1908, in Bukovina four electric power stations operated; 45 companies were supplied with electricity. In 1911, there were seven processing plants for the oil brought from Galicia and Romania, three sugar factories, more than 70 bakeries, brick and glass factories etc. The number of industrial workers increased from over 8 000 in 1851 to about 32 000 in 1910, of which approx. 8 000 worked in large industrial enterprises. 48% of the workers were Hebrews and Germans, followed by Ukrainians (18%), Romanians (16%), Poles (15%) etc. Most industrial enterprises were settled in Chernivsti, where there were one third of the total number of workers.¹⁰

⁸ Constantin Ungureanu, *Bucovina în perioada stăpânirii austriece (1774 – 1918). Aspecte etnodemografice și confesionale* [Bukovina during Austrian dominion (1774-1918). Ethno-demographic and religious issues], Chișinău, Editura „Civitas”, 2003, p. 255.

⁹ *Die Ergebnisse der Volks- und Viehzählung vom 31 Dezember 1910 im Herzogtume Bukowina nach dem Angaben der k. k. statistischen Zentral-Kommission in Wien,* in *Mitteilungen des statistischen Landesamtes des Herzogtums Bukowina*, Czernowitz, Heft XVII, 1913, p. 54-95.

¹⁰ See: *Буковина: історичний нарис* [Bukovina: A Historical Essay], Чернівці, Зелена Буковина, 1998, p. 111-142.

The expansion of the communication routes was blooming. In 1864-1866, the railway Lemberg-Czernowitz was built, and by 1869 it was also built the route Czernowitz-Hliboka-Suceava that made the junction with the Romanian railway network. In 1884, the Czernowitz-Sadagora-Bojan-Nowosielitza railway was completed and it made the junction with the railway network of Bessarabia (1893).¹¹

Despite the industry boom, the agriculture remained the strong point of Bukovina's economy. Moreover, the same phenomenon characterized the economic operation of the dualist monarchy. Thus, in 1910, 56.5% of the total Austria-Hungary labour force was engaged in agriculture.¹² Due to the agrarian reform carried out in the 1850s, the number of property owners increased from 64 900 in the mid-nineteenth century, to 219 500 in 1905, while the number of households grew from 38 100 in 1847 to 109 200 in 1902. The Fund of the Orthodox Church and big landowners had 520 400 hectares of land (49.8%), the farms possessed 484 500 hectares (46.4%) and the remaining land of 39 400 hectares (3.8%) belonged to the state, to communes and cities.¹³

In terms of participation to the creation of material assets and population welfare, most Romanians and Ukrainians worked in agriculture, while Jews, Germans and Poles were involved in commercial-industrial, administrative and financial activities:

Table no. 1, The percentage of Bukovina's ethnic groups in the province's economy (1910)¹⁴

Nationality (persons)	Agriculture and forestry	Industry and crafts	Commerce and transportation	Public and military service, professions (law, medicine, etc.)
Romanians (155 879)	89,7	2,8	1,5	6,0

¹¹ Paul Braşcanu, *Emanuel A. Ziffer – „părintele căilor ferate din Bucovina”* [Emanuel A. Ziffer – “Father of Bukovina's railways”], p. 6-7. Accessed August 19, 2016, <http://hauster.de/data/Ziffer.pdf>

¹² Hew Strachan, *The First World War*, Vol. I, *To Arms*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 37.

¹³ Demir Dragnev et al., *Din istoria ţinutului natal (regiunea Cernăuţi)* [From the History of Homeland (Chernivtsi region)], Cernăuţi, Editura „Alexandru cel Bun”, 2003, p. 115.

¹⁴ Albert Lichtblau and Michael John, *Jewries in Galicia and Bukovina, in Lemberg and Czernowitz: Two Divergent Examples of Jewish Communities in the Far East of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy*, in Sander L. Gilman and Milton Shain (eds.), *Jewries at the Frontier: Accommodation, Identity, Conflict*, Chicago, University of Illinois Press, 1997, p. 49.

Ukrainians (175 840)	89,6	3,0	2,3	5,4
Germans (30 319)	48,2	24,2	6,5	21,1
Jews (40 366)	13,3	24,3	41,7	20,7
Poles (15 788)	35,5	29,7	13,1	21,7

Through the administrative and economic policy, the imperial authorities have created social-national faults in Bukovina. Although interfering economically, spiritually or intellectually, Bukovina continued to be a multipolar world: *the cities* being dominated by elements of German-Jewish-Polish ethnicity; *the villages* were Romanian-Ukrainian and German-Romanian, in various proportions to total homogeneity; *the institutions* (church, school) characterized by an interfaith and / or ethnicity competition (in the Orthodox Church) – were dominated by the Hebrews, Germans and Poles.¹⁵ These worlds evolved alongside, their representatives interacting occasionally and with interest (in the market, stores, courts, public institutions, etc.).

BUKOVINIANS' STATE OF MIND ON THE EVE OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR

The decade preceding the outbreak of the Great War was one in which the European countries invested heavily in armies' development, new weapons' invention and in the articulation of strategies for waging modern military conflicts etc. By 1914, the feeling that the war is a biological necessity of first importance, "as a racial and social cathartic" through which the health of nations was ensured, was one that caught all the European peoples.¹⁶ In Austro-Hungary, the public opinion was fed with news about: the increase of nationalism in the Balkans, the need to maintain the influence of the Court of Habsburg on the course of European policy, the endowment of the continental powers with new weapons, the external menaces and the sustainability of the imperial structure over which the king and the government watched over.

¹⁵ Marian Olaru, Ștefan Purici, *Bucovina – mirajul identitar supranațional* [Bukovina – the supranational identity mirage], „Analele Bucovinei”, VI, 1999, no. 2, p. 260.

¹⁶ H. P. Willmott, *When Men lost Faith in Reason. Reflections on War and Society in the Twentieth Century*, Westport – Connecticut – London, Praeger Publishers, 2002, p. 55.

With the hostilities' outbreak and with the successive engaging of the European powers at war, in all the countries of the continent, the peoples were captured by a particular enthusiasm, openly supporting the governments as they felt that history was being made.¹⁷ At the end of July 1914, patriotic events took place in most European cities starting with Berlin, Paris¹⁸, London or Vienna. This reaction of the population can be explained by the very small number of "pure pacifists" in the early twentieth century in Europe, while the number of different associations and political groups that did not always openly supported the war, but did not excluded violence as a solution for the international conflicts and militated for war preparation, was rather high.¹⁹ On the other hand, people judged the future war based on past experience of war. Both the 1870-1871 Franco-German war and the Balkan wars, as well as the military propaganda supported the public confidence in the victorious conclusion of the conflict until Christmas²⁰, therefore the bellicose euphoria of the first period was justifiable. The existence of compulsory military service and the previous experience of those mobilized in 1914 are a good explanation for the prevailing of recruitment acceptance at the time, all over Europe.²¹ The sincere enthusiasm was much more common in urban areas (among literate population) than in rural areas, but the differences should not be exaggerated.²²

An important role in cultivating a patriotic (nationalistic) attitude among the people was played by the media, especially by the tabloid press. Distributed among a semiliterate population, this type of publications contributed to the crystallization of a "xenophobic paranoia" atmosphere that characterized the crisis atmosphere in the decade preceding the First World War.²³ However, if in Germany and France in the month of August the enthusiasm of the masses deepened, in Austria-Hungary it began to decline.²⁴

In Bukovina, the modernization accomplished in the decades preceding the war generated on the one hand, satisfaction due to the access to central European civilization material and cultural benefits and on the other hand, it contributed to

¹⁷ Strachan, *First World War*, p. 104.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 150-151.

¹⁹ Volker R. Berghahn, *Europe in the era of two World Wars: from militarism and genocide to civil society, 1900-1950*, Princeton - Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2006, p. 26.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

²¹ Strachan, *First World War*, p. 149.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 142.

²³ Willmott, *When Men lost Faith*, p. 52.

²⁴ Strachan, *First World War*, p. 157.

the affirmation of the national cultural identity consciousness, both phenomena contributing to the achievement of increased levels of civic involvement and population politicization. In this context, the mass attitudes fluidization level, but also the manipulation ability of the governmental or political actors were the factors that influenced the public opinion's reaction to the major events.

At the end of First World War, Bukovina's society resembled a fragmented glass picture: each ethnic group displayed their political demands and their vision of the Province's future, none of these visions being identical or similar to the others. Basically, all had one common element: the destiny of the land and of their own ethnic group being no longer tied to Austria or to the emperor. Since Austria-Hungary ended up dismembering into several national states, there is the temptation to conclude that this tendency existed long before hostilities' outbreak. But one must keep in mind that for decades most ethnic groups shared the benefits and disadvantages of belonging to the dualist empire, so before 1914 most hoped for a federate status quo and not for independence.²⁵

THE SPECIFICITY OF THE ETHNO-CULTURAL MOSAIC AND POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS OF THE BUKOVINIAN ETHNIC GROUPS

The ethnic mosaic and the absence of a majority nation in Bukovina, the legal framework and the political and national-cultural expression opportunities led to the configuration of a system for interests' balancing and for the defusing of potential ethnic tensions²⁶. This fact did not exclude the crystallization phenomenon of separate ethnic identities, but neither the affirmation of a regional appurtenance. To highlight the role of local identities in the process of mobilization, it would be wrong to limit ourselves to only two levels: the nation and the town, therefore a study of all the intermediate groups is necessary.²⁷ This endeavour is essential for a province with a complex national and social structure such as Bukovina in 1914. Even if the example of the neighbour (another ethnic group) was of particular importance, the nationalities of the land had singularized reactions to the news related to the war and, subsequently, to the mobilization.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 40-41.

²⁶ See Börries Kuzmany, *Habsburg Austria: Experiments in Non-Territorial Autonomy*, „Ethnopolitics”, 15, 2016, no. 1, pp. 52-55, 59-61.

²⁷ Pierre Purseigle, *Beyond and Below the Nations: Towards a Comparative History of Local Communities at War*, in Jenny Macleod and Pierre Purseigle (eds.), *Uncovered fields: perspectives in First World War studies (History of Warfare, Volume 20)*, Leiden – Boston: Brill Academic Publishers, 2004, p. 105.

Of Bukovina's communities, the Poles had a special place, after the consecration of the province's autonomy in 1861, they managed to achieve a constructive dialogue with the representatives of the other ethnic groups and participated in a unitive manner to the implementation of the broad interests of Bukovinians. Concerned to preserve their national identity, nourishing the dream of the national state's revival, Bukovina's Poles²⁸, often seen by the Austrian authorities as a revolutionary factor (even if of anti-Russian orientation, during the 1830-1831, 1863-1864 events, anti-Prussian in 1848, as well as anti-Habsburg in 1846, in Kraków) was the ballast in the province, showing respect for the interests and rights of the other ethnic groups. There were situations when the Poles in Bukovina had to face the pressure from radical compatriots from Galicia, having to notify the public opinion of the actuality in the province.²⁹ The ethnic Hebrews were an active element in the economic and public life of the land. Not being recognized as a nationality in Austria-Hungary, in Bukovina, Jews were identified and identified themselves as "German-speaking", thus contributing to the consolidation of the Habsburg administration in the region. The ethnic distinction could be established only on religious criterion, the mosaic cult being recognized by the Austrian authorities. However, the Austrian government refused to recognize Hebrews as a nation. Legally, it was argued that the recognition of political rights based on religious affiliation was contrary to the Constitution. Also, there was the governmental concern that this acknowledgement could lead to demands for the establishment of publicly funded Hebrew schools.³⁰ In the twentieth century, the Hebrew students at the University of Chernivsti protested against this situation, actions

²⁸ See: Kazimierz Feleszko, *O Bukowinie. Razem czy oddzielnie?* [About Bukovina. Together or separately?], Warszawa, 2000; Florin Pintescu, Daniel Hrenciuc, *Din istoria polonezilor în Bucovina (1774-2002)* [From the History of Poles in Bukovina (1774-2002)], Suceava, Uniunea Polonezilor din România, 2002; Андрій Горук, *Національно-культурний рух поляків на Буковині (друга половина XIX ст. – 1914 р.)* [The National-Cultural Movement of Bukovina's Poles (the second half of the 19th Century – 1914)], Чернівці, Зелена Буковина, 2005.

²⁹ See: „Polskość i katolicyzm na Bukowinie”. Odpowiedź „Gazety Polskiej” w Czerniowcach na artykuł „Bukowiner Nachrichten” z d. 25 sierpnia 1901 [“Polishness and Catholicism in Bukovina”. The Answer of the “Polish Gazette” in Czernowicz on the article „Bukowiner Nachrichten” of Aug. 25th, 1901.], Czerniowche, 1901.

³⁰ Fred Stambrook, *The Golden Age of the Jews of Bukovina, 1880-1914*, Center for Austrian Studies Working Papers 03-2 University of Minnesota, October 2003, 10. Accessed October 11, 2016, <http://conservancy.umn.edu/bitstream/handle/11299/90464/1/WP032B.pdf>

that forced the university administration to include in the annual report for 1912-1913, for the first time, and the number of Hebrew ethnicity students.³¹

Throughout the nineteenth century, the Hebrew community aimed at ensuring a stable and secure place at Bukovina's population level, among Jews being manifested the tendency to "settle down" and – from the early twentieth century – the resettlement in Palestine. It should be noted that the goals of the Jewish nationalists and of the Zionists were to a great extent congruent, despite sharp disputes between the two sides, especially among Benno Straucher and the Zionist leaders Mayer Ebner, lawyer, and Leon Kellner, professor. Both movements aimed at promoting Hebrew identity, dignity and confidence in own forces. Zionists, of course, were concerned with encouraging the return of Jews to Jerusalem, although only small groups were resettled from Bukovina to Palestine, before 1914. On the other hand, National Hebrew were seeking for a Jewish future in the Habsburg Monarchy and in particular, in Bukovina, Jews wished to gain recognition as one of the Austrian nationalities and not just as a separate religious community. In the Bukovinian society existed the conditions needed to strengthen the sense of identity among Jews, especially because anti-Semitism was not openly manifested. One might speak about passivity as a specific feature of the rural population in the province, but Bukovina was noticed even since the nineteenth century for the tolerant and adapting spirit. The Orthodox did business with the Jews, and the latter greeted with pomp any bishop who arrived in Czernowitz and the Romanian Metropolitan Vladimir de Repta was the one that saved the Torah and other holy scriptures from the Czernowitz synagogue during the first Russian occupation (1914).

The Romanian Bukovinian leaders – a community that dominated the villages of the south and centre of the province – considered that the Habsburg authorities do not pay due consideration to the requests of this ethnic group, favouring the development of other nationalities in Bukovina. For example, the Romanian Bukovinians were anxious because of the society's Teutonization tendencies³², in terms of the proclaimed equality among nations³³ without

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

³² *Ministrul de justiție germanizează Bucovina* [The Minister of Justice Teutonizes Bukovina], „Gazeta Română. Foaie politică națională”, Gura Humorului, February 1914, p. 3.

³³ Therefore, after the publication of the “Bukowiner Nachrichten” in the journal of the German Union from Bukovina, of a poem in which Czernowitz was called “German city on the Prut”, the magazine “The Romanian Gazette” (issuing once a month at Gura Humor, under the guidance of Ambros Comoroșan) wrote the following: “It is rather daring to call Bukovina's capital a German city, the capital where are located the

spreading irredentist projects. Within the limits accepted by the political regime, the Romanian nationalism could be manifested only in a dual form: the militant had to be simultaneously a “good Romanian” and an “Austrian patriot”.³⁴ However, the political elite did not forget to emphasize loyalty for the dynasty and empire. For example, at a political assembly organized by the Romanian National Party leaders in the Rosa suburb of Bukovina’s capital, after the speech given by Eusebius Popovici, chairman of the party, the participants cheered the final words of the speaker “with a blizzard of shouting “long live the Emperor!”³⁵

Given that the Austrian authorities were watching closely the occurrence of any separatist feelings and tried to suppress them from the very beginning, on the eve of World War I, “for Bukovinian Romanians the annexation of Bukovina to their homeland was more a vague desire, a resigned expectation of a distant ideal, than a strong belief in a certain and close achievement...”³⁶ However, among the intellectual elite there was the wide spread opinion that the imperial dualist structure is obsolete: “In our monarchy, for some time past terribly scandalous and shameful things happen and signs of a dissolution process arise. (...) Catastrophe approaches and collapse threatens.”³⁷ Another ethnic group related more to the rural world than to the urban one, with close connections to the compatriots of neighbouring Galicia, was the Ukrainian (Ruthenian) one. The Austrian Constitution recognized Ukrainians the right of existing and developing on equal terms with all the other peoples of the empire³⁸, but the precarious economic and political potential of the Ukrainian Bukovinians did not allowed them to capitalize all the rights and freedoms

institutes and cultural centres of Romanians and Ruthenians, the capital with the Romanian Mitropoly, the theological faculty partly teaching in Romanian, with the Jewish crowd that tends to get their national individuality recognized. (...) Then, how can Czernowitz be called a German city, it’s beyond our understanding. (...) We reject these attempts to Teutonize this ancestral land”. (See: *Din Cernăuți* [From Czernowitz], „Gazeta Română. Foaie politică națională”, February 1914, p. 4).

³⁴ *Orațiunea d-lui deputat Dr. Isopescul-Grecul în parlament* [The oration of the deputy Isopescul-Grecul in the Parliament], „Gazeta Răzeșilor și Mazililor”, June 21, 1913, p. 31.

³⁵ *Mare adunare politică a «Partidului național»* [The big political gathering of the “National Party”], „Viața Nouă”, December 21, 1913, January 03, 1914, p. 3.

³⁶ Nicolae Coman, *Martiriul Bucovinei, 1914-1915* [Bukovina’s Martyr, 1914-1915], București, Editura Librăriei Pavel Suru, 1915, p. 32-33.

³⁷ *Semne rele* [Bad signs], „Viața Nouă”, December 21, 1913, January 03, 1914, p. 2-3.

³⁸ В. Левицький, *Як живеться українському народові в Австрії* [The way of life of the Ukrainian people in Austria], Відень, Союз визволення України, 1915, с. 9.

guaranteed by the Austrian legislation of that era.³⁹ On the eve of World War I, among Ukrainians three distinct currents were being manifested: Moscowphile (which appreciated that that only with the Russian support could be salvaged the national identity against the Austrian state's pressure and against the Polish and Romanian domineering tendencies); Austrophile (which advocated the division of Galicia between Ukrainian and Poles and the establishing of an Ukrainian province within the monarchy) and Radical (separatist, who promoted the idea of reuniting all Ukrainians in an independent state).⁴⁰ Despite the mistrust expressed by the Austrian political leaders in the Ruthenians from the Empire, despite the display – not very obvious – of the Ukrainian irredentism, the Ruthenian community considered itself loyal to the House of Habsburg. This loyalty was confirmed publicly during the political gatherings held in Lemberg and Chernivsti (December 1912, December 1913 and March 1914).⁴¹

The Bukovinian Germans were obviously the cornerstone of the Habsburg regime in Bukovina. Artisans, farmers, practitioners of liberal professions, but especially officials, the representatives of this community were considered “culture carriers” and promoters of the German language at the border of the empire. Even if within the German ethnic group there wasn't a politics and projects unity, in its relation to the other nationalities it played the role of mediator or model and to a lesser extent that of a dominant nation. Without a doubt, the future of this community was inextricably linked to the maintenance of the Austrian administration in Bukovina. Nevertheless, in 1913-1914 in Bukovina there were rumours about the potential loss of the province. According to the confidential report drawn up in April 1914 by Alexander Dolivo-Dobrovolski, the Russian consul in Czernowitz, in the cafes of province's capital there were open discussions about the fact that: “In a few years Bukovina can become Russian or Romanian.”⁴²

The interethnic conflicts that were so visible in other parts of Austria-Hungary were virtually non-existent in the easternmost country of the Monarchy.

³⁹ Сергій Попик, *Українці в Австрії 1914-1918. Австрійська політика в українському питанні періоду Великої війни* [Ukrainians in Austria, 1914-1918. The Austrian policy in the Ukrainian issue during the Great War], Київ-Чернівці, Золоті литаври, 1999, с. 26.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 33-36.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 46.

⁴² Ion Varta, *Bătălia pentru Bucovina în ajunul Unirii cu România (1913-1917)* [The battle for Bukovina on the eve of the unification with Romania (1913-1917)], Chișinău, Cartdidact, 2008, p. 20.

After 1848 none of the ethnic groups had numerical majority so as to impose in the detriment of other nationalities; most of the inhabitants of the province settled in the land after 1775, as colonists; none could have advanced irredentist claims for the union with another state, except Romanians. Living on a relatively small territory, along with other nationalities, the Bukovinian was had to be acquisitive to the Eastern and Western Europe traditions and cultures. Without receding from their ethnic identity, the Bukovinian rejected chauvinism and promoted tolerance. Religiously, it was a similar situation.

If the Roman Catholic Church and, implicitly, the Greek Catholic one enjoyed privileged positions in Austria, the Orthodox church supported their authority and influence on the prosperous Bukovina's Orthodox Religionist Fund, the aggressive proselytism being absent in the province. The nationalities managed to maintain *pax bucoviniensis* until the eve of the Dualist Empire's dissolution⁴³, living together rather harmoniously from a cultural and social perspective.

BUKOVINA BETWEEN ENTHUSIASM OF PEOPLE AND LOYALIZATION ACTIONS OF THE AUTHORITIES

In spite of the many social, economic or political problems, visible and less visible, the society in Bukovina evolved confidently and safely on the path of progress, relying on the stability and adaptability of Dualist Empire. The British historian A. J. P. Taylor observed: "People have never had more confidence in the future of the Habsburg Monarchy than in the years preceding the end."⁴⁴ However, nobody expected things to precipitate. A few months after the outbreak of the Great War, Octavian C. Tăslăuanu, the Transylvanian journalist and fighter for national rights of Romanians in Transylvania, noted the following: "the revolver of young Gavro Princip killed along with the Crown Prince Franz Ferdinand, the only hope for a better future of the dualist kingdom's peoples. That is why the death of this sphinx of the future stirred waves of deep pain in the souls of those loyal to the House of Habsburg. They grieved a disaster, the collapse of an illusion that promised to many a better fate. (...) Most of the tears were sincere, springing from the hearts, for they were selfish. These weren't mourning the misfortune of

⁴³ Sophie A. Welsch, *The Bukovina-Germans During the Habsburg Period: Settlement, Ethnic Interaction, Contributions*, „FEEFHS Journal”, 2002, no. 10, p. 94, <http://feefhs.org/journal/10/bukovina.pdf>

⁴⁴ Taylor, *Monarhia Habsburgică*, p. 191.

the monarchy, but their own fate, about the future reign.”⁴⁵

Among the first communities that openly and massively expressed the support of Vienna's government policy was the Hebrew one. Therefore, the publication of the July 25th, 1914, notice on the partial mobilization, hundreds and thousands of Hebrews took to the streets in Czernowitz and in other cities of Bukovina. The Hebrew population was overwhelmed by war fever and bellicose shouting and military songs were heard in many places. This patriotism was inspired by two generations of imperial government during which Jews obtained equal rights with other ethnicity and occupied high positions in public service. Their loyalty was based on absolute confidence in the Austrian armed forces who have impressed rather through the brilliantly executed manoeuvres and parades⁴⁶ than on the battlefield.

On July 28th, 1914, Emperor Franz Joseph, launched the manifesto ‘*To My Peoples!*’ announcing the decision to initiate war against Serbia and expressed trust “in my peoples, who, throughout every storm, have always rallied in unity and loyalty around my throne, and have always been prepared for the severest sacrifices for the honour, the greatness, and the might of the Fatherland”⁴⁷. Immediately, loyalty and the assurance for the necessary support for waging war began to be made public by various institutions and organizations, as well as political parties. The day the Emperor published the manifesto, in front of the governor's palace in Czernowitz took place a great “patriotic demonstration”, and the next day a meeting with an even greater participation was organized in front of City Hall and of the governor's palace.⁴⁸ The attachment to the emperor and adherence to the war initiated by Austro-Hungary was acclaimed by the hierarchy of the Orthodox Church in Bukovina, but also by the other churches.

⁴⁵ Octavian C. Tăslăuanu, *Trei luni pe câmpul de războiu. Ziarul unui român, ofițer în armata austro-ungară, care a luat parte, cu glotașii români din Ardeal, la luptele din Galiția* [Three months on the battlefield. The newspaper of a Romanian, an officer in the Austro-Hungarian army, who took part, with the Romanian soldiers from Transylvania region, in the battles in Galicia], Ediția a II-a revăzută și întregită, București, Editura Librăriei Școalelor V. Sfetea, 1915, p. 9-10.

⁴⁶ Arie Leon Schmelzer, *The Jews in Bukowina (1914-1919). World War and Russian Occupation*, in Hugo Gold (ed.), *History of the Jews in the Bukovina*, Originally published as *Geschichte der Juden in der Bukowina*, Tel Aviv, Olamenu, 1958, Vol. 1, p. 67, http://www.jewishgen.org/yizkor/bukowinabook/buk1_067.html

⁴⁷ Direcția Județeană Suceava a Arhivelor Naționale [Suceava County Department of National Archives], Collection Primăria Vatra Dornei [Mayorality of Vatra Dornei], Record 37/1914.

⁴⁸ Teodor Bălan, *Bucovina în războiul mondial* [Bukovina in First World War], Cernăuți, Institutul de Arte Grafice și Editură „Glasul Bucovinei”, 1929, p. 13.

Besides Hebrews, the Bukovinian Romanians through the two political organisms – The Democratic Peasants' Party and The National Romanian Party – were placed in a loyalty position to the House of Habsburg.⁴⁹ On August 3rd, 1914, “The Union of Bukovina’s Ukrainian deputies in the parliament and diet” released the manifesto *To the Ukrainian people from Bukovina*, where it was specified that “together with all the peoples of this beautiful new state we will gladly make any sacrifice for our emperor, for the proud Habsburg Monarchy.”⁵⁰

The general mobilization order, issued on July 30th, 1914⁵¹, had immediate consequences in Bukovina. Aurel Morariu, a lawyer and politician, related: “Through heralds and messengers sent at a rate of knots, through trumpets and drums sounds, by ringing the church bells, it was spread in all corners of the country the dread of the news that the Muscovite has raised more than ever and the country is in danger. Immediately the emperor’s for most peoples has been heard and all those who had served in the imperial armies under the royal flags, from age 21 to 42 years, entered in this army. (...) Cheerfully and willingly, nearly 20 000 Romanians, boys and grizzled men, belonging to the mentioned regiments [41 and 22 – St. P.], departed to defend their country and those left behind, for the liberation of their Bessarabian brothers”.⁵²

The Poles – a nation seeking revival among the European states – considered Russia to be the biggest enemy of their dream. From the second half of August 1914, Bukovinian Poles were enrolled as volunteers in the Polish Legions coordinated by Józef Piłsudski. In the Eastern Carpathians area, against Tsarist armies acted the Polish Legion in the East, led by Colonel Józef Haller.⁵³

Authorities could not rely solely on the sincere enthusiasm or on the awareness of a part of the population. Whether in times of peace or in war, the loyalty and fidelity of the subjects, the social discipline, the economic, politic and

⁴⁹ Anghel Popa, *Între fronturi. Bucovineni în România primului război mondial* [Between fronts. Bukovinians in Romania during World War I], Câmpulung Moldovenesc, Fundația culturală „Alexandru Bogza”, 1998, p. 20.

⁵⁰ Попик, *Українці в Австрії*, с. 48.

⁵¹ Aurel Morariu, *Bucovina: 1774 – 1914* [Bukovina: 1774 – 1914], Ediție și notații biobibliografice de Nicolae Cârlan, Suceava, Lidana, 2012, p. 148. In Province’s localities, the general mobilization order, printed in German, Romanian and Ukrainian, was made public on July 31st (See Direcția Județeană Suceava a Arhivelor Naționale, Collection Primăria Vatra Dornei, Record 37/1914).

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 149.

⁵³ See Daniel Hrenciuc, *Un destin pentru istorie: polonezii în Bucovina (1774-2008)* [A destiny for history: The Poles in Bukovina (1774-2008)], Iași, Princeps Edit, 2008, p. 214-217.

fiscal order were ensured both through incentives and punitive means. In early August, the governor of Bukovina published an appeal to the banks and Austrian savings banks depositors not to withdraw the savings and deposits that are not needed urgently, justifying through the restrictions imposed on the citizens and relying on their civic consciousness: "In these difficult days surely it will be a display of patriotism and sense of solidarity of our monarchy's population through the renouncing to a hasty mobilization of money just right now. (...) So, it would be an unpatriotic act if someone would draw the money without needing them..."⁵⁴.

Another call addressed young people in schools and gymnasiums, which were invited to replace the parents and siblings from the front "Whether you will be applied to work the land, or for other activities in offices, various institutes and credit unions each of you must do with joy and heartfelt the work attributed to him."⁵⁵ On the other hand, Bukovinians were reminded the potential crimes for which in the given state of war, were subject to military criminal jurisdiction.⁵⁶ Also in various urban localities it was ordered the establishment of citizen safety patrols to provide the necessary support to public safety services. Thus, Ștefan Forfotă the mayor of Vatra Dornei (1910-1918), "summoned" his fellow citizens, on August 10th, 1914, "to voluntarily express their will to be in the service" (!) by immediate presence to the town hall.⁵⁷

A true test for Bukovinians loyalty was the Tsarist occupation of a significant part of the province. We should mention that the Austro-Hungarian government treated differently the component nations of the dualist empire, some peoples being considered less determined to defend the dynasty than others. For example, according to the imperial authorities, among the "unreliable elements" of the Austro-Hungarian army there were the ethnic Serbs, Czech, Romanian and Ruthenian.⁵⁸ The behaviour of the population during the withdrawal of the

⁵⁴ Meran, *Avertisment serios către depunători* [Serious warning for depositors], Direcția Județeană Suceava a Arhivelor Naționale, Collection *Primăria Vatra Dornei*, Record 39/1914.

⁵⁵ Meran, *Apel către tineretul dela școlile primare și secundare ale ducatului Bucovina* [Appeal to the youth from the primary and secondary schools of the Duchy of Bukovina], Direcția Județeană Suceava a Arhivelor Naționale, Collection *Primăria Vatra Dornei*, Record 39/1914.

⁵⁶ Meran, *Publicațiune* [Notice], Direcția Județeană Suceava a Arhivelor Naționale, Collection *Primăria Vatra Dornei*, Record 39/1914.

⁵⁷ Forfotă, *Apel* [Appeal], Direcția Județeană Suceava a Arhivelor Naționale, Collection *Primăria Vatra Dornei*, Record 39/1914.

⁵⁸ Mark Cornwall, *Morale and patriotism in the Austro-Hungarian army, 1914-1918*, in John

imperial troops and entering of tsarist ones brought arguments for future attitudes of the Austrians towards the ethnic groups in Bukovina. The offensive of the Russian armies led to the occupation of region's capital on September 2nd, 1914, and of the city of Storojineț on September 15th, the tsarist troops stopping at the river Siret, which formed the border with Romania. Meanwhile, Count Meran, the Austrian Governor of Bukovina, moved his residence from Czernowitz to Vatra Dornei⁵⁹ and the gendarmerie's headquarters was established at Rădăuți, where the Military tribunal functioned.

The attitude of some of the Romanian leaders towards Russia's arrival was full of expectations and based on the idea that Bukovina could get out from under the Austrian administration. After the tsarist authorities removed Czernowitz's City Council led by Mayor Salomon Weisselberger, city's leadership was appointed an interim committee which included a majority of ethnic Romanians: (Maximilian) Hacman, (Titus) Onciul, Modest Scalat, Themistocles Bocancea⁶⁰, the latter occupying the position of mayor. Other Romanians, as well as Ukrainians collaborated with the occupying military authorities, causing subsequent reprisals from the Austrian administration. Many, however, took refuge together with the imperial troops from the Russian army. Noteworthy is that the Orthodox Metropolitan Vladimir de Repta refused to officiate the divine service for the Russian Tsar.⁶¹

Most of the Ukrainian leaders, sensing that once with the return of the Austrian government they might be charged with treason and being aware that Russia was not going to satisfy their national aspirations, they avoided manifesting openly for or against the new administration. The Jews, however, being aware of the status of their countrymen from the Russian Empire, did not rush to cooperate with the new authorities. On September 21st, 1914, V. N. Muraviov, superior secretary of the diplomatic chancellery attached to the tsarist Russian Army Headquarters, located in the city of Czernowitz, wrote: "...the local Hebrew population has a hostile attitude towards us."⁶²

Horne (ed.), *State, society and mobilization in Europe during the First World War*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 178.

⁵⁹ Bălan, *Bucovina*, p. 19.

⁶⁰ Nicolae Iorga, *Cei ce au îndrăznit...* [Those who have dared ...], in N. Iorga, *Războiul nostru în note zilnice 1914-1916* [Our War in daily notes 1914-1916], Craiova, Ramuri, n. d., Vol. 1, p. 43.

⁶¹ Romulus Deladorna, *Bucovina în 1914-1915* [Bukovina in 1914-1915], Suceava, Tipografia Societății „Școala Română”, 1915, p. 54.

⁶² Varta, *Bătălia*, p. 33.

The first months of the war, the conducted mobilization, the tsarist military occupation proved that the overwhelming majority of Bukovinians was and has remained loyal to the Court of Vienna. In October 1914, when 5 of the 7 battalions of Bukovinian volunteers that were under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel (which became Colonel on October 23rd) Eduard Fischer entered the city of Czernowitz banishing the Russian armies, the locals set on the Transylvania street two rows of tables with food and drinks, the tables being arranged on a distance of about 2.5 km, between the city customs and the Cathedral The Descending of the Holy Ghost.⁶³ "There was great joy in Czernowitz. The Austro-Hungarian troops had returned – even if without the glory of a victory – to the capital of Bukovina. And everyone he came out to greet them (...),"⁶⁴ noted N. Iorga on October 19th, 1914.

The initiative of establishing Bukovinian volunteer troops is on the same direction with the rejection of the "Russian" liberation. After the November 13th, 1914, Colonel Eduard Fischer obtained the General Karl von Pflanzer-Baltin approval to recruit volunteers, the achievement of the mission was assumed by the Bukovinian deputies in the Parliament from Vienna, Nikolaus Wassilko (among Hutsuls) and Aurel Onciul (among Romanians).⁶⁵ Thus, on November 22nd, 1914, in Suceava, a large peasant gathering was organized and it was decided to create a Legionary Corps, for which to recruit 50 volunteers from each commune, and to write a telegram addressed to King Ferdinand I, in which the authors were asking the monarch to join the war alongside Austria-Hungary.⁶⁶ The massive participation of the villagers (over 3 000 people) was due, among other reasons, to the fact that participants were promised meals and transportation on the organizers' account ("mayors and Diet deputies"). Nicolae Iorga pessimistically commented: "All Bukovina's countrymen came to Suceava. There's no doubt about the sincerity of the resolutions. And we know one thing. We don't belong in Bukovina. They don't want us – the Romanian peasants there."⁶⁷ Despite the intense display of group identity in the decades prior to the

⁶³ Володимир Заполовський, Сергій Осачук, *Слідами забутої війни в Буковині* [On the track of a forgotten war in Bukovina], Чернівці, 1998, с. 10.

⁶⁴ Nicolae Iorga, *Bucuria din Cernăuți* [The joy in Czernowitz], in Iorga, *Războiul*, Vol. 1, p. 94.

⁶⁵ Володимир Заполовський, *Буковина в останній війні Австро-Угорщини 1914-1918* [Bukovina in the last War of Austria-Hungary, 1914-1918], Чернівці, Золоті литаври, 2003, с. 38-39.

⁶⁶ Popa, *Între fronturi*, p. 28-31.

⁶⁷ Nicolae Iorga, *Întrunirea din Suceava* [The assembly in Suceava], in N. Iorga, *Războiul nostrum*, Vol. 1, p. 114-115.

war, during the four years of war, the Romanian nationalist activity was modest.⁶⁸ The most active leaders of the community emigrated to Romania or to other European countries or they were under close supervision by the Austrian authorities.⁶⁹ Until the Kingdom of Romania joined in the war (August 1916), the Romanian soldiers from Bukovina, the civilian population, especially the peasantry, remained loyal to the Habsburg Monarchy.⁷⁰

On November 19th, 1914 the Hutsul volunteers Corps was established (1 351 soldiers), and in December it was established in Câmpulung the Romanian Battalion (1 500 soldiers).⁷¹ The local authorities were instructed to provide financial support to these paramilitary formations.⁷² The success of the prompt organisation of these formations parties was explained by the fact that the peasants were promised that if they voluntarily join to fight against the Russian troops they will remain to defend their own villages, otherwise will be recruited for Landsturm* and sent to fight in Hungary.⁷³

CONCLUSION

From all the above it results that most of the population of Bukovina was really loyal to the Emperor in Vienna and the mobilizations that were carried out, especially in the first weeks of the war had the people's support. Despite this evidence of loyalty, after recovering the territories occupied by the Russian troops, the Austrian military authorities proceeded to repressions against the Bukovinians, the main suspects that were accused of collaboration with the enemy were among the Romanians and Ukrainians. The abuses committed then had shaken little by little Bukovinian's confidence in the faultlessness of the Habsburg administration, in the infallibility of the Court of Vienna, in the

⁶⁸ Keith Hitchins, *România 1866 – 1947* [Rumania 1866 – 1947], Bucureşti, Humanitas, 1996, 301.

⁶⁹ See Constantin Ungureanu, *Memoriul lui Iancu Flondor, din anul 1915, despre hotarele Bucovinei*, [The 1915 Memoir of Iancu Flondor on the boundaries of Bukovina], „Analele Bucovinei”, X, 2003, no. 2, p. 493-508.

⁷⁰ Keith Hitchins, *România*.

⁷¹ Володимир Заполовський, Сергій Осачук, *Слідами*, p. 12; Fischer, *Abgeordneter von Wassilko und das Bukowinaer Huzulenkörps*, „Bukowinaer Post”, 20 Dezember, 1914, S. 1.

⁷² Direcția Județeană Suceava a Arhivelor Naționale, Collection Primăria Vatra Dornei, Record 60/1914, document dated 06.12.1914.

* Reserve forces formed to provide soldiers for the front-line troops.

⁷³ Попик, *Українці в Австрії*, с. 63.

impartiality of the government. This seed of distrust found fertile soil in the World War's conditions, being fed by the nationalism cultivated by local elites in previous decades and by the dualist empire's dissolution perspectives. Therefore, after four years of war, the majority of Bukovina's population stopped hoping in the perpetuation of the pre-war situation, the ethnic groups (except the Germans and Jews) were seeking – through their political representatives – political solutions outside the Austrian state.

THE END OF THE SLOVAK ARMY EPIC ON THE EASTERN FRONT AND THE CHANGE OF THE ROMANIAN STRATEGY TOWARDS BRATISLAVA

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Abstract. *This analysis considers the way in which Romania managed the more and more complex relations within the Axis during the year 1943. At the beginning of the year, the military situation on the Eastern front had changed substantially. Germany's defeat at Stalingrad had changed the relation between Germany and its allies. The tension between Germany and Romania, on the one hand, and between Slovakia and Hungary on the other hand, would also mark the relations within the Axis. However, the armies of the three allies continued to support the German war effort. The Slovak Rapid Division participated during the year in the military defensive operations of the Crimean Peninsula. Its effort led to the erosion of the combat capabilities, especially after the disaster caused by the Battle of Kakhovka. Instead, the Slovakian army had to face an unprecedented number of defections. The Slovak soldiers moving to the enemy had forced the Germans to disband the Rapid Division, some of which being sent to the Italian front and the other to the labour force. Nevertheless, Romanian-Slovak relations continued to be good. The change in the Romanian strategy having as its main objective to restore the Transylvania's border, will force Bucharest to maintain the best possible relations with Slovakia.*

Keywords: *Slovak army, Rapid Division, Crimean Peninsula, Eastern Front, deserters*

Rezumat: *Sfârșitul epopeii armatei slovace pe Frontul de Est și schimbarea strategiei românești față de Bratislava. Analiza de față are în vedere modul cum a gestionat România raporturile tot mai complexe din cadrul Axei pe parcursul anului 1943. La începutul anului situația militară de pe frontul de est se modificase substanțial. Înfrângerea de la Stalingrad a reasezat raporturile dintre Germania și aliații săi. Tensiunea care s-a instalat între Germania pe de o parte și România, Slovacia și Ungaria pe de alta avea să marcheze relațiile din cadrul Axei. Cu toate acestea, armatele celor trei aliați au continuat să sprijine efortul de război german. Divizia Rapidă slovacă a participat pe parcursul anului la operațiunile militare de apărare a Peninsulei Crimeea. Efortul ei a dus la erodarea capacității de luptă, mai ales după dezastrul din bătălia de la Kachovka. În schimb, armata slovacă s-a confruntat cu un număr fără precedent de dezertări. Trecherile soldaților slovaci*

la inamic i-a obligat pe germani să desființeze Divizia rapidă, o parte fiind strămutată pe frontul italian iar alta trecută în cadrul unităților de muncă. Cu toate acestea relațiile româno-slovace au continuat să fie bune. Schimbarea strategiei românești care și-a impus ca principal obiectiv în refacerea frontierei din Transilvania, forța Bucureștiul să păstreze relații cât mai bune cu Slovacia.

Résumé : La fin de l'épopée de l'armée slovaque sur le Front d'Est et le changement de la stratégie roumaine envers Bratislava. L'analyse ci-jointe fait référence à la manière dans laquelle la Roumanie gère les rapports de plus en plus complexes du cadre de l'Axe le long de l'année 1943. Au début de l'année la situation militaire du front d'est se modifia de manière substantielle. La défaite de Stalingrad rétablit les rapports entre l'Allemagne et ses alliés. La tension qui s'installe entre l'Allemagne d'une part et la Roumanie, la Slovaquie et la Hongrie de l'autre marquera les relations à l'intérieur de l'Axe. Malgré cela, les armées des trois alliés continuèrent à appuyer l'effort de guerre allemand. La Division Rapide slovaque participa le long de l'année aux opérations militaires de défense de la Péninsule Crimée. Son effort mena à l'érosion de la capacité de lutte, surtout après le désastre de la bataille de Kachovka. En échange, l'armée slovaque se confronta avec un numéro sans précédent de désertions. Les passages des soldats slovaques à l'ennemi obligèrent les Allemands à détruire la Division rapide, on déménagea une partie sur le front italien, pendant qu'on passa une autre dans le cadre des unités de travail. Malgré cela, les relations roumano-slovaques continuèrent à être bonnes. Le changement de la stratégie roumaine qui s'imposa comme objectif principal refaire la frontière de la Transylvanie, obligea Bucarest à garder les meilleures relations avec la Slovaquie.

INTRODUCTION

The epic of the Slovak army on the Eastern Front was extensively dealt with in Czech and Slovak historiography. In contrast, in Romanian historiography, cooperation on the military realm between Romania and Slovakia during the war years was only partially studied. Moreover, the way the dissolution of the Slovakian small army was received and how this was reflected in the bilateral relations was not surprised by any analysis. The present study focuses on the complex relationship between the Axis satellites and the Nazi Reich and on how the Romanian-Slovak cooperation was influenced by this relationship¹. The two countries

¹ See our previous studies: *La participation de l'armée slovaque à la campagne contre l'Union Soviétique en 1941. Perceptions roumaines*, in "Codrul Cosminului", XX, no. 1, 2016; respectively *Relations militaires roumaines-slovaques en 1942*, in "Codrul Cosminului", XXII, no.2, 2016.

had contacts in various forms, without a real Romanian-Slovak but cooperation in the military field. Despite the unfavourable situation on the front, relations between politicians and Romanian and Slovak militaries have been constant. At the same time, we considered the situation of Romania and Slovakia during 1943 and from the perspective of the relations between the two allied states of the Nazi Reich. Since 1943, for Romania, military participation against the Soviet Union has gained new connotations. Under the conditions of defeat in front of the Red Army, the main objective, that of rebuilding the frontiers of Great Romania, has articulated and was viewed more nuanced. The reconstruction of the Eastern border of Romania began to be regarded with caution. With the defeats in Russia, the cancellation of the consequences of the Vienna agreement of 1940 became the main objective. As for Slovakia, since the border issue with Hungary was the only objective, the cooperation between the two became tighter. Both countries hoped that at the end of the war they would be able to rebuild the lost frontiers of the Vienna accords, or at least to preserve the existing ones in the face of the Hungarian threat. The same realities forced Hungary to look for solutions in the new context. Hungary's military cooperation aimed to preserve borders or even increase them on the part of Romania and Slovakia. At the same time, the three were aware that a possible victory against the Soviet Union would not solve the territorial dispute between them. That is why everybody tried not to exhaust their military potential and economic capabilities in the confrontation of the East. Romania and Slovakia were in a favourable position because they could always fight against the common opponent represented by Hungary at any time. This was well known in Budapest, which had only one advantage: the influence in Berlin. But the general situation of the Reich has rapidly deteriorated what has affected the general relations in the Tripartite Pact.

Along with some general considerations issued by the American historian Larry Watts, but without considering Slovakia, data on the situation of the Romanian-Slovak-Hungarian relations in 1943 can be found in the studies of the Romanian historians Petre Otu or Nicolae Ciachir². In her turn, Slovak researcher Jana Bauerová partially touched some details of the collaboration between Bratislava

² Petre Otu, *Relații militare româno-slovace (1940-1944)* [Romanian-Slovak Military Relations (1940-1944)], in Constantin Hlihor (coord.), *Structuri politice în secolul XX*, [Political Structures in the 20th Century], București, Editura Curtea Veche, 2000; Nicolae Ciachir, *Relații româno-slovace și româno-croate între 1941-1944*, [Romanian-Slovak relations and Romanian-Croat relations between 1941-1944], in "Revista de Istorie Militară", 1(41), 1997.

and Bucharest in 1943³. Instead, the documents edited by Alesandru Duțu and his collaborators captured the Romanian-Slovak relations during 1943⁴. Corroborated with information from the diplomatic environments and preserved in the Romanian archives, they complete the overall picture of an aspect of Romanian's well-unknown history.

ROMANIANS, SLOVAKS AND HUNGARIANS ON THE EASTERN FRONT. GERMAN PERCEPTIONS

The year 1943 began under the auspices of the great German defeat at Stalingrad. Reich leaders were not able to assume the blame for disaster and tried to accredit the idea of betrayal. The German Army Staff blamed its allies for failure in Stalingrad. "About hundreds of thousands of Allies - Romanians, Hungarians, Italians and Slovaks - as well as the countless Hilfswillige (Russian auxiliaries), no one spoke to the Führer Headquarters. And if, however, they were mentioned, it was only to bring false accusations and reproaches about their alleged shameful shame before the enemy"⁵. Not all German military leaders agreed that the Allies were guilty of the Stalingrad disaster. Colonel Hans Doerr, commander of the German liaison detachment with the 4th Romanian Army, considered that the Romanian soldiers "fought bravely". In turn, field Marshal Gerd von Runstedt said the Slovaks were "excellent, very modest" admitting that they were badly equipped and unprepared for the battlefield on the eastern front. Instead, the Hungarians "only wanted to go home sooner"⁶. Another German officer, Colonel Wilhelm Adam, made a comparison of Germany's allies on the eastern front. He doubted the Italians' ability to cope with the weight of being 3000 km away on the front. He also had doubts about the Romanians or the Hungarians, but he believed

³ Jana Bauerová, *Slovensko a Rumunsko v rokoch 1939-1944*, [Slovakia and Romania between 1939-1944], Filozofická Fakulta Trnavskej Univerzity v Trnave, 2014.

⁴ Alesandru Duțu, Lenuța Nicolescu, Alexandru Oșca, Andrei Nicolescu, *Atașatii militari transmit* [Military attaches transmit], vol. IV, 1940-1944, București, Editura Europa Nova, 2004.

⁵ Rolf-Dieter Müller, *Alături de Wehrmacht. "Cruciada împotriva bolșevismului". Aliți, voluntari, auxiliari 1941-1945*, [Alongside the Wehrmacht. "A Crusade against Bolshevism". Allies, voluntaries, auxiliaries 1941-1945], translated by Cristina Crâmpîță, București, Editura Militară, 2015, p. 21.

⁶ Constantin Corneanu, *Sub povara marilor decizii. România și Geopolitica Marilor Puteri (1941-1945)* [Under the burden of big decisions. Romania and Great Powers Geopolitics (1941-1945)], 2nd edition, Târgoviște, Editura Cetatea de Scaun, 2013, note 346, p. 371.

that they had a good moral, despite their weak endowment. According to his testimony, "Paulus valued the Romanians a lot" but "he also trusted the Hungarians"⁷. The German officer did not criticize allied armies even after the Stalingrad disaster. He considered the diminished morale of the Romanian or Hungarian troops a result of the weak endowment and especially the lack of motivation to fight on such a terrain. He mentioned that the Romanians had fought very well in 1941 when they had a clear objective but that beyond the Don and the morale of the German soldiers had fallen. "What do we look for in the Volga, Colonel?" Was the question that it would also smash Adam⁸.

Relations between the Axis partners have become more and more tense with unfavourable military operations. Germany noted that the rivalry of Romanians and Slovaks with the Hungarians could even lead to a military conflict. On January 9, 1943, Marshal Ion Antonescu submitted a Memoir to Adolf Hitler. Along with the serious military problems due to the imminent defeat at Stalingrad, Antonescu touched on the Hungarian problem. He noted in the Memorial some statements in the Budapest Parliament regarding Transylvania. He cited, among other things, Minister Ullein Retvitzsky, Hungarian media director, who said to a close friend that "Hungary's preoccupation is to win the war when it would be willing to lose the Slovakian and Yugoslav territories if it would be offset in the territory of Romania". Other Hungarian deputies thought that Hungary should recover all lost territories from Transylvania to the Tatra Mountains.⁹ The German attaché to the Romanian Army High Command reported that "on the basis of the old enmity of death promoted to the present day by Romanian propaganda, Hungary is perceived as an enemy. Even in the Romanian units fighting in the east, chauvinist elements within the officers' body present Hungary as the main enemy, suggesting that the purpose of the Romanians' struggle in the Eastern campaign would be the recovery of the broken parts of the country - as a kind of appreciation for the Romanian help"¹⁰. It is true that at the time of his report - March 5, 1943 - in Romania, the idea that Germany had lost the war in the East and that the country had to redefine its objectives of war by rebuilding the lost frontiers in 1940

⁷ Wilhem Adam, *O hotărâre dificilă. Autobiografie. Cu aportul științific și literar al prof. dr. doc. Otto Rühle* [A tough decision. Autobiography, With the guidance of prof. dr. doc. Otto Rühle], translated by Costin Feneșan, București, Editura Militară, 1988, p. 68.

⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 187.

⁹ *Antonescu-Hitler. Corespondență și întâlniri inedite (1940-1944)* [Antonescu-Hitler. Correspondence and unique encounters (1940-1944)], 2nd volume, edited by Vasile Arimia, Ion Ardeleanu, Ștefan Lache, București, Editura Cozia, 1991, doc. 52, p. 16-17.

¹⁰ Rolf-Dieter Müller, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

became clearer. The old anti-communist propaganda was more obviously replaced by a new campaign of awareness that the war effort was aimed at restoring the border in Transylvania.

The Slovaks were no longer willing to support the military effort. Romania's military attaché to Bratislava, C. Ștefănescu, wrote in January 1943 that Slovakia sends no more than a contingent to Russia, and only if it is armed by the Germans. Moreover, Tiso was worried about the general military evolution and demanded Germany's guarantees of how the new European post-war order would look. He was also anxious about the aggravation of the domestic political situation becoming more and more difficult in the conditions of prolonging the war. For his part, Chief of Staff of the Slovak Army, Ferdinand Čatloš called for the withdrawal of the Rapid Division in Slovakia. A Slovak report on the situation on the front indicated that "it is generally said that Germany will lose the war"¹¹. This gesture followed the statements of the Banská Bystrica Conference on January 22-23, 1943, when it was decided to stop supporting the German Military Mission in Slovakia. The Slovaks were also dissatisfied with the efforts made by the Hungarians on the front, having information that they had lost many militaries from the occupied territories, Romanian and Slovak, preferring to keep the Hungarians in reserve¹². The Slovaks informed the Romanians that the armaments acquired by Hungary in Germany lately, especially tanks, were not sent to the front¹³.

In turn, the relations between the Hungarian and the German military were very tense. The withdrawal of German units in the Hungarian sector created the Hungarian commander Vitéz Gusztáv Jány the impression that he was betrayed. He even intended at one point to leave the front with the entire army. But the German pressures were so great that the Hungarians remained on the front. In January 1943, the Red Army launched a large military operation in the Voronezh sector, hitting the Hungarian troops across the entire stretch of the front sector. Three days later, the Hungarian and Italian troops were crushed and retreated. The withdrawal order came only on January 26, when much of the Hungarian Army was defeated and decimated. It lost 100,000 troops and the whole arsenal. Though the Romanian troops were losing even more, Hungary could not cope with this war. It was the first time the Budapest authorities understood that the war in

¹¹ James Mace Ward, *Priest, Politician, Collaborator. Josef Tiso and the Making of Fascist Slovakia*, Ithaca, London, Cornell University Press, 2013, p. 236.

¹² Alesandru Duțu, et al. *op. cit.*, doc. 40, p. 186-188.

¹³ Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereinafter A.M.A.E.), Fond 71, Slovacia, vol. 13, f. 197.

the East was lost and they posed the question of a diplomatic solution to the conflict. After the Voronezh disaster, the Hungarian troops were no longer able to fight, providing only occupation sectors on the territory of Ukraine. Even if they had suffered losses in the fighting with the Partisans and Horthy wanted to pull them off the front. Hitler had lost confidence in Hungary's ability to contribute to the war but had no intention of saving it¹⁴. As the German army was very weak and incapable to keep up with the Soviet offensive, any ally was welcome. The Führer had changed its optics towards smaller allies. He put pressure on Bucharest, Bratislava, and Budapest to ensure continued participation in the war by the three.

Although the German leadership was warned about the altered attitudes of its allies, it avoided making firm commitments. Even in the defeat of Stalingrad, he declined to accurately state what the Axis's geopolitical intentions and goals were. Under these circumstances, small allies have begun to open communication lines with the United Nations through neutral states. Germany's response was to take strong measures to achieve the loyalty of its partners. With pressure, but also benefiting from the advantage of military domination, Berlin brought the Hungarians, Romanians and Slovaks to account. That is why he stopped arms supplies to the three countries and took into account a military step that would lead to their occupation. There was information that these countries did not use military equipment from Germany on the eastern front but were preparing them inside the country for a possible direct confrontation with each other¹⁵. The Germans changed their tactics and in January-February 1943 Hitler threatened all collaborators who were planning a possible separate peace¹⁶. In turn, the leaders of the satellite countries were summoned to Germany.

Antonescu was the first to visit Hitler on April 12-13, 1943. The German Chancellor asked Antonescu for explanations of the peace-surveys undertaken by Romania. To stop Hitler's accusations, the Romanian leader accused the Hungarians of contributing to the eastern front with improvised troops, poorly prepared and largely formed of uninstructed Romanians in the Transylvanian territory¹⁷.

¹⁴ Paul Lendvai, *Ungurii. Timp de un mileniu învingători în înfrângeri* [The Hungarians: A Thousand Years of Victory in Defeat], București, Editura Humanitas, 2001, p. 429.

¹⁵ Generalul Ion Gheorghe, *Un dictator nefericit. Mareșalul Antonescu (Calea României spre Statul satelit)* [Marshal Antonescu, An unhappy dictator (Romania's way to the Satellite State)], edited by Stelian Neagoe, București, Editura Machiavelli, 1996, p. 200.

¹⁶ Róbert Letz, *Slovenské dejiny v 1938-1945* [Slovak History in 1938-1945], Bratislava, Literárne informačné centrum, 2012, p. 165.

¹⁷ Larry L. Watts, *Aliați incompatibili. România, Finlanda, Ungaria și al Treilea Reich*

Antonescu was well informed because the Romanian military attaché in Budapest regularly reported reports showing that after the Voronezh disaster, the Hungarians remained only declarative in the Axis, seeking to diminish their military effort and started secret negotiations with the Allies for the retreat from war¹⁸.

Two days later, Horthy's turn came. At the Klessheim meeting between Hitler and Horthy on April 16, 1943, the Führer accused Horthy of having the Hungarian troops fought very badly. The Hungarian leader tried to explain that Hungary is obliged to keep part of the army in the country to prevent the restoration of the Little Entente between Croats, Romanians and Slovaks. Together with Ferenc Szombathelyi, he tried to bring the issue of Banat and the revision of the Hungarian border with Romania and Slovakia. But Hitler did not let him present his materials, interrupting him violently, and reproaching him that the military reports prove the Hungarian army's inability to rise to the importance of the situation¹⁹. The Hungarian diplomatic failure would lead to the loss of Berlin's confidence in Budapest and the final deterioration of the German-Hungarian relations.

On April 23, Monsignor Jozef Tiso was summoned to the Klessheim Headquarters to take into account the need to continue the military effort²⁰. The Slovak leader was convinced to continue the war effort in the hope that Hitler would recognize his merits and support it against Hungary. Tiso complained of Hungarian irrational propaganda but promised that Slovakia would continue the fight²¹. While preserving his confidence in the Slovak leader, Hitler turned to a classical stratagem: he decorated it in 1943 with the Golden Cross of the German Order. Moreover, Hitler promised him to re-establish the military potential of the Slovak army²². Obviously, Hitler assured Tiso that he would give him all the support and told him that "With the exception of Mussolini, no other ally caused less trouble than Slovakia"²³.

[Incompatible allies. Romania, Finland, Hungary and the 3rd Reich], București, Editura RAO, 2012, p. 229.

¹⁸ Cezar Măță, *Serviciile secrete ale României în războiul mondial (1939-1945)* [Romania's Secret services during the Second World War (1939-1945)], Iași, Casa Editorială Demiurg, 2010, Anex 23, p. 332-333.

¹⁹ Larry L. Watts, *op. cit.*, p. 225; James Mace Ward, *op. cit.*, p. 238.

²⁰ Milan S. Đurica, *Jozef Tiso 1887-1947. Životopisný profil* [Jozef Tiso 1887-1947, Biographical profile], Bratislava, Lúč, 2014, p. 379.

²¹ James Mace Ward, *op. cit.*, p. 238.

²² Anton Spiesz, Dusan Caplovic, *Illustrated Slovak History. A Struggle for Sovereignty in Central Europe*, Wauconda, Illinois, Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers, 2006, p. 211.

²³ Livia Rotkirchen, *A Few Considerations on the Historiography of the Holocaust*, in *The*

These visits of enemy leaders were meant to break their collaboration in various fields. The rivalry between them was for Germany a situation which they explored as much as possible. Neither Horthy knew what Hitler had promised Antonescu's or Tiso's, nor did they know what the Fuhrer had promised to the Hungarians. That's why they were willing to compromise. Instead, in August, the Slovenian president said that if Italy exited the war, he would follow the actions of Romania and Hungary. His fairly elusive speech made it clear that they might distance themselves from German politics. But its condition for a possible new orientation was to preserve the country's independence. In October, Tiso reiterated his unconditional loyalty to the Reich²⁴.

The three countries continued fighting alongside the Reich, but their adversity did not diminish. In the new strategy, everyone has sought to find new solutions to achieve their goals. In the September 1943 bulletin, the Romanian military diplomat in Bratislava said that Hungary's decision to exit the war caused her to liquidate her conflict with her neighbours by granting tolerance to the Romanian or Slovak minority on its territory. The Hungarians tried to "close their eyes to the anti-Hungarian demonstrations that occur every now and then in Slovakia", hoping they will be able to reconcile with Bratislava²⁵. Their gesture was supposed to be a signal in Bucharest to normalize relations. But the General Staff was considering keeping a troop reserve on the national territory that would ensure territorial integrity if attacked by its neighbours. The refusal to send troops to the front was also motivated by negotiations with the Allies and wanted to be a sign of his good faith²⁶. In a discussion with Hans Ludin, the German Minister in Bratislava in July 1943, the Romanian military attaché drew his attention to the importance of Transylvania for Romania's policy. The German has refrained from commenting on the Hungarian-Romanian relations but said that "Romania has had the greatest losses among all our allies and knows that it has a large army in Russia, while other allies would like to make the war without loss, sitting the home". Asked who he was referring to, the German diplomat responded elusively: "My comrades who fought with the Slovaks told me that the Slovak army had fought well"²⁷. The Hungarian army was considered to be worse. Most of the military came from among

Tragedy of the Jews of Slovakia. 1938-1945: Slovakia and the "Final Solution of the Jewish Question", Oświęcim-Banská Bystrica, 2002, p. 80.

²⁴ Milan S. Ďurica, *op. cit.*, p. 387.

²⁵ Cezar Măță, *op. cit.*, p. 336.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 334-335.

²⁷ Alesandru Duțu, et al. *op. cit.*, doc. 45, p. 211.

the minorities, which aroused the mistrust of the officers. The presence of Romanians and Slovaks in these units has further strained relations with Romania and Slovakia. The Hungarians, however, continued to motivate the danger inside as they tried to withdraw their troops from the front²⁸.

In spite of official statements, Romanians, Slovaks and Hungarians have knitted through various channels their contacts with neutral countries or Axis opponents. But Germany's allies' goals did not have much of an echo in Washington and London. Only Romania still had military and economic capabilities that would have been attractive to Western allies. Instead, Slovakia had not been recognized by them, and Hungary was accused of supporting Germany's pre-war policy. The Hungarians and the Slovaks sought to persuade Westerners that the refusal to support Germany in its military effort was an important argument. But for Hungary alone, leaving the alliance with Germany could be an asset at the next peace conference. Given the existence of an exiled Czechoslovakian government recognized by the Allies, for Slovakia the defeat of Germany represented the end of independence. In turn, Romania was in a complicated situation. The secret negotiations that began in 1943 aimed at rebuilding the border of Transylvania. But the alliance of the three with Germany blocked such initiatives.

THE SLOVAK'S ARMY DISSOLUTION

The German command had in the spring of 1943, 232 divisions on the Eastern Front, of which 196 were German and the rest of belonged to the allies and auxiliaries. Among these, Romania had the largest forces, estimated at nine divisions from the five Hungarians and the two Slovaks²⁹. The latter would lose their first motivation to fight, and the Slovak military forces on the Eastern Front entered into dissolution in 1943.

The Slovak army experienced the shock of winter 1942-1943. The Slovak Army Corps fought in 1942 within the South Army Group, subordinated to the Army Group "A" acting on the direction of the Caucasus Mountains, alongside a 1st Corps of the 3rd Romanian Army³⁰. Once the Stalingrad disaster was profiled, the

²⁸ Cristian Troncotă, *Glorie și tragedii. Momente din istoria Serviciilor de informații și contrainformații române pe Frontul de Est (1941-1944)* [Glory and tragedies. Moments of the History of the Romanian Intelligence and Counterintelligence Services on the Eastern Front (1941-1944)], București, Editura Nemira, 2003, p.160.

²⁹ Vladimir Zodian, *Armatele româno-germane pe frontul din Răsărit* [Romanian and German Armies on the Eastern Front], Bacău, Editura Vicovia, 2014, note 120, p. 181.

³⁰ Pavel Mičianik, *Vojnoví zajatci slovenskej armády na východnom fronte 1941-1943*

Rapid Division was seized with all the artillery material for recovery. From January 8, 1943, the Slovak Rapid Division was subordinated to the Armed Forces Group by Angelis, along with four German divisions and the 6th and 9th Romanian Divisions. The Rapid Slovak Division received a withdrawal order commenced on January 23, 1943, to Crimea, where it was involved in fighting for the defence of the sea. Slovak military leaders hoped to re-establish the Division with a staff of 12-13,000 soldiers. It was the beginning of the year at Perekop, and the reorganization was to be taken on the west coast of the Crimean Peninsula, between Sevastopol and the Evpatoria. Without receiving significant reinforcements and low morale, the Slovak troops continued to fight alongside the Wehrmacht. In March 1943, 5,000 soldiers with the Rapid Division led by Pavel Kuna were ordered to defend a 250 km shoreline, being involved only in struggles against the Soviet partisans in the Crimea³¹. At the same time, Slovak aviation was rebuilt with German support. In Crimea there used to be an aviation school for bombing that prepared the Slovak pilots. The Germans expressed favourably to the performances of the Slovak pilots and appreciated their work. Along with German and Romanian comrades, Slovak pilots participated in the battles of the Novorossiysk area in April 1943³². It was the first time that Romanian and Slovak soldiers fought side by side.

After the withdrawal of the Slovak army and the reorganization of its combat units, in July 1943, the only remaining Slovakian structure was the Rapid Division. Ferdinand Čatloš repeatedly tried to withdraw this unit too, in Slovakia, but the Germans opposed. Under these conditions, the Slovak Army leaders organized visits of the military attachés accredited to Bratislava to the Slovakian regiments on the front to raise their morale. In August 1943, Slovak troops were sent to the west of the peninsula to build fortifications to prevent the Red Army from entering the interior. The division was reorganized and divided into 1st Infantry

[Slovak soldiers seized on the Eastern front], in Peter Sokolovič (coord.), *Od Salzburgu do vypuknutia Povstania. Slovenská republika 1939-1945 očami mladých historikov VIII* [From Salzburg to the outbreak of insurrection. Slovak Republic seen by young historians], Bratislava, Ustav Pamäti Národa, 2009, p. 365.

³¹ František Cséfalvay, Ľubica Kázmerová, *Slovenská republika 1939-1945. Chronologia najdôležitejších udalostí* [Slovak Republic. The cronology of the main events], Bratislava, Historický ústav SAV, 2007, p. 95.

³² General Platon Chirnoagă, *Istoria politică și militară a războiului României contra Rusiei Sovietice 22 iunie 1941-23 august 1944* [Political and Military History of the War of Romania against Soviet Russia June 22, 1941-August 23, 1944], 3rd Edition, Iași, Editura Fides, 1997, p. 180.

Division, respectively II Infantry Division³³. Division I was sent to the isthmus Perekop area and the other was placed at Kahovka in front of the Soviet army, and on 27 October received the order to occupy defensive positions on the Askanija Nova – Dmitrijevska line (west of Melitopol). Here was the largest military catastrophe in Slovakia on the eastern front, the division being destroyed by the Soviets in one day in what was called the “Stalingrad of the Slovaks”. Without the full squad, the Slovaks were strongly attacked by Soviet troops of tanks and cavalry decimating them. More than 2200 Slovak soldiers were taken out of the battle, the rest retreating in dandy over the Dnieper. The only exception was the II / 11 artillery detachment that resisted until November 7, alongside German troops in the Kachovka area³⁴.

After this disaster, the 1st Division of the Slovak Republic was sent to strengthen the defensive lines south on Nikolaev. At the beginning of 1944, part of the Division was reformed and sent to secure the lines of the Crimean Peninsula. Between April 20 and May 3, 1944, the last 700 Slovak soldiers were evacuated from the Crimea, along with Germans, Romanians, or other allies³⁵. The remainder of the Slovak units were reorganized under the name “Tatarko Battle group”³⁶, assuring the backs of the South Army Group lines. Subsequently, they retreated to the Black Sea coast, west of the Dnieper until confluence with the Bug, receiving tasks for the defence of communications lines and railways³⁷. Around 5000 Slovak soldiers led by Colonel Karol Pekník, billeted in southern Ukraine, were withdrawn in the second half of February 1944 to the west, reaching the territory of Romania³⁸.

³³ Ján Stanislav, *Ferdinand Čatlos v perimetri kolaborácie a odboja* [Ferdinand Catlos in the space of collaboration and resistance], in Marek Syrný (coord.), *Kolaborácia a odbojna Slovensku a v krajinách nemeckej sféry vplyvu v rokoch 1939-1945* [Collaboration and resistance in Slovakia and territories under German influence], Banská Bystrica, Muzeum Slovenského Národného Povstania, 2009, p. 330.

³⁴ Rolf-Dieter Müller, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

³⁵ General Platon Chirnoagă, *op. cit.*, p. 196.

³⁶ He became chief of staff of the Slovak Army, Petre Otu, *op. cit.*, p. 378.

³⁷ Josef Bystrický, *Evoluția pe frontul din România anul 1944 în relație cu Slovacia* [Evolution on the Romanian Front of 1944 in relation to Slovakia], in *Evenimentele de la 23 august 1944 din România și Insurecția națională slovacă din 29 august 1944. Consecințele lor asupra eliberării României și Slovaciei și a sfârșitului celui de al doilea război mondial* [The events of August 23, 1944 in Romania and the Slovak National Insurrection of August 29, 1944. Their Consequences on the Liberation of Romania and Slovakia and the End of the Second World War], Banská Bystrica – Alba Iulia, Academia Română, Academia Slovacă de Științe, 2012, p. 76.

³⁸ Rolf-Dieter Müller, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

One of the problems faced by the Slovak army was the large number of desertions, especially after the military turn from Stalingrad. Slovak soldiers have been confronted with big problems regarding food supplies, illness and malnutrition. According to historian Rolf-Dieter Müller, “these poor soldiers, poorly commanded in the campaign, have gone through a lot of trouble without finding an understanding from the German allies”³⁹. The first major default in the Slovak army occurred during the Battle of Stalingrad⁴⁰. Commander of the Rapid Division, the elite force of the Slovak army, General Štefan Jurech, together with a group of officers, came in contact with the Red Army to teach. On behalf of his commander, Lieutenant Major Gustáv Donoval signed with the Soviet Colonels Dolganov and Jemeljanov, on January 22, 1943, an understanding of how the transfer to the enemy was to be organized. But the general withdrawal order of the entire army to which the Division was subordinated, prevented this desertion⁴¹.

This change of disposition was also due to the First Czechoslovak Brigade of the Red Army. In January 1942, the first battalion of Slovak soldiers’ prisoners to the enemy was created in the USSR, at Buzuluk, on the Samara River. Led by Lieutenant Colonel Ludvik Svoboda, it entered the battle in March 1943 in the battle of Sokolovo, south of Kharkov. In April, 124 officers and soldiers from the Rapid Division, Sukhumi prisoners, asked Stalin for approval to join the Czechoslovak Brigade⁴². A second unit, made up of Slovaks, entered the battle against the Axis troops in May⁴³. In the same month, Colonel Ludvik Svoboda, the commander of

³⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 103.

⁴⁰ The first known defect in the Slovak army was that of Lieutenant Anton Hirner since the Battle of Lipovec, in July 1941. Along with several members of a mobile brigade, he was taken prisoner of the Soviet soldiers. Marxist historiography tried to accredit the idea that the Slovak army did not trust the victory against the Soviet Union, and that mass desertions are a response to this mistrust. In fact, Anton Hirner’s example cannot be given as the moment of the beginning of the desertions. The loss of confidence in the victory of the Wehrmacht took place gradually and became apparent only after the Battle of Stalingrad. See: Martin Lacko, *Pripad poručíka Antona Hirnera a spol. (O jednom mýte slovenskej vojenskej historiografie)* [The case of Lieutenant Anton Hirner and collaborators (About one myth of Slovak military historiography)], in Michal Šmigel’, Peter Mičko (Eds.), *Slovenská Republika 1939-1945 očami mladých historikov IV*, [Slovak Republic 1939-1945, seen by young historians], IV, Banská Bystrica, 2005, pp. 238-248.

⁴¹ Josef Bystrický, *op. cit.*, p. 75-76.

⁴² František Cséfalvay, Ľubica Kázmerová, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

⁴³ *Rezistența europeană în anii celui de al doilea război mondial 1938-1945*, vol. I, *Țările din Europa Centrală și de Sud-Est* [European resistance in the years of the Second World

the Czechoslovak forces fighting on the eastern front, was decorated with the Lenin Order by Mihail Kalinin in person. On this occasion, he declared that "Czechoslovakia will remain faithful forever to the union of the Slavic peoples"⁴⁴. The Czechoslovak I Brigade, out of which 10% formed the Slovaks, also distinguished itself in the struggles for the release of Kiev in autumn⁴⁵. On 30 October 1943 north of Melitopol, 2750 soldiers and 500 officers deserted. Since then, the Germans have lost confidence in the Slovak army and their units have been interposed between the German ones, being strictly supervised⁴⁶.

The other Slovak military unit deployed on the front was the Security Division which in 1942 had operated behind the lines in the Minsk region. A part of the Slovak troops stationed in Minsk were withdrawn, and instead on them, Hungarian troops were brought to defend Zhitomir-Kiev line. And within the Slovakian units in the Minsk region there have been large percentages of desertions. Here, Slovak soldiers passed to partisans encouraged by slave-propaganda propaganda. As in the Minsk sector, the mood of the Slovaks was very poor, which caused many to desert and surrender the 1st Czechoslovak Brigade that fought alongside the Red Army. In September and October 1943, the number of desertions in the Security Division increased significantly⁴⁷. Undergoing decomposition, the Security Division was abolished by the Germans in October and transferred as a unit of work in Italy⁴⁸.

The Slovak army has also got broken behind the front. On August 16, 1943, the 15,000 soldiers of the Tarnov garrison revolted against the authorities refusing

War 1938-1945, vol. I, Central and Southeast European Countries], București, Editura Militară, 1973, p. 86.

⁴⁴ A.M.A.E., Fond 71, 2ndWW, Vol. 303, General, f. 133.

⁴⁵ Others officers as Ján Nálepka or Otakar Jaroš have been decorated as post-mortem heroes of the Soviet Union, see *Istoria Țărilor Coroanei Cehe*, [History of the Czechs Crown Countries], București, Editura Enciclopedică, 2007, p. 468; see also František Cséfalvay, Ľubica Kázmerová, *op.cit.*, p. 103.

⁴⁶ Nicolae Ciachir, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

⁴⁷ Pavel Mičianik, *Veteráni východného frontu v povstaní. Pôsobenie niektorých vyšších povstaleckých dôstojníkov na východnom fronte* [Veterans on the eastern front in insurrection. The action of senior officers on the Eastern Front], in Marek Syrný (coord.), *Kolaborácia a odboj na Slovensku a v krajinách nemeckej sféry vplyvu v rokoch 1939-1945* [Collaboration and resistance in Slovakia and territories under German influence in 1939-1945], BanskáBystrica, Muzeum Slovenského Národného Povstania, 2009, p. 278-279.

⁴⁸ Elena Mannová (coord.), *Scurtă istorie a Slovaciei* [Short history of Slovakia], București, Editura Enciclopedică, 2001, p. 367.

to leave on the front or to work in the Reich⁴⁹. In Officer in reserve Viliam Zingor refused in 1943 to lead the Slovakian troops to the Eastern Front. He called for the withdrawal of German troops from Slovakia, even if he did not find political support at the time⁵⁰. He will then pass on the side of the partisans⁵¹. The Germans have noticed the Slovak army had lost confidence in its fighting force. The Romanians also had information about the state of the Slovak army. The loss of Slovakia's fighting capacity did not lead to political changes in the country and did not affect the political and military relations with Romania. The authorities were forced to continue their struggle with Germany, with every alternative and especially a victory for the Soviet army being considered a disaster for the Bratislava political regime. But the prolongation of the war began to be felt among the Slovaks who manifested dissatisfaction with the Germans: "The great times of the Czechoslovak Republic are regretted, and the ranks of the Czechoslovaks are increasing"⁵². In October 1943, Ferdinand Čatloš declared in a public speech: "In the course of this war, while making a forced bypass across the Ukrainian plain, the Slovak army is going to recapture and provide the rest of the Slovak territory with the nation"⁵³. These were the last timid attempts to increase the morale of the Slovak army.

The Germans lost confidence in Slovak soldiers and tried, by various means, to take control of the country and the Slovak army. General Čatloš told Gheorghe Elefterescu this fact at a meeting in January 1944. "He controls us all, they ask for more than we can give them"⁵⁴. Although the Germans were pushing Bratislava to increase Slovak troops on the front, army leaders understanding the risk that the Red Army could reach the Slovakian border, would have wanted to keep as many as possible at home to defend the national territory. At the same time, they had made a habit of reproaching the Germans that even the Hungarians did not make every effort to support the front, and that the Budapest leaders secretly negotiated the exit from the war. The Chief of Staff of the Slovak Republic complained to the Germans that Hungarians "do not do their duty on the front"⁵⁵. For this reason, it was preferable to keep important reserves in the country in the event of a Slovak-Hungarian conflict. Thus, during 1943, the Slovak army represented by the Rapid Division and the Security Division, has disappeared as a fighting force. Losing

⁴⁹ *The European Resistance*, vol. I, p. 88.

⁵⁰ Anton Spiesz, Dusan Caplovic, *op. cit.*, p. 226.

⁵¹ Róbert Letz, *op. cit.*, p. 273.

⁵² *Ibidem*, p. 199.

⁵³ A.M.A.E., Fond 71, Slovacia, vol. 4, f. 201.

⁵⁴ *Ibidem*, vol. 3, f. 237.

⁵⁵ Alesandru Dușu, et al., *op. cit.*, doc. 43, p. 203-204.

Germany's confidence, especially due to the great number of desertions, the Slovakian army was abolished and turned into a work unit behind the front, for the German fortification lines.

The dissolution of the Slovak army has not gone unnoticed in Romania. But the authorities had no attitude towards ending the existence of the Slovak army. There was no reaction of Romania to the dissolution of the Slovak army. For Romania, Slovakia had a greater political importance than the military.

SINUOSITIES OF ROMANIAN-SLOVAK COOPERATION

Competing with Hungary for influence in Berlin, Romania and Slovakia were forced to increase their military and economic contribution. If Romania had the capacity to maintain its war effort, Slovakia suffered from this reality. Under the difficult circumstances of 1943, it was more important that the spending should be well thought for a potential post-war confrontation against Hungary. So both have sought to increase their country's army. Instead, other resources could be used to continue military efforts on the Eastern Front. Romania had the oil and Slovakia's industrial capacities. Both will try since 1943 to use these advantages in the competition with Hungary.

Gradually, there has been a change in the balance of interest between the two countries and Germany. The Bratislava regime became more servile towards Berlin, while in Bucharest the idea of a separate peace had grown. If, for Bratislava, separate peace had led to the disappearance of statehood, in the conditions in which an exiled Czechoslovak government was recognized by the great powers, in Bucharest separate peace was the solution for the preservation of statehood. Although the political and military situation of the Axis was deteriorating, the Romanian-Slovak relations were growing. Minister Pantazi told Slovak military attaché Jozef Parcan that the Romanian army was in the process of reorganization after the heavy winter battles. In turn, Ilie Șteflea tells the same attaché that "we have common, political and military interests, which we have to solve in the future". The Slovak attaché was not very confident about Romania's ability to cancel the Vienna decision without German support. But he was sure that an agreement between Hungary and Romania was impossible: "Romania - he appreciates - awaits the right moment to enter Transylvania and recover the lost territories". Parkan was afraid that Hungary enjoyed Germany's support, which made it a danger to neighbouring countries⁵⁶.

⁵⁶ Petre Otu, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

Contacts between Romanians and Slovaks were recorded on the front. The head of the German air mission in Slovakia, General Ludwig Keiper, visited the Crimean front sector in April 1943. He was accompanied by the Slovak aviation leaders who expressed their wish to be received by Alexianu in Odessa⁵⁷. As the Germans expressed satisfaction with the performance of the Slovak pilots, they had to become an example for the entire army. Keiper said on this occasion that "the Romanian soldier is an example of discipline, instruction and morality, not as soldiers of other allies", alluding to Slovak soldiers. The Germans also praised the Romanians and how they soon succeeded in rebuilding the Odessa industry and how they managed Transnistria⁵⁸.

The contacts between the Romanian and Slovak soldiers were carried out directly, without the German intermediation. Based on the bilateral agreement, in April 1943, infantry master Gheorghe Pătraşci and artillery captain Vasile Anghel left for the Slovak Military School⁵⁹. July has represented a moment of maximum military closeness between the two countries. On July 23, 1943, a solemnity took place at Elefterescu's home, where 20 Slovak officers, headed by General Čatloš, were decorated. "Already in the past year, Romania has shown how much the Slovak army appreciates when Marshal Antonescu, the ruler of the state, gave the highest Romanian military decoration – the order of Mihai Viteazul – to his Excellency, Mr. Čatloš, the creator of the Slovak army today. "If the future calls for it, the Romanian and Slovak armed forces will fight together for the realization of holy national rights", Elefterescu said on this occasion⁶⁰.

An ample report of the situation in Slovakia from 8-17 July 1943 was sent to Romania by the Romanian military attaché in Bratislava. The Slovak Deputy Foreign Minister questioned Romania's losses and the fact that the Hungarians monitored the losses so that they could prepare themselves in the future if the situation requires it. A Hungarian deputy had declared in 1941 that "Hungary must have a large army of 1-1,5 million combatants permanently in order to be able to restore order in the war at the end of the war". The Slovaks were worried about the prospect of a confrontation with the Hungarian army in the future and needed the alliance with Romania to cope with Budapest's pressures. That is why they wanted to know if Romania's losses could be replaced for a possible confrontation in the West. The Romanian attaché denied this information and assured the

⁵⁷ A.M.A.E., Fond 71, Slovakia, vol. 4, f. 183.

⁵⁸ Alesandru Duţu, et al., *op. cit.*, doc. 43, p. 206.

⁵⁹ Petre Otu, *op. cit.*, p. 380.

⁶⁰ Alesandru Duţu, et al., *op. cit.*, doc. 45, p. 213.

Slovakian minister that the troops could be filled. He said that the Slovaks too should be prepared to replace the losses in people and arms and “to prepare the mobilization of all the forces of the state to get the maximum power if and when it will be needed”. The Romanian attaché insisted especially on the need to train new military cadres and make stockpiles of ammunition⁶¹. In the report from July 18-27, the military attaché again assessed the situation in Slovakia. He reported that many of the quotes of Romanian politicians and Ion Antonescu were taken over by “Grenzbote” truncated or omitted. The Germans in Slovakia only took the paragraphs that pleased the policy of the Reich. That is why the paper did not refer to the Transylvanian issue⁶².

Elefterescu visited his Romanian officers on August the 1st, 1943, at the Piešťany Sanitary District and was very pleased with the way they were treated⁶³. In October 1943, four Slovak officers visited the Romanian Aeronautical Industry from Braşov⁶⁴. The visit was part of the regulations of the Romanian-Slovak economic agreement, renewed in 1943. But the difficulties of cooperation can be overtaken in this field as well. The problem of the purchase of Slovak armaments became difficult after the Battle of Stalingrad. Mihai Antonescu's move to Bratislava to obtain weapons was unsuccessful. The Romanian military attaché declared that the Slovaks claimed that they did not have this availability. “Still - the Romanian diplomat continues - from what I have seen, Slovakia has weapons for almost three army bodies, that is, it has them if necessary. Of course, the refusal is justified by the prudence with which he looks in the future, the Slovak General Staff wanting to have material reserves because it does not know how long the war will last and other material cannot buy or manufactured”⁶⁵. Instead, the sympathy Romania enjoys in Slovakia can be traced from other perspectives. The Škoda factory in Dubnica had problems due to delays. All sorts of tricks the workers did to delay deliveries made the Germans accuse them of sabotage. However, deliveries to the Romanian army were not sabotaged and the orders were respected on time⁶⁶.

Cooperation in the field of military information continued too. Colonel Pavel Kuna came to Bucharest in March 1943 and contacted Colonel Boian of the Second

⁶¹ *Ibidem*, doc. 43, p. 196.

⁶² *Ibidem*, doc. 45, p. 210-211.

⁶³ A.M.A.E., Fond 71, Slovakia, vol. 13, f. 318.

⁶⁴ Petre Otu, *op. cit.*, p. 381.

⁶⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 379.

⁶⁶ Alesandru Duşu, et al., *op. cit.*, doc. 43, p. 207.

Section of the Romanian Army General Staff⁶⁷. The Slovaks spied on the endowment of the Hungarian army - especially they were interested in having Tiger tanks - but they were also following the mood in Hungary that collapsed when the Anglo-American landed in Sicily. The Slovaks also complained about the publication of a propaganda map of Greater Hungary (with Slovakia and Transylvania passed into mourning, with black paint) that was displayed in all public places in Hungary⁶⁸. In November 1943, the head of the Special Intelligence Service (S.S.I.), I. Lissievici, received the mission to oversee the activity of the S.S.I. from Bratislava to be able to use the diplomatic mission in the capital of Slovakia and its links with neutral countries in order to probe the ground for an exit from the Axis⁶⁹. Since Slovakia did not start negotiations for an armistice, the Romanian diplomatic action in Bratislava had no results. The Slovaks were carefully following the reorientation of Romania towards Anglo-Americans. On September 26th, 1943, Jozef Parcan reported to Bratislava data about King Michael's visit accompanied by Queen Elena, at the hospitals where British and American prisoners were cared for. He concluded his report by stating that "the reality is that all Romanian strata are Francophile and only on the current policy lies Germany" with reference to Marshal Antonescu's regime. On 11 February 1944, Slovak attaché Jozef Parcan reported that "the Marshal is convinced that the Germans lost the war and that their days are numbered"⁷⁰. Parcan was worried about rumours circling through Romania that Marshal Antonescu could hand over the power of Iuliu Maniu, who was trying to negotiate a separate peace with the Soviets. At the same time Parkan noticed that in Bucharest everyone feared that Bessarabia was lost, but that Transylvania could be a compensation. In turn, the Romanians informed Bratislava of the Hungarian attempts to secretly negotiate with the Allies⁷¹. In September 1943, an attempt from Budapest was made to improve the Slovak-Hungarian relations, as they worried more and more about the military evolution on the eastern front⁷². In 1943, the Hungarians tried to negotiate with the Slovaks trying to persuade the Bratislava authorities on the danger of rebuilding Czechoslovakia. The reconstruction of Czechoslovakia was a real threat also for the Hungarian hopes of obtaining territorial rewards on Slovakia's behalf. The

⁶⁷ Central National History Archives (hereinafter S.A.N.I.C.), Fund Ministry of the Interior, Directorate General of Police, 28/1942, f. 26.

⁶⁸ Alesandru Duțu, et al., *op. cit.*, doc. 43, p. 204-205.

⁶⁹ Cristian Troncotă, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

⁷⁰ Alesandru Duțu, et al., *op. cit.*, doc. 46, p. 221.

⁷¹ Jana Bauerová, *op. cit.*, p. 112.

⁷² Alesandru Duțu, et al., *op. cit.*, doc. 46, p. 222.

Hungarians have accredited the idea that relations with Slovakia could reach a compromise that could not be achieved with Romania, due to the anti-Hungarian atmosphere that ruled in Bucharest⁷³.

The personal relations between the Romanian and Slovak officers were not always tight. They were also influenced by Romania's and Slovakia's position on Hungary. This was proved by the gesture of Colonel Davidescu who left the post of military attaché in Bratislava and Budapest without paying good gratitude to his Slovak colleagues. He would have had the opportunity to do so if he accepted the invitation to attend, together with General Malar, the Slovakian attaché in Berlin, the military ski competitions organized in the Tatra Mountains near Poprad on 13-14 February 1943⁷⁴. The moment was extremely delicate after the defeat at Stalingrad, and could be related to Mihai Antonescu's statements before Ivan Milecz in which he spoke of Romania's independence from Berlin. The Romanians showed their dissatisfaction with Slovakia's oscillations in their relations with Hungary, and the non-protocol gesture of the Romanian military attaché was a consequence of them. In February 1943, Mihai Antonescu reiterated to Ivan Milecz the idea of tightening the Romanian-Slovak-Croat collaboration in order to prepare a common strategy. The Slovak diplomat reported to Bratislava the discussion with Antonescu, but the position of Slovak Prime Minister Vojtech Tuka has not changed. He believed that a closer collaboration could only be made with the acceptance of Berlin. Tuka encouraged the Romanian side to resume the initiative of this triple collaboration⁷⁵.

Ivan Milecz made a public statement in March 1943 underlining that "the sacrifices made by Romania on the Eastern Front justify a fair solution to the Romanian problems (...) Romania's contribution to this war is more important than the other allies of Germany"⁷⁶. But the evolution of the front, totally unfavourable to the Axis, put Romania and Slovakia in the position of preparing for new events. He thus spoke of a possible total mobilization of the two countries and revealed that there were great difficulties in equipping and arming their armies. He held a rather optimistic, rather diplomatic tone, to Germany's chances of winning the war, which meant that there was great fear in Slovakia over a possible victory of the Soviet Union. Milecz's hopes at that time were linked to the fact that this victory was not wanted by Anglo-Americans⁷⁷. Milecz watched carefully the

⁷³ Jana Bauerová, *op. cit.*

⁷⁴ A.M.A.E., Fond 71, Slovakia, vol. 13, f. 194-195.

⁷⁵ Jana Bauerová, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

⁷⁶ *Eadem.*

⁷⁷ S.A.N.I.C., Fund Ministry of the Interior, Directorate General of Police, 54/1943, f. 238-

state of mind in Romania. He informed that in the event of an attack by the Anglo-Americans coming from the Balkans, Romania will not resist and will take advantage of the situation to return the weapons. At the same time Milecz was surprised that the Antonescu regime no longer enjoys popularity. Given that a possible defeat of Germany for Bratislava did not bring any guarantee of survival, the signals from Bucharest were not encouraging⁷⁸.

Slovak Prime Minister Vojtech Tuka repeatedly asked Milecz to check Romania's position. In September, the Slovak diplomat met Mihai Antonescu. He was assured by the Romanian minister that the Romanian army is still a military force able to help Slovakia in a possible confrontation with Hungary⁷⁹. In October, in a press conference, Mihai Antonescu explained the position of the country to international events. He vaguely hinted at some negotiations with neutral countries like Turkey. In the last months of 1943 Milecz believed that Romania would be willing to follow the Italian model of unconditional surrender. For the Bratislava government, the separate exit from the war was not an alternative. However, the Slovak press kept the same propaganda tone. A December article in the "Slovak" reminded that the Romanian army did not consider leaving the "brave German army"⁸⁰.

Despite the unfavourable military situation, contacts between Romanians and Slovaks continued throughout 1943. They could even diversify, but they pursued the same goals. However, the various Romanian-Slovak ties were not enough to reach the desired outcome. Only the general context would prove to be decisive.

CONCLUSIONS

The international political situation imposed a repositioning on relations with Germany, both in Bucharest and Bratislava but in Budapest too. The loss of the military initiative by the German army forced the ruling political circles in Romania and Slovakia to seek alternative solutions. This was compounded by the rapid deterioration of the Tripartite Pact relations. Romania sought to step away gradually from the Reich in anticipation of a favourable moment for the outbreak

239; Tiso expressed his conviction to the Hungarian diplomat Lajos Kuhl de Boroshat that neither England nor America wanted a victory of the Soviets. See James Mace Ward, *op. cit.*, p. 236.

⁷⁸ Jana Bauerová, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

⁷⁹ *Eadem*, p. 114.

⁸⁰ *Eadem*, p. 115.

of war. For Slovakia this reality was unthinkable. In Bucharest, Ion Antonescu's viewpoint with the opposition movement was obvious. The methods of achieving the objectives were different. In Bratislava, the situation was different. For the circles around Tiso, the exit from the war was excluded. Instead, the opposition grew bigger and had other plans than power. The reaction was precisely the gradual dissolution of the army on the front, where it became obvious that co-operation with the Germans was supposed to end. The year 1943 represented the end of the Slovak army epic as a combative force on the Soviet front.

The complex political and military conjuncture of 1943 determined the oscillations in the Romanian-Slovak relations. It was not the dissolution of the Slovak army that conditioned the continuation of the collaboration. Redefinition of bilateral relations was given by the new situation. Both have retained their common interests in terms of Hungary. Although the solutions were different, the objective remained common. Romania's tendency to secede from the alliance with Germany did not correspond to that of Slovakia. Rather, the community of interest on the negotiation of a separate truce should bring it closer to Hungary. But precisely the problem of the Romanian-Hungarian common frontiers hinders any cooperation. In pursuing the interest at the western border Romania needed a common file with Slovakia. That is why the Romanian-Slovak relations remained good during the year 1943 independently of the action of the Slovak army.

THE INFLUENCE OF THE IDEOLOGICAL STRUCTURES OF THE RED ARMY ON THE TERRITORY OF UKRAINE UPON ROMANIAN SERVICEMEN DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR

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Abstract. *The article analyses some aspects of the activity of the ideological structures of the Red Army. Based mainly on archive documents, the study reviews the ways to achieve one of the main goals of the Red Army's ideological structures – working with the enemy's servicemen, in order to stimulate their desertion. Specialists of the political departments of the Soviet army took into account the enemy's lack of confidence in the potential consequences of the fall into his captivity. This state of mind was sustained and promoted by the German High Command (i.e. Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, OKW). Transmission of information that the Soviet captivity was the only way to stay alive and return home after the war called for the use of a set of measures with informational and psychological impact. These measures aimed at demoralizing the enemy's personnel, decreasing the level of combat, and generally giving up the fight.*

The historiography of the problem available today is mainly marked by preconceived ideas. The attitude of the Romanian servicemen, their level of combativeness or the willingness to lay down arms can be analysed only on the basis of their testimonies. Access to archival funds containing such information has been restricted for a long time and researchers have been forced to resort to studies of Soviet historians. Their works, however, were highly politicized and aimed at justifying and glorifying of the communist ideology. The present study uses historical sources from the Ukrainian archives which became accessible only after obtaining of the independence of Ukraine.

Keywords: *information, psychological influence, Romanian soldiers, ideological structures, Red Army, disintegration*

Rezumat. *Influența structurilor ideologice ale Armatei Roșii pe teritoriul Ucrainei asupra militarilor români, în timpul celui de-al Doilea Război Mondial. Articolul analizează anumite aspecte ale activității structurilor ideologice ale Armatei Roșii. Pe baza documentelor de arhivă, studiul trece în revistă modalitățile de realizarea unuia dintre principalele obiective ale structurilor ideologice ale Armatei Roșii – activitatea cu militarii inamicului, în vederea încurajării dezertării lor. Specialiștii*

departamentelor politice ale armatei sovietice luau în calcul lipsa de încredere a inamicului față de potențialele consecințe ale nimeririi în captivitatea sa. Această stare de spirit a fost susținută și promovată de Înaltul Comandament (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, OKW) german. Transmiterea informațiilor potrivit cărora prizonieratul sovietic era singura modalitate de a rămâne în viață și de întoarcere acasă după război reclama utilizarea unui anume set de măsuri, cu impact informațional și psihologic. Aceste măsuri urmăreau demoralizarea personalului inamicului, scăderea nivelului de combativitate și renunțarea la luptă în general.

Istoriografia problemei disponibilă astăzi este marcată în mare măsură de idei preconcepute. Atitudinea militarilor români, nivelul lor de combativitate sau dorința de a depune armele pot fi analizate doar în baza mărturiilor acestora. Accesul la fondurile arhivistice care cuprindeau asemenea informații a fost îngrădit o lungă perioadă de timp iar cercetătorii era constrânși să apeleze la studiile istoricilor sovietici. Lucrările acestora erau însă puternic politizate și aveau drept scop justificarea și glorificarea ideologiei comuniste. În prezentul studiu sunt valorificate surse istorice din arhivele ucrainene ce au devenit accesibile abia după dobândirea independenței Ucrainei.

Résumé : L'influence des structures idéologiques de l'Armée Rouge sur le territoire de l'Ukraine sur les militaires roumains, pendant la Seconde Guerre Mondiale. L'article ci-joint analyse certains aspects des activités des structures idéologiques de l'Armée Rouge. A la base des documents des archives, l'étude passe en revue les modalités de réalisation d'un des principaux objectifs des structures idéologiques de l'Armée Rouge – l'activité avec les militaires de l'ennemi, en vue d'encourager leur désertion. Les spécialistes des départements politiques de l'armée soviétique prirent en calcul le manque de confiance de l'ennemi envers les conséquences potentielles de la prise en captivité. Le Haut Commandement allemand (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, OKW) soutint et promut cet état d'esprit. La transmission des informations conformément auxquels la prison soviétique était l'unique modalité de rester vif et de revenir chez soi après la guerre réclama l'utilisation d'un certain set de mesures, avec impacte informationnel et psychologique. Ces mesures suivaient la démoralisation du personnel ennemi, la baisse du niveau de combativité et le renoncement à la lutte, en général.

L'historiographie du problème disponible aujourd'hui est marquée, en général, par des idées préconçues. On peut analyser l'attitude des militaires roumains, leur niveau de combativité ou le désir de déposer les armes seulement à la base de leurs témoignages. On bloqua longtemps l'accès aux fonds des archives qui comprenaient des informations semblables, pendant qu'on contraint les chercheurs à faire appel aux études des historiens soviétiques. Mais leurs travaux étaient puissamment politisés, ayant comme but de justifier et de glorifier l'idéologie communiste. On valorisa, l'étude ci-jointe, des sources historiques des archives ukrainiennes qui devinrent accessibles à peine après que l'Ukraine obtint son indépendance.

INTRODUCTION

The relevance of this topic from a historical point of view is due to the possibility of studying documents which had been hidden for a long time. There were reports of the heads of ideological departments of the Red Army, which contain information on interrogations of Romanian prisoners of war. The surrender of Romanian soldiers to the Red Army, testify for the effective influence of Soviet ideology. However, with careful examination of the testimonies under interrogation of captured Romanian soldiers, it is possible to understand their moods/states of mind and experiences. Analysing those interrogations of Romanian soldiers captured and wishing to return home, who had hopes of gaining land and were exhausted by the war, we understand that their answers are clearly structured. Employees of the ideological structures of the Red Army conducted during the interrogation a kind of sociological survey with a standard set of questions. They led these activities in order to find out the effectiveness of their propaganda methods. For the ideologists of the Red Army, it was important to know what method of informational and psychological influence on Romanian prisoners is more effective. We talk about the impact on people's psychology through the use of an appropriate information product. A large number of Allied forces fought on the side of Hitler's Germany. Representatives of each nationality reacted differently to Soviet propaganda and agitation. This article examines the impact of methods of influence on the motivation of Romanian servicemen to cease participation in the war on the side of Hitler's Germany.

ARGUMENTATION

The experience of the Second World War was an example of the use of powerful ideological mechanisms both by Germany and by the USSR. The use of non-military methods to neutralize the enemy was as important as the armed struggle. The foreign policy of Romania in World War II defined the goals for the return of territories, which the country had lost as a result of the Molotov - Ribbentrop Pact, signed by Germany and the Soviet Union in August 1939.

In 1940 Romania became the victim of massive and concerted diplomatic and military aggressions. By means of force treatment, important parts of the national territory were uprooted (about 100,000 km² and almost 7,000,000

inhabitants, namely 33% of the surface and population). Bessarabia (44,500 km² with 3,200,00 inhabitants) and the Northern part of Bucovina (6,000 km² with 500,000 inhabitants) were occupied by the Soviet Union following the ultimatum notes of 26 and 28 June 1940, the Northern part of Transylvania (43,492 km² with 2,667,000 inhabitants) by Hungary through the Dictate of Vienna of 30 August 1940, while the Southern Dobruja (Rom. Dobrogea, actually the counties Durostor and Caliacra, with 6,921 km² and 410,000 inhabitants), by Bulgaria through the Treaty of 7 September 1940.¹

In these tragic conditions, Romania was forced to go to a rapprochement with Germany. Germany guaranteed the integrity of the preserved part of the Romanian state. That is why Romania joined the war on the side of the Third Reich against the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. The purpose of the new government in the country (King Mihai I and General Ion Antonescu), democratic parties and the army was the restoration of the territorial integrity of the country. The 3th and 4th Romanian armies, together with the 11th German army, under the leadership of General Antonescu, released Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina by July 26, 1941. By difficult military and political conditions, when the Soviet Union was not defeated, and Hungary threatened to seize the southern part of Transylvania, Antonescu decided to continue the struggle on the side of Germany. The Romanian troops carried out a large-scale military operation near Odessa, in the middle of the Azov Sea, in the Crimea, south of Kharkov, in the Caucasus.²

The interest of the German military command was in the supply of oil, food, and the use of a significant number of personnel of the Romanian armed forces. Hitler's assault on the Soviet Union meant that oil supplies would be cut off from there. And, in this case, Germany was dependent on Romanian oil for 90%.³ The lands between the Dniester and Bug were named Transnistria. Ukrainian territory was divided into 13 counties, 64 districts, which included 15 cities, 18 suburban and 1363 rural communes with 2568 villages and 72 farms. The Transnistrian capital proclaimed Odessa, incorporating it into the newly established Romanian province on October 17, 1941. The Romanian administration (August 1941 - March 1944) established the so-called "Transnistrian Governance", headed by

¹ ****Armata Română în cel de-al doilea război mondial* [Romanian Army in World War II], București, Editura Meridiane, 1995, p. 18.

² *Ibid.*, p. 202.

³ С. Демьянов, *Румыния во Второй мировой войне* [Romania in World War II], in http://www.world-history.ru/countries_about/2354.html/ (Accessed on 20.10.2017)

Governor G. Alexianu.⁴

A powerful incentive for the participation of the armed forces of Romania in the war on the side of Germany was the promise of Mihail and Ion Antonescu, appointed vice-premier of the government on the first day of the war.

So, the famous Circular No. 1500/A was wide-spread in the army, and stated that "... military units must compile registered lists of distinguished officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers deserving to be endowed with land on the territories which previously were Romanian. Lists must be compiled by military units every 15 days".⁵ In this case, it is necessary to take into account the fact that the document speaks of the potential distribution of land plots in the "liberated territories", that is, in Bessarabia and northern Bucovina.

The powerful informational and psychological influence of the ideological structures of the Red Army began to be realized since the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty in 1939. This type of activity was characterized by the complexity, planning, and clear specialization in the areas. The most characteristic ways of carrying out information-psychological influence on the enemy were: the production and distribution of leaflets in the language of enemy troops (German, Romanian and Hungarian), so-called "oral propaganda", that is, the systematic disclosure of texts with appropriate content and appeals through sound reinforcement systems. A separate line of activity was the training and sending of specially trained prisoners of war back to their units to persuade other "Hitlerian" soldiers to end the armed struggle and surrender⁶. The reception points of prisoners of war and frontier transit camps were deployed by the Red Army on the fronts in July 1941.

⁴ В. Волошин. *Маршал Іон Антонеску як виразник «тотального націоналізму». Маловідомі факти антиукраїнської діяльності румунського диктатора* [Marshal Ion Antonescu as the spokesman for "total nationalism". Little-known facts of the anti-Ukrainian activities of the Romanian dictator] in https://dt.ua/SOCIETY/marshal_ion_antonesku_yak_viraznik_totalnogo_natsionalizmu_malovidomi_fakti_antiukrayin (Accessed on 20.10.2017).

⁵ *Внешняя политика Советского Союза в период Отечественной войны* [The foreign policy of the Soviet Union during the Patriotic War], Т. 1. Москва, 1946, с. 214.

⁶ *Политическая работа среди войск и населения противника в годы Великой Отечественной войны (1941-1945)* [Political work among the troops and the population of the enemy during the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945)], Москва, Военное Издательство Министерства Обороны СССР, 1971, с. 196.

Specialists of 7 departments of the political departments of the armies, together with intelligence were engaged in the selection of prisoners of war for training with the aim of being sent beyond the front line. The Main Directorate of Political Propaganda of the Red Army instructed the structures of the propaganda of the fronts and armies to deploy political work among prisoners of war at transit points. For this purpose, distinguished political workers which knew German, Romanian and Finnish, which spoke conversationally, stood out. For the military prisoners it was necessary to find Soviet literature in foreign languages. It was necessary to report regularly about the results and all problematic issues to the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda.⁷

Despite this, there were actions taken by the army's ideological structures to study the possibilities of information-psychological influence upon the captured Romanian military personnel. In a letter from D. Manuilsky, the Political Leader of the Main Political Directorate, to Lev Mehlis, the head of the Main Political Administration of the Army, about the state of the psyche of prisoners of war located in the camp on August 15, 1941 pointed to such facts:

"German prisoners of war - especially fascists - are insolent. If Romanian prisoners of war, who come from the social point of view mainly from the poor peasantry, are susceptible to political processing, German prisoners of war in their relations with the Romanians are related to the «higher race». The German prisoners continue to spread rumours that «the German army is at the gates of Leningrad» that «Moscow is surrounded» and that Hitler will soon free up the prisoners of war... there is no differentiated approach to prisoners of war in the camp, their social status is not clear, their documents are not always studied and confirmed and that could highlight the political benefits of a prisoner of war. Hungarians and Romanians who instinctively hate the German fascists or against German soldiers deceived by the fascists are unacceptable to the fascist bandits who continue to behave in the camp as if they were at home."⁸

Given the authority of ideologically well-trained German prisoners of war, the author of the report speaks of the need for a differential approach to organization of content in the prisoner of war camp. In his opinion, any attempt at hostile agitation regarding the USSR should be stopped by a very tough military situation in accordance with Soviet legislation. In this case, we are talking about

⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 190.

⁸ ****Prizonieri de război români în Uniunea Sovietică. Documente 1941-1956* [Romanian Prisoners of War in the Soviet Union. Documents 1941-1956], București, 2013, p. 34.

imperfect ideological work with Romanian prisoners of war, which, in the opinion of the Soviet leadership, are more ready to move to the sides of the Red Army.⁹

Later, in March 1943, the Military Command of the Red Army held a special meeting on political work with the prisoners. Questions were discussed about the achievements and shortcomings of this work. The Regulations on political work among prisoners of war in the USSR were adopted. The main task was to educate the bulk of prisoners of war in an antifascist spirit. It was necessary to turn them into friends of the USSR. It was necessary to use proven forms and methods of work to do this. At the same time, it was necessary to take into account the political level and national characteristics of the prisoners. The document recommended the following basic forms and methods: individual and group interviews; lectures and conferences to discuss topical political issues; publication and distribution of printed publications in the languages of prisoners; use of broadcasting with group hearing; prisoners of war at conferences and meetings were to receive appeals to their compatriots; had to send letters to their homeland and the army; organization of question and answer evenings; issue of wall newspapers; demonstration of motion pictures; organization of labour competition.¹⁰

And by 1944 the algorithm of work with Romanian prisoners of war had changed. When the Soviet Union organized military formations among prisoners of war, the Soviet authorities displayed a certain interest in the circumstances when the servicemen of the enemy army were imprisoned. In this sense, prisoners of war were asked whether they had been registered in the army under a mobilization order or at the request of registering as volunteers. They also had to declare their responsibility, whether they voluntarily surrendered to Soviet troops or were taken prisoner. Employees of the camps participating in the questionnaire had to complete the physical description of the interlocutor.

Questions of a personal nature about the relatives, about the cultural and religious views of the prisoner were included in the sociological questionnaire. All these data were extremely valuable source of information and could be used for various purposes, including attracting new supporters and supporters or neutralizing opponents of pro-Soviet political forces, blackmailing people for obtaining classified information, promoting foreign interests in various political, economic, cultural, religious and other areas.¹¹

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Политическая работа среди войск и населения противника...*, с. 190-191.

¹¹ *Prizonieri de război români în Uniunea Sovietică*, p. XVIII.

However, confidence in the invincibility of Hitler's Germany was shaken after the failure of the German offensive against Moscow in September 1941- April 1942. It was finally undermined after the defeat of the Allied forces in the Battle of Stalingrad in July 1942 - February 1943. By 1944 the Red Army fully owned a strategic initiative. Groups of German troops were significantly weakened by this time. However, the German High Command (OKW) did not consider this situation hopeless.

Antonescu's regime did not have the support of the entire Romanian society and a lot of Antonescu opponents were among the servicemen. It was not unusual for the Romanian soldiers to surrender voluntarily. Especially a lot of such cases were at Stalingrad, where the Romanian and Italian formations suffered a crushing defeat together with the army of von Paulus.

On February 2, 1943, a group of captured Romanian soldiers appealed to the Soviet government to give them the opportunity to fight volunteers along with the Red Army. In August 1943, the conference of Romanian prisoners of war authorized several of them to turn to Stalin for permission to form a volunteer legion. This initiative was supported by the Romanian communists who were in exile in the USSR. On October 4, 1943, the State Defence Committee adopted a resolution on the formation of the 1st Romanian Volunteer Infantry Division¹². The new compound was given the name of Tudor Vladimirescu, the national hero of Romania, who battled against Turkish rule in alliance with the Russians in the beginning of the nineteenth century.

By analogy with other foreign units that were being formed in the USSR during the war years, the form of the new compound was sewn on the models adopted in the Romanian army, with the only difference as the emblem "TV" (Tudor Vladimirescu). The officers of the division wore Red Army tunics and riding breeches, but with Romanian epaulettes. Colonel Nicolae Cambrea was the commander of the Romanian Volunteer Division. Before falling into Soviet captivity in 1942, Cambrea commanded the 5th Romanian Infantry Division.¹³

There was no shortage of volunteers-the number of Romanian prisoners of war who wanted to turn their weapons against Hitler and Antonescu was measured in thousands. To strengthen the ideological component of the division,

¹² *Дивизия народного героя. Как Румыния переходила на сторону СССР* [Division of the national Hero. How Romania moved to the side of the USSR], in http://www.aif.ru/society/history/diviziya_narodnogo_geroya_kak_rumyniya_perehodila_na_storonu_sssr (Accessed on 20.10.2017).

¹³ *Ibid.*

a commissioner was appointed to become a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Romania Anna Pauker.

The formation, armament and training of the division, which numbered about 9600 people, were completed by March 1944. On March 31, 1944, the 1st Romanian Volunteer Infantry Division named after Tudor Vladimirescu was sent by rail to the commander of the 2nd Ukrainian Front.¹⁴

But, despite the facts, in 1944, mobilization was carried out into German troops; a military-industrial complex was operating. During interrogation on June 17, 1945, General-Field Marshal W. Keitel said that Germany's resources at that time were quite powerful: the production of weapons remained at the same level. This made it possible to maintain the army in a normal state. In consequence of air bombardment, individual enterprises were damaged. However, their production activities were quickly restored. We can say that Germany's military-economic situation became catastrophic only in late January 1945¹⁵. The ideological structures of the Red Army clearly understood the need for agitation and propaganda activities aimed at enemy troops.

The most accessible to the German allies was information posted in leaflets and transmitted through sound reinforcement installations. It should be noted that information about the military achievements of the Red Army raised doubts in the Nazi troops. Information about the actions on the territory of the Allies was actively discussed.

Unfortunately, leaflets and propaganda texts aimed at Romanian servicemen almost were not preserved in Ukrainian archives. We can learn this information from the partially preserved daily detailed reports of the political departments of the armies to the higher leadership. It should be noted that political interrogations of prisoners of war were the first form of ideological and political influence on them. The following tasks were defined in the instructions for the interview of prisoners of war: receiving information about the enemy, in the course of the conversation, awaken the class consciousness from the captive, a prudent understanding of his interests in this war. Thus, the propaganda of prisoners of war occurred. Individual questions of prisoners of war were supplemented by another effective form of work. There were group conversations

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ Центральный архив Федеральной службы безопасности России [Central Archive of the Federal Security Service of Russia], Д. ПФ-10054. В 3-х тт. Т. 1. Л. 219-231, in <http://istmat.info/node/53807>

and meetings with the newly-captured servicemen.

In April 1942, an anti-fascist school for 100 people was established by the Bureau of military-political propaganda. It had two sectors – German and Romanian. The school's mission was to prepare anti-fascist personnel from the prisoners of war to work in the camps and at the front with the aim of disposing the enemy soldiers.¹⁶

From the first days of the war, the personnel of political departments of the Southern Front began to conduct such work with Romanian prisoners of war. They told Romanian captive officers and soldiers about the liberation mission of the Soviet people in this war. They disclosed the “real goals” of Hitler. They explained how the Hitler destroys Romania and enslaves other nations with his hands.¹⁷ We get information about it from the saved archives material of the interrogations of Romanian warriors.

Corporal Gölneu from company 3 of the 694th Infantry Regiment of 72 infantry divisions, captured in May 1944, trusted rather not Russian propaganda, but interpretations of events on the territory of Romania by Nazi propaganda. He said this during the interrogation: “Regarding the fact that the Red Army is already fighting on the territory of Romania, the soldiers are explained that the Russians have set themselves the goal of withdrawing Romania from the war. But this attempt fails, because: «The Romanians support Antonescu and bravely fight against the Russians». This is the real asset of the Romanians to the war. This is beneficial to the German army”.¹⁸ Attention is drawn to the fact of the consumer attitude towards the allies. Their actions must be subordinated to the benefits of the Germans. It is worth noting that, first of all, the degree of information-psychological impact was influenced by the actual situation of armed struggle. That is why one and the same information was perceived by the German servicemen in a different way in a few months.

Adolf Schaffhouser, the German soldier of the 13th company of the 669th regiment of the 371th division, who voluntarily went over to the side of the Red Army in August 1944, during the interview, testified: “About the events in Romania, the soldiers of our company learn about the events by the Russian sound broadcasts which were conducted on the night of 26 to 27 August. Audibility was

¹⁶ *Политическая работа среди войск и населения противника...*, с. 192.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ Центральный государственный архив общественных объединений Украины [Central State Archive of Public Organizations of Ukraine. Hereinafter: ЦДАГО України], Фонд 1, Опись 23, Дело 972, л. 1.

good, as the installation stood in front of our positions. The announcer was a German, told that Romania had stopped military operations and Antonescu was arrested. Comrades told me about the fact that the installation informed, in addition, about the liberation of Paris. Hitler continues the war, because he has few dead soldiers. He wants to kill thousands more people”¹⁹.

Despite the fact that the Goebbels’ propaganda events were quite active, the actual military situation did not correspond to the propagated by a propaganda cliché. Information that the *Conducător* of Romania, Ion Antonescu, had been arrested, and military operations had ceased on the territory of the Allied Romania, contributed to the formation of decadent sentiments among the “Hitlerians” and the desire to preserve their lives, stopping the armed struggle. In these terms there was only one way out - surrender in the hope of returning alive to their homeland. The officers reasoned more pragmatically, given the views of the national socialist ideology regarding the prevailing position of Germany and the servicing role of all territories. Thus, in his testimony, Dr. Erich Haade in May 1944 says: “We, the officers, understand that Germany is compelled to capture Ukraine - otherwise Germany will not have anything to eat, that Germany is compelled to capture Romania, otherwise Germany will not have petrol ... Recent events have shown that with military offensives to Ukraine we will not succeed. Ukraine is lost, Romania is hanging by a thread. The loss of bread and gasoline means a final defeat for Germany”. According to archives data it was the opinion of imprisoned German officers.²⁰

A real assessment of the current situation leads to disappointing conclusions about the impossibility of continuing the war without provisions and fuel. During the period of the Second World War the Nazis were forced to form their military units from nationalist-minded representatives of the occupied territories. They fought together with the personnel of the armed forces of the allied states of Germany. In addition, both prisoners and former deserters were mobilized for service. Evidence of this is found in the testimony of Petru Golduș soldier of the 1st company of the 1012 worker’s battalion of the Romanian Infantry Division, who was captured in March 1944. He said: “The division has 8 workers’ battalions. The composition of the battalions is of delinquents and prisoners. The sentiments of soldiers, especially Hungarians and Ukrainians from Northern Bukovina, are

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, Дело 978, л. 54.

²⁰ *Ibidem*, Дело 972, л. 2.

suppressed. No one wants to fight in the ranks of the Germans. Taking advantage of the retreat, the soldiers scatter, some of them desert, and some leave with the Russians".²¹ It is clear that the motivation for this contingent to fight for Germany was extremely low. Any opportunity to stay alive and have the hope of returning home was used. Is it possible to condemn these servicemen for their actions? From the point of view of military discipline, they committed a crime and they deserve punishment. But it is worth taking into account the factors that influenced their participation in the war on the side of Germany.

The nationalist-minded citizens of the occupied territories had their own political goals related to the support of Nazi Germany. The implementation of plans for revamping annexed territories was possible only under the auspices of Germany.

The weakening of the positions of Hitler's Germany in the war led to the fact that the nationalist-minded representatives of the occupied territories firstly had doubts about the power and invincibility of the German armed forces. Later, there was a desire for self-preservation and unwillingness to fight for the already ephemeral victory of the Germans in the war. In this case, it is a question of prudence on both sides. And it would be foolish of Germany to surrender its positions to hope for the fidelity of the collaborators and their willingness to fight to the end. Militant moods were supported in many ways by the myth of the invincibility of the Wehrmacht, boastful promises of a quick victory.

D. Manuilsky, the Political Leader of the Main Political Directorate, in his reports on working with prisoners, mentioned that he Romanians instinctively hate German fascists or just German soldiers. The nature of fascism is understood only by the language of force.²² This fact is evidenced by the testimony of Corporal 1 battalion of the 4th Battalion of the 2nd Romanian Artillery Regiment Martin Stefan, taken prisoner on March 19, 1944 in the area of Gnivani Vinnytsia region. "The government of Antonescu promised every soldier, participant of the Dniester defence 20 hectares of land, provided the Romanians keep this territory. I and three other Romanian soldiers of our unit, stragglers regiment, who had already crossed the Dniester, were disarmed by the Germans and disguised as Italian uniforms. After that, they were sent to repair the dirt road Schastlivets -Vinnitsa."²³

²¹ *Ibidem*, Дело 973, л. 74.

²² *Prizonieri de război români în Uniunea Sovietică. Documente 1941-1956*, p. 34.

²³ ЦДАГО України, Фонд 1, Опись 23, Дело 974, л. 100.

The use of Allied military personnel not for their intended purpose, with demeaning functions for them, also influenced the formation of anti-war sentiments. In the spring of 1944, the German command began to show loyalty to the former deserters from the Allied military personnel who served their sentences in places of deprivation of liberty. Soldiers of 1015 workers of the Romanian battalion Constantine Stan and Adrian Dumitrescu, captured in March 1944 said that they had been sent to the front from prison, where the first served a sentence of 20 years, and the second 10 years for desertion. The most common disease in the working battalion is jaundice due to a lack of nutrition supplied by the Germans.²⁴ As can be seen from the report, the attitude of the German command to the Romanian military personnel was disparaging. Romanian soldiers in a short phrase outlined the tragic horror of the situation of servicemen of the ally country, with whom the German command treated inappropriately.

The tragedy of people who did not want to fight for Germany, forced into punishment to serve a long term of imprisonment and subsequent coercion to violent activity at the front, grew into the tragedy of a whole nation. And this was expressed not only in the situation that developed at the front. Romanian soldiers were forced to tolerate Germans on the territory of the kingdom. So, the soldier Myron Lank, taken prisoner in March 1944, said during the interrogation that he did not believe the German command. "They as allies must behave on the territory of Romania. And in fact they behave like invaders and robbers. From letters from home I know that the Germans take away cattle, property and in general, treat the Romanians as invaders. My family suffers from hunger and cold²⁵."

Captured in March 1944, the soldier Petre Mocanu testifies that he does not trust the German command. His wife wrote in a letter that the Nazis who had come to their city began to commit outrage and were raped, despite the fact that she had given birth a few months ago. How can, in his opinion, believe those who behave like an occupier²⁶.

The information about the difficult situation in the families of Romanian soldiers greatly affected their morale and readiness to carry out the assigned tasks. Despite the fact that all measures were taken by the censorship to prevent such news from reaching the front, Romanian soldiers received this news. It increased the anti-war sentiment. The German command, in no way putting the

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ ЦДАГО України, Фонд 1, Опись 23, Дело 975, л. 24.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, Дело 973, л. 92.

life of Romanian soldiers, often threw them at the most dangerous sites and forced them to make a breakthrough. The more the unwillingness to fight on the Soviet-German front of the Romanian soldiers revealed, the more openly the Nazis expressed their disdain for the Romanians. The number of skirmishes between Romanian and German soldiers has continuously increased.²⁷

In this regard, back in November 1941, there was an order No. 28010, signed by the commander of the 3rd Romanian Army, General Dumitrescu, in which it was stated that “in order to avoid misunderstandings and sad incidents in the future, which took place between Romanian and German soldiers”, Romanian units “in the case of complaints on disputes with the Germans should be absolutely courteous for”, as further noted in the order, these conflicts “can have serious consequences for the implementation of our wishes in the future ...”²⁸. Thus, it can be concluded that, worried about this state of affairs, Romanian officers intimidated the soldiers with fables about the “Russian captivity”, tried to convince them that they would be shot. As prisoners of war were told, the soldiers were still under the influence of this propaganda and were afraid to go over to the side of the Soviet troops.

Regarding this, the political agencies of the Red Army issued a number of leaflets, addressed the Romanian soldiers, saying that “the Soviet command provides all those who will go over to the side of the Red Army, life, good treatment and return to their homeland after the war”²⁹. A Romanian serviceman, Florian Poienaru, taken prisoner in the spring of 1944, says that the Romanian commanders are not respected by the Romanians, although they are afraid. They are not in a hurry to surrender, as rumour has it that the war was lost by the Germans and it is necessary to flee to Romania³⁰.

The issue of the Romanian military prisoners is being studied by Romanian researchers together with their foreign colleagues. Despite of the possibility of studying open archival materials, many questions remain unanswered. In general, the number of Romanian prisoners in the Soviet Union after the Second World

²⁷ Н. Э. Левит, *Вступление Румынии в войну против Советского Союза*, in М. Чернов, *Крестовый поход на Россию. Сборник статей* [The Crusade against Russia], Москва, Яуза, 2005, с. 221, in http://militera.lib.ru/h/sb_crusade_in_rossia/03.html (Accessed on 20.09.2017).

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 221-222.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 223.

³⁰ ЦДАГО України, Фонд 1, Опись 23, Дело 974, л. 102.

War is not known with precision. Until August 23, 1944, when Romania joined the anti-Hitler coalition, about 165,000 Romanian soldiers were missing; most of them were captured in Soviet captivity. After August 23, Soviet troops disarmed and captured about 100,000 Romanian military. According to official Soviet sources, which should be treated with great care, in 1946 there were 50 thousand Romanian prisoners in Soviet camps.³¹

It is difficult for specialists to determine how many Romanian soldiers surrendered voluntarily and how many of them surrendered under the influence of information-psychological influence from the army ideological structures.

Vitalie Văratîc, the author of the study *Romanian prisoners of war in the Soviet Union / Documents of 1941-1956* launched an idea: "Today we do not even know the exact number of Romanian prisoners of war. The language of the documents of that time used the term <<missing>>. If these people, when crossing some obstacle, for example rivers, fell into the water, no one else knew what happened to them. One of my colleagues, whom we worked with on the research, tried to recreate the list of those killed in the battle of the Gypsy, and he told me that even to this day it is impossible to determine the number of dead, captured and missing accurately. These people are included in the category of missing persons, despite the fact that no one knows what happened to them. And this is only in the battle on the river Prut. And what happened on the Don, or during the crossing of the Dnieper, or near Stalingrad?³²"

According to military historians, the total number of victims from the Romanian army was 794,562 troops, of which 92,620 people were killed, 333,966 injured and 367,976 missing persons.³³ In this way, we can talk about motivation for the cessation of hostilities within the German armed forces, backed up by the possibility of desertion and return home in the years 1944-1945. In Romania, there have been fundamental changes in the reorientation of an ally. King Mihai I arrested Antonescu, and Romania joined the anti-Hitler coalition. Its participation in the war on the German side ended. At the same time, a number of convinced Romanian fascists voluntarily joined the SS forces.³⁴ It should be noted that after some hesitation, the Soviet command decided to use Romanian formations at the

³¹ Румынские пленные в СССР после Второй Мировой Войны [Romanian prisoners in the USSR after World War II] // http://www.rri.ro/ru_ru-13287 (Accessed on 20.12.2017)

³² *Ibid.*

³³ *Prizonieri de război români în Uniunea Sovietică Documente 1941-1956*, p. XI.

³⁴ С. Демьянов. *op. cit.*

front. The 1st Army (created on the basis of divisions and training units withdrawn from Crimea) and the new 4th Army (almost entirely composed of training units) began fighting in Transylvania again. Another type of propaganda influence is connected with this territory at different stages of the war. This is poster propaganda. Unfortunately, there is very little evidence of it in the Ukrainian archives.

A feature of the zone of Romanian occupation in Ukrainian territories is the small amount of visual ideological propaganda products of Romanian origin. The authorship of most posters and caricatures belongs to German artists. The decision to replicate one of the most massive posters on the territory of the Transnistrian governorate was adopted after the tenth issue of the "Odesa Gazeta" on November 23, 1941, on the first page of which the article "Transnistria will be Romanian forever" was published. This article was re-printed from Transnistria (Bucharest). As an illustration, the article depicts the image of two servicemen, depicting Transnistria territory in a dynamic, offensive movement from the Dniester to the Bug with clear cartographic outline. Under the onslaught of servicemen over the Bug area, the Bolshevik fled from the background of a sickle and a hammer burning in the fire. The soldiers depicted in the foreground with a rifle in their hands are easily attributed to the Romanian soldier, thanks to the clearly depicted Dutch helmet of the M34 model, which, after the occupation of the Netherlands, Germany handed over to the Romanian allies (picture 1. See Annexes).³⁵

Unique in his artistic and symbolic decision is the work of Sylvestrovich (picture 2), published on the title page of the Odessa newspaper from January 1, 1943. Under the New Year's congratulations, a Romanian rider was depicted with a banner in his hand and the date "1943". The horse became dowry before a Bolshevik soldier who asks for mercy, lying on the tune of 1942, lifting up his left arm, and holding his busby in his right hand. In the upper left part of the image behind the horse's head, the author depicted the steel crown of Romania from which, like from the sun, the rays. The subject of promotional visual products was the only one for the German and Romanian occupation zones, since artistic performance had its own specific features inherent in the region. One of the most

³⁵ Олександр Маєвський, *Карикатура та політичний плакат у періодичних виданнях півдня України (1941-1944 рр.)* [Caricature and political booklets in periodical of the south of Ukraine (1941-1944 years)], in "Black Sea Scientific Journal of Academic Research Multidisciplinary Journal", Vol. 25, 2015, No. 7, p. 53-54.

massive coloured posters in the territory of the Romanian occupation zone was the poster "Transnistria" (picture 3), which was published by the department of propaganda of the administration of the governorship. Chromolithographic picture came out of typography of Odessa municipality.³⁶

The lower part of the poster attracts attention in intense colours, a smiling figure of a woman with a sheaf in her hand and a sunshine against the background of a church bath with a cross and a column of an ionic order and a dwelling house that should not have been symbolized by the reflection of free labour and freedom of conscience in the Romanian occupation zone. The image and manner of performance gives grounds for the conclusion that the author himself was a representative of the Romanian or Ukrainian ethnos.³⁷

These samples of poster art served as propaganda on the territory created by the German command of Transnistria. The themes on the posters change rapidly after Romania's accession to the USSR in the fight against German fascism. We have the same dynamics, almost the same ways of stylistic image. But now the Romanian soldier, along with the Red Army, is destroying the "Hitlerian" soldier³⁸ (picture 4). Researchers today are trying to answer the question of why so few samples of the visual program on the topic of Romania's participation in the Second World War in the Ukrainian archives were preserved. The effectiveness of such propaganda was recognized by the special organs of the Red Army. For the found at an Red Army soldiers' an enemy leaflet, a newspaper or another kind of agitation-propaganda production he was executed.³⁹ If we take into account the fact that this territory subsequently moved back to the USSR, the storage of such samples was dangerous for citizens. Compared with the number of German and Soviet models of poster propaganda, the number of surviving Romanian samples is small. So, this could offer one of the directions of historical research.

Continuing to consider the theme of the allied actions of Romania and the USSR, it should be noted that in the military operations against the German-Hungarian troops the Romanian air force actively manifested itself. In total, according to experts' calculations, Romania lost 350 thousand people in battles

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ А. Гогун, *Черный пиар Адольфа Гитлера. СССР в зеркале нацистской пропаганды* [*Black PR Adolf Hitler. USSR in the mirror of the Nazi propaganda*], Изд. 2-е, испр. и доп., Киев, «К. І. С.», 2016, с. 15.

with Soviet troops and in the end of the war another 170 thousand in battles with German and Hungarian troops. The irrevocable loss of Romania for 1941-1944 on the Soviet-German front of the Second World War amounted to 475,070 military personnel⁴⁰.

Modern researchers believe that according to the strategic, political and material benefits of the number of participating troops, Romania ranks fourth among the participants in the defeat of fascism in the final stage of the war. Participating on the side of the United Nations, Romania for 6 months brought the end of the war closer. But at the peace conference in 1946 in the Paris Romania was included in the composition of the conquered countries. She was denied the status of partner.⁴¹

RESULTS

Given all of the above, there are grounds for the following approval:

1. The Romanian nation became simultaneously a participant and a victim of the events of the Second World War. A change of the territories as a result of the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the establishment of a military dictatorship and a battle on the side of Hitler's Germany in the hope of regaining the lost lands, determined the vector of the foreign policy of the country.

2. When the strategic initiative moved to the side of the Red Army, Romanian soldiers began to increasingly feel the disdain of the Germans. This circumstance became one of the causes of distrust in relation to the German allies. This, in turn, led to the formation of sentiments regarding the cessation of participation in hostilities.

3. Informational and psychological influence was exercised on the Romanian military personnel, as well as on the entire personnel of the German armed forces. Information and psychological influence both from Hitler's propaganda and from Soviet propaganda were made. Under the dual ideological influence, in 1944, the Romanian military trusted information, received from leaflets and sound informational messages of Soviet propagandists. This information was confirmed by the real situation in the war, when the successful

⁴⁰ Г. Ф. Кривошеев (ред.), *Россия и СССР в войнах 20-го века. Потери вооруженных сил. Статистическое исследование* (Russia and the USSR in the wars of the 20th century. Losses of the armed forces. Statistical study), Москва, «Олма-Пресс», 2001.

⁴¹ ****Armata Română în cel de-al doilea război mondial*, p. 202.

actions of the Red Army instilled uncertainty in the victory among the personnel of the enemy troops.

4. The main methods used by the ideological organs of the Red Army were a specially created information product: leaflets, sound transmissions. Interrogations played a special role. Specially trained specialists during the interrogations received information and tried to re-propagate the prisoners. By using the use of communication, the prisoners formed a class consciousness. In addition, single interrogations and collective ones were used. Several prisoners, who had undergone a certain propaganda treatment, influenced their comrade. Soviet military ideologists thus formed the necessary point of view.

5. A special role was played by information on the Soviet captivity from the words of prisoners who were specially processed in the Red Army and returned to their units. Working with prisoners of war as agitators for Soviet captivity brought its results and gained effectiveness considering the fact that the degree of confidence in the prisoners - anti-fascists on the part of the Nazis and their allies was previously quite high.

6. From the side of the ideological organs of the Red Army, powerful psychological pressure was exercised. The purpose of informational-psychological influence was to force Romanian soldiers to stop the armed struggle and surrender. In all propaganda materials one semantic block sounded: "If you want to stay alive and return home, you need to surrender to captivity".

7. The propaganda work on the part of both the Red Army and Germany strengthened. Offers to surrender and to enter into the Soviet captivity sounded very insistent. They were backed up by the real situation at the front and the successful actions of the Red Army. However, it is worth noting the fact that Romanian soldiers were often guided by another opinion. Some archival documents testify to the following fact: Romanian soldiers understood that they were fighting near the territory of their country. The option to surrender and then go home changed the option to stop the armed struggle in alliance with Germany and immediately go to defend their national and personal values. It is worth noting that, according to the generally accepted assessment of modern researchers, Romania occupies the fourth place among the participants in the defeat of Nazi Germany in terms of strategic, political and material participation, according to the number of participating troops.

CONCLUSIONS

On the whole, it can be said that the experience of organizing ideological work during the Second World War is relevant today for the Armed Forces of any country in confrontation with the enemy. Demoralization and reduction of the readiness of fight at the enemy personnel was and it is an important element for reducing the use of own military forces and minimizing losses. Modern technologies associated with the use of the Internet and mobile devices become ineffective in the absence of electricity or network. Even in the presence of electricity and the Internet, enemy means of electronic warfare play an important role in stopping the flow of information. Therefore, the experience of neutralizing the enemy in a non-military way, tested in the Second World War, will always be relevant, given the constant possibility of using direct communication with war prisoners.

ANNEXES



Picture 1, "Transnistria will be Romanian forever"



Picture 2, "Happy New Year!"



Picture 3, "Transnistria"



Picture 4, "The Romanian Army alongside the glorious Red Army"

**EDVARD BENEŠ' DEMARCHES
CONCERNING CARPATHIAN RUTHENIA AND MOSCOW'S POSITION
(SEPTEMBER 1939 – JUNE 1941)**

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Abstract: *The article deals with the problems of Carpathian Ruthenia and its population, which became the object of international negotiations in the 20th century. The issue of Transcarpathian Region is analysed in the context of statements and bilateral discussions between Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. The author presents the opinions of Edvard Beneš on Subcarpathian Rus' and the attitude of Joseph Stalin on the same topic, as well as the main positions taken by the representatives of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union.*

Keywords: *Beneš, Carpathian Ruthenia, Transcarpathia, Ukraine, split, reunion, Rusyns, Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia*

Rezumat: *Demersurile lui Edvard Beneš privind Rutenia Carpatică și poziția Moscovei (septembrie 1939 – iunie 1941)* Articolul abordează chestiunea Ruteniei Carpatice devenită obiect al negocierilor internaționale în secolul XX. Problema regiunii transcarpatice este analizată în contextul declarațiilor și discuțiilor bilaterale sovieto-cehoslovace. Autorul prezintă opiniile lui Edvard Beneš față de Rusia Subcarpatică și atitudinea lui Iosif Stalin pe marginea acestui subiect, precum și principalele luări de poziție ale reprezentanților Cehoslovaciei și Uniunii Sovietice.

Résumé : *Les démarches de Edvard Beneš concernant la Ruthénie Carpatique et la position de Moscou (septembre 1939 – juin 1941).* L'article ci-joint analyse la question de la Ruthénie Carpatique devenue objet des négociations internationales au XX-ème siècle. On y analyse le problème de la région transcarpatique dans le contexte des déclarations et des discussions bilatérales soviéto-tchécoslovaques. L'auteur présente les opinions d'Edvard Beneš envers la Russie Subcarpatique et l'attitude de Joseph Staline vis-à-vis ce sujet, ainsi que les principales prises de position des représentants de la Tchécoslovaquie et de l'Union Soviétique.

INTRODUCTION

The world history of the tragic 20th century showed how often the fate of big regions and communities depends on solving problems of small territories and nations. In spite of its marginal nature generated by the general tectonic displacements in Europe, the problem of Carpathian Ruthenia and its native population of Carpathian Rusyns became a subject of international negotiations and agreements at least three times in the 20th century: in 1919 in Paris, in 1938 in Vienna, and during 1941-1945 in London and Moscow. Just before and during the Second World War, this territory (which got a specific name during the 1919 Peace Conference in Paris) caught the interest of European and world media, refined diplomatic officials and Generals of the army.

The issue of the "Carpathian Ruthenia" was analysed in contemporary historiography from various perspectives.¹ Using the "principle of the cone",

¹ General historiographical guide to the history of Transcarpathia, see: Paul R. Magocsi, *An Historiographical Guide to Subcarpathian Rus'*, in "Austrian History Yearbook", Vol. IX, [Cambridge, Massachusetts], 1973, p. 201-265; Д. Д. Данилюк, *Історіографія Закарпаття в новітній час (1917-1985)* [Historiography of Transcarpathia in modern times (1917-1985)], Львів, Вища школа, 1987, 130 с.; И. И. Поп, *Историография истории русин и Подкарпатской Руси* [Historiography of Rusyns History and Carpathian Ruthenia], in "Славяноведение", 2003, № 1, сс. 57-72; *Historiography*, in Paul Robert Magocsi and Ivan Pop (eds.), *Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture. Revised and Expanded Edition*, Toronto-Buffalo-London, University of Toronto Press, 2005, pp. 169-185; *Історіографія* [Historiography], in Павло Роберт Магочій, Іван Поп (укладачі), *Енциклопедія історії та культури карпатських русинів* [Encyclopedia of Carpathian Rusyn History and Culture], Ужгород, Видавництво В. Падяка, 2010, сс. 258-284; Омелян Довганич, *За глибоке вивчення джерельної бази та історіографії возз'єднання Закарпаття з Україною*, in *Возз'єднання Закарпаття з Україною (матеріали наукової конференції, присвяченої 60-ти річчю возз'єднання Закарпаття з Україною, Ужгород, 29 червня 2005 р.)* [To Detailed Study of the Source Base and Historiography of Reunification of Transcarpathia with Ukraine (materials of scientific conference devoted to the 60th Anniversary of reunification of Transcarpathia with Ukraine, Uzhhorod, June 25, 2005)], Ужгород, 2006, сс. 34-47; Іван Мищак, *Возз'єднання Закарпаття з Радянською Україною: сучасна історіографія* [Reunification of Transcarpathia with the Soviet Ukraine: modern historiography], in *Історіографічні дослідження в Україні* [Historiographical Investigations in Ukraine], Випуск 20, Київ, 2010, сс. 455-474.

Current problems of modern Russian and Czech Historiographies, see.: Г. П. Мурашко,

suggested by the Ukrainian historian Nataliya Yakovenko², we propose to sort the historical literature “from the bottom to the top”. The main events of the general history of Carpathian Ruthenia – Transcarpathian Ukraine – Zakarpattya are placed in the very “bottom of the cone”.³ As “the middle of the cone” contains the

Советский Союз и общественные трансформации в Восточной Европе в 1940-1950 гг. Некоторые дискуссионные вопросы в современной российской и чешской историографии [The Soviet Union and Public Transformations in Eastern Europe during 1940-1950. Some Debating Points in Modern Russian and Czech Historiography], in Е. П. Серапионова (Отв. ред.), *Власть и общество: непростые взаимоотношения. Страны Центральной и Юго-Восточной Европы. Сборник статей* [The Power and Society: uneasy relationship. The Central and South-East European Countries. Collected Works], Москва, Институт славяноведения РАН, 2008, сс. 219-239; В. В. Марьина, *Клио на перепутье общественного развития (По материалам российского журнала «Новая и новейшая история» и чешского журнала «Современная история» 90-х годов XX века)* [Clio on Crossroad of the Public Development (According to Materials of Russian Magazine “Modern and Contemporary History” and Czech Magazine “Contemporary History” of the 90-s of the 20th century)], in Е. П. Серапионова (Отв. ред.), *Советский Союз и общественные трансформации в Восточной Европе. Сборник статей* [The Soviet Union and Public Transformations in Eastern Europe. Collected Works], Москва, Институт славяноведения РАН, 2008, сс. 421-445.

² Наталя Яковенко, *Вступ до історії* [Introduction to the History], Київ, Критика, 2007, сс. 317-318.

³ Иван Поп, *Номо totalitaricus? Історія Закарпаття: критичні роздуми* [Номо totalitaricus? The History of Transcarpathia: Critical Thoughts], in “Карпатський край. Історико-краєзнавчий журнал”, VI, 1996, № 5-7 (114), сс. 4-22; Павло Роберт Магочій, *Формування національної самосвідомості: Підкарпатська Русь (1848-1948)* [The Shaping of a National Identity: Subcarpathian Rus', 1848-1948], Ужгород, Полічка «Карпатського краю», 1994, сс. 142-153; *Нариси історії Закарпаття. У трьох томах* [Essays on the History of Transcarpathia. In three volumes], Том II (1918-1945), Відп. ред. і керів. авт. кол. проф. І. Гранчак, Закарпаття, Ужгород, 1995, сс. 467-575; Peter Švorc, *Zakliata krajina Podkarpatská Rus (1918-1946)* [Charmed Land: Carpathian Ruthenia (1918-1946)], Prešov, Universum, 1996, ss. 87-104; József Botlik, *Közigazgatás és nemzetiségi politika Kárpátalján. I. Magyarok, ruszinok, csehek és ukránok, 1918-1945* [Public administration and nationality policy in Transcarpathia. I. Hungarians, Ruthenians, Czechs and Ukrainians, 1918-1945], Nyíregyháza, Nyíregyházi Főiskola Ukrán és Ruszin Filológiai Tanszéke, 2005, oo. 352-388; Д. Поп, І. Поп, *Історія Підкарпатської Русі* [The History of Carpathian Ruthenia], Ужгород, Приватна друкарня Р. Повча, 2005, сс. 211-233; Андрей Пушкаш, *Цивилизация или варварство: Закарпатье 1918-1945* [Civilization or Barbarism: Transcarpathia

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⁴ Роман Офіцинський, *Політичний розвиток Закарпаття у складі Угорщини (1939-1944)* [Political development Transcarpathia within Hungary (1939-1944)], Київ, Інститут історії України Національної Академії Наук України, 1997, 244 с.; Василь Маркус, Василь Худанич (Ред.), *Закарпаття під Угорщиною. 1938-1944 рр.* [Transcarpathia under Hungary rule], Нью-Йорк-Чикаго-Ужгород, Гражда-Карпати, 1999, 232 с.; Fedinec Csilla (Szerkesztőben), *Kárpátalja 1938-1941. Magyar és ukrán* [Transcarpathia 1938-1941. Hungarians and Ukrainians], Budapest, REGIO, 2004, 277 old.; József Botlik, *Közigazgatás és nemzetiségi politika Kárpátalján. II. A Magyarországhoz történt visszatérés után 1939-1945* [Public administration and nationality policy in Transcarpathia. II. After the return to Hungary, 1939-1945], Nyiregyháza, Nyíregyházi Főiskola Ukrán és Ruszin Filológiai Tanszéke, 2005, 445 old.; Май Панчук, *Закарпаття в умовах угорської окупації та Другої світової війни (етнополітичний аналіз). Угорська окупація краю* [Transcarpathia under the Hungarian occupation in the Second World War time (ethno-political analysis). Hungarian occupation of the region], in "Історичний журнал", 2008, № 5, с. 82-99; Май Панчук, *Закарпаття в умовах угорської окупації та Другої світової війни (етнополітичний аналіз). Рух опору, входження до складу СРСР* [Transcarpathia under the Hungarian occupation in the Second World War time (ethno-political analysis). Resistance Movement, joining the USSR], in "Історичний журнал", 2008, № 6, с. 44-60; Иван Поп, *Подкарпатская Русь - Карпатська Україна - Kárpátaljai terület - Закарпатська Україна (1938-1945 гг.)* [Carpathian Ruthenia (1938-1945)], Ужгород, 2008, 104 с.; Ігор Мазурок, *Правове становище Закарпаття у 1939-*

Carpathian Ruthenia (Transcarpathian Ukraine) issue in bilateral foreign relations between the USSR and Czechoslovakia are situated at "the top of the cone".⁵

1944 pp. (Історико-правове дослідження) [Legal Status of Transcarpathia during 1939-1944 (Historical and Juridical Research)], Ужгород, Карпатська Вежа, 2010, 305 с.; László Brenzovics, *Nemzetiségi politika a visszacsatolt Kárpatalján 1939-1944*, [National Policy in Reannexed Transcarpathia 1939-1944], Ungvár, Kárpátaljai Magyar Kulturális Szövetség, 2010, 204 old.; В. І. Фенич, І. О. Шніцер (Упорядники), *Підкарпатська Русь в роки Другої світової війни. Матеріали міжнародної наукової конференції 16-17 жовтня 2014 року* [Carpathian Ruthenia during the World War II. Materials of International Scientific Conference, 16-17 October, 2014], Ужгород, АУТДОР-ШАРК, 2015, 291 с.

- ⁵ F. Němec, V. Moudrý, *The Soviet Seizure of Subcarpathian Ruthenia*, Toronto, William B. Anderson, 1955, IX+375 p.; Walter Ullmann, *Great Britain and cession of Transcarpathian Ruthenia*, 1945, in "East European Quarterly", XVII, No. 2, June 1983, p. 173-184; Михайло Болдижар, *Закарпаття у відносинах між Чехословаччиною та Радянським Союзом у роки Другої світової війни* [Transcarpathia in the relations between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union during the Second World War], in "Новини Закарпаття", 1993, 25 листопада, № 174 (613), с. 4; М. І. Россовська, Й. Сталін, Е. Бенеш і Закарпаття восени 1944 р. [J. Stalin, E. Beneš and Transcarpathia in the Autumn of 1944], in *Carpatica-Karpatika. Актуальні питання історії, історіографії і культури країн Центральної і Південно-Східної Європи*, Випуск 2, Ужгород, 1993, с. 210-222; І. М. Гранчак, І. І. Поп, *Закарпаття в чехословацько-радянських відносинах періоду Другої світової війни* [Transcarpathia in the Czechoslovak-Soviet Relations during the Second World War], in *Ibidem*, с. 223-236; Василь Маркусь, *Приєднання Закарпатської України до Радянської України, 1944-1945* [Accession of Transcarpathian Ukraine to Soviet Ukraine, 1944-1945], Київ, ІНТЕЛ, 1992, 111 с.; Ivan Pop, *Problém Podkarpatské Rusi v Benešově zahraničné politické koncepci za druhé světové války* [The Issue of Subcarpathian Rus' in Beneš' Foreign Policy Concept during the Second World War], in *Velké dějiny, malý národ*, Praha, Ed. Frank Boldt, 1995, s. 191-202; Іван Поп, *Режисери і статисти. «Возз'єднання Закарпаття з Радянською Україною» в дзеркалі московських документів 1944-1945 pp.* [Producers and Figurants. "Reunion of Transcarpathia with the Soviet Ukraine" reflected in the 1944-1945 Moscow Documents], in "Карпатський край. Історико-краєзнавчий журнал", V, 1995, № 1-4 (110), с. 68-72; Роман Офіцинський, *Політичні орієнтири підкарпатських членів Державної ради Чехословацької республіки у Лондоні (1940-1944)* [Political Benchmarks of Carpathian Members of the State Council of Czechoslovakian Republic in London (1940-1944)], in Володимир Задорожний та Роман Офіцинський (Упорядники), *1945 рік. Закарпатська Україна. Матеріали наукової конференції, присвяченої 50-річчю перемоги над фашизмом та 50-річчю возз'єднання Закарпаття з Україною*

(Ужгород, 26 травня 1995 р., Ужгород, Патент, 1995, с. 28-40; Richter Karel, *Podkarpatskí rusíni v boji za svobodu* [Carpathian Rusyns in the Fight for Freedom], Praha, 1997, 117 s.; Омелян Довганич, *Ставлення чехословацького емігрантського уряду і президента Е. Бенеша до національно-визвольного руху і возз'єднання Закарпаття з Україною* [The Attitude of the Czechoslovak Emigrant Government and President E. Beneš to the National Liberation Movement and Reunification of Transcarpathia with Ukraine], in В. І. Худанич (Укладач), *Возз'єднання. Матеріали Міжнародної наукової конференції, присвяченої 55-річчю возз'єднання Закарпатської України з Україною (26 червня 2000 року, Ужгород, Україна)*, Ужгород, Мистецька лінія, 2001, с. 94-101; В. В. Марьина, *К событиям в Подкарпатской Руси (Закарпатской Украине) осенью 1944 - зимой 1945 года* [About Events in Carpathian Ruthenia (Transcarpathian Ukraine) during the Autumn 1944 – Winter 1945], in "Славяноведение", 2001, № 3, с. 27-48; В. В. Марьина, *Закарпатская Украина (Подкарпатская Русь) в политике Бенеша и Сталина. 1939-1945 гг.* [Transcarpathian Ukraine (Subcarpathian Rus') in Beneš' and Stalin's Policy], Москва, Новый хронограф, 2003, 304 с.; Омелян Довганич, *Так ламалися долі репресованих закарпатців. Сторінками обласного тому «Реабілітовані історією»* [So the fate of the repressed Transcarpathians were broken. On the materials of a regional issue «Rehabilitated by History»], Ужгород, Гражда, 2008, с. 15-37; Jiri Plachý, Ivo Pejčoch, Prokop Tomek, *Občané Podkarpatské Rusi v boji za svobodu Československa 1938-1945* [Citizens of Subcarpathian Rus' in the Fight to Freedom of Czechoslovakia 1938-1945], Praha, Vojenský historický ústav, 2014, 12 s.; Іржі Плахи, Іво Пейчох, Прокоп Томек, *Громадяни Підкарпатської Русі в боротьбі за свободу Чехословаччини 1938-1945* [Citizens of Subcarpathian Rus' in the Fight to Freedom of Czechoslovakia during 1938-1945], Прага, Інститут військової історії, 2014, 12 с.; Ігор Шніцер, *Проблема Підкарпатської Русі (Закарпаття) у відносинах Чехословаччини і Радянського Союзу в 1943-1945 роках* [The Issue of Subcarpathian Rus' (Transcarpathia) in Relations between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union during 1943-1945], in *Закарпатська Україна: перспективи та реалії розвитку. Матеріали Всеукраїнської наукової конференції, присвяченої 65-й річниці возз'єднання Закарпатської України з Радянською Україною (Ужгород, 24 червня 2010 року)*, Ужгород, ТІМΠΑНИ, 2010, с. 70-77; Jiri Plachý, *Obyvatelé Podkarpatské Rusi v československém zahraničním odboji na Západě (1939-1945)* [Citizens of Subcarpathian Rus' in Czechoslovakian Foreign Resistance in the West (1939-1945)], in В. І. Фенич, І. О. Шніцер (Упорядники), *Підкарпатська Русь в роки Другої світової війни. Матеріали міжнародної наукової конференції 16-17 жовтня 2014 року.*: Ужгород, АУТДОР-ШАРК, 2015, с. 151-160; Milan Hauner, *Podkarpatská Rus (PR) v zahraničné-politické koncepcii prez. Beneše, 1938-1945* [Subcarpathian Rus' in Beneš' Foreign Political Concept. 1938-1945], in *Ibidem*, с. 161-180; David Hubený, *Podkarpatská Rus na jednáních československé Státní rady v Londýně* [Subcarpathian Rus' at the Meeting of the Czechoslovakian State

Therefore, our research objective is to present the Carpathian Rus' (Transcarpathian Ukraine) issue as a subject of bilateral Soviet and Czechoslovakian discussions, with particular emphasis on the policy of Beneš and Stalin. The documentary support of our investigation (represented by archive documents and materials, journals, memoirs and letters written by diplomats from those two countries) concerns the fate of Carpathian Ruthenia during and after the Second World War.⁶

Council in London], in *Ibidem*, c. 181-200; Ján Stefanica, *Právne postavenie Podkarpatskej Rusi z pohľadu československej exilovej vlády v Londýne* [Legal Status of Carpathian Ruthenia from the Point of View of Czechoslovakian Exile Government in London], in *Ibidem*, c. 201-213; Ігор Шніцер, *Проблема Підкарпатської Русі (Закарпаття) у чехословацько-радянських відносинах в роки Другої світової війни* [The Issue of Carpathian Ruthenia (Transcarpathia) in the Czechoslovak-Soviet Relations during the Second World War], in *Ibidem*, c. 214-228; Zdenko Maršálek, *Rusíni a Ukrajinci v čs. vojenských jednotkách v zahraničí v letech druhé světové války* [The Rusyns and Ukrainians in Czechoslovakian Military Units Abroad During the Second World War], in *Ibidem*, c. 229-246; Jan Dvorák, *Útěky československých občanů do SSSR a jejich reflexe ve vzpomínkách pamětníků* [Czechoslovakian Citizens Escape to the USSR and its Depiction in Memoirs], in *Ibidem*, c. 247-254; І. Поп, Д. Поп, *Підкарпатська Русь в часи Другої світової війни (1939-1945)* [Carpathian Ruthenia during the Second World War (1939-1945)], in <http://prozak.info/mobile/IIstoriya/Pidkarpatska-Rus-v-chasi-Drugoyi-svitovoyi-vijni-1939-1945> (Accessed on 16.12.2016)

⁶ Edvard Beneš, *Reč o problému Podkarparském a jeho vztahu k Československé republice* [The Speech about the Carpathian Issue and his Relationship with Czechoslovakian Republic], Praha, 1934 (Reprints: *Podkarpatsko a jeho vztah k Československu* /1996/; *Edvard Beneš a Podkarpatská Rus* /2006/); Michael Winch, *Republic for a day. An Eye-Witness Account of the Carpatho-Ukraine Incident*, London, Robert Hale Limited, 1939, 287 p.; Володимир Бірчак, *Карпатська Україна: Спомини й переживання* [Carpathian Ruthenia: Memories and Uneasiness], Прага, «Нація в поході», 1940, 91 c.; E. Táborský, *Beneš and Stalin – Moscow 1943 and 1945*, in "Journal of Central European Affairs", Vol. 13, July 1953, pp. 154-181; Ladislav Karel Feierabend, *Soumrak československé demokracie (Vzpomínky z londýnské vlády. Od jara 1944 po návrat do vlasti)* [Twilight of Czechoslovakian Democracy (Memories from the London-based Government. Since the spring of 1944 after returning to homeland)], Washington, D.C., 1967, p. 106-115; О. Довганич (Ред.), *Крізь пекло ГУЛАГів (Документи, спогади, нариси)* [Through the Hell of Gulags (Documents, memories, sketches)], Ужгород, Полічка «Карпатського краю», 1996, 185 c.; Володимир П. Стахів, *Про українську зовнішню політику, ОУН, Карпатську Україну та політичні вбивства Кремля* [About the Ukrainian Foreign Policy, OUN, Carpathian Ukraine and the Kremlin Political Murders], Гадяч, 2005, c. 163-225; О. М. Корсун, О. М. Пагіря (Упорядники),

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Edvard Beneš (1884-1948) served as the President of Czechoslovakia twice, from 1935–1938 and 1939–1948. After the Munich Agreement, in the most difficult period of this state, in October 1938, “*the famous European democratic person*”⁷ resigned and emigrated. A few months later, in March 1939, when the German military dismembered and occupied Czechoslovakia, he decided to take the lead in the fight for the renewing of his country within its borders.

In June 1939, Beneš arrived in the USA⁸, but after a month he returned to Europe and began to organize the Czechoslovak resistance movement abroad. The traumatic dilemma⁹ of Beneš started at the same time. In the autumn of 1939, the temporary Czechoslovak Government in Exile or the Czechoslovak National Committee (further CNC)¹⁰ was not recognized by Great Britain and France. In addition, the implementation of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and its Secret Protocol was in progress. As it is known, its first victim was Poland, the “artificial creation of the Treaty of Versailles” as it was called by Hitler or the “monster-state” as it was named by People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Vyacheslav Molotov. On September 1, 1939, the German troops invaded Poland from the North, West, and South; on September 17, the Soviet troops started their attack from the East. On the ruins of a conquered country, after common parade of the Wehrmacht and Red Army’s victory, Berlin and Moscow signed the “Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Demarcation”.¹¹

These events influenced the choice of E. Beneš, who by searching found a

Закарпатські втікачі в СРСР: через табори ГУЛАГу і БУЗУЛУК до рідних Карпат. 1939–1949. Архівні документи і матеріали [Transcarpathian Escapees in the USSR: Through the Camps of Gulag and Buzuluk to native Carpathians. 1939-1949. Archive Documents and Materials], Карпати, Ужгород, 2011, 768 с.

⁷ “The University of Chicago Magazine”, 1938, November, pp. 17-18.

⁸ Milan Hauner, *Edvard Beneš v Chicagu a počátky druhého odboje* [Edward Beneš in Chicago and the Beginning of the Second Opposition], in “Historie a vojenství”, 1996, No 1, s. 31-55.

⁹ See: Milan Hauner, «We Must Push Eastwards!» *The Challenges and Dilemmas of President Beneš after Munich*, in “Journal of Contemporary History”, Vol. 44 (4), 2009, pp. 619-656.

¹⁰ Валентина Мар’яна, *Закарпатская Украина (Подкарпатская Русь) в политике Бенеша и Сталина...*, с. 19-20.

¹¹ Тімоті Снайдер, *Криваві землі: Європа поміж Гітлером та Сталіном: монографія* [Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin], Київ, Грані-Т, 2011, с. 125-127.

new ally: Joseph Stalin. It was evident that the former Czechoslovak president paid much attention to the cooperation with the USSR; he considered this country to be a liberator and a ruling power in Central-Eastern Europe. As his own land was a bridge between West and East, it could influence Stalin to eradicate "feudalism" in neighbouring Poland and Hungary.¹²

CARPATHIAN RUTHENIA, ITS TERRITORY AND POPULATION

From autumn 1939 till autumn 1944, the territory of Carpathian Ruthenia covered 12,146 square kilometres. Of the 671,512 (or 667,561) citizens who lived there, at that time, 498,290 (74.7%) were Rusyns.¹³ This small region in the centre of Europe had not been as ethnically homogenous as it was at that time. Nevertheless, the previous events that happened in the Republic ("of one day") of Transcarpathian Ukraine¹⁴, the authoritarian one-party rule, the concentration camps for political opponents, and the election for Sejm of February 1939¹⁵ influenced and modified the population's attitude and perception. Some Rusyns insisted on being Ukrainians, promoting national or communist views.¹⁶ While some of them turned to Nazi Germany (which later betrayed them in favor of Hungary, its new ally according to the Anti-Comintern Pact)¹⁷, those with communist opinions

¹² Пьотр Вандич, *Ціна свободи. Історія Центрально-Східної Європи від Середньовіччя до сьогодення* [The Price of Freedom. A History of East Central Europe from the Middle Ages to the Present], Київ, Критика, 2004, с. 288.

¹³ József Botlik, *op. cit.*, pp. 352, 387.

¹⁴ Michael Winch, *Republic for a day...*

¹⁵ See the memories of the Englishman Michael Winch (*Republic for a day...*), Galician Volodymyr Birchak (*Карпатська Україна: Спомини й переживання*) and Vikenti Shandor – the Subcarpathian Rusyn of Ukrainian orientation (*Спомини, У 2-х томах; Нариси історії Закарпаття...*, Том II (1918-1945), сс. 283-293, 302-317.

¹⁶ Іван Лисяк-Рудницький, *Карпатська Україна: народ у пошуках своєї ідентичності* [Carpathian Ukraine: the Nation in the Search of its Identity], in І. Лисяк-Рудницький, *Історичні есе* [Historical Essays], В 2 т, Том 1, Київ, Основи, 1994, сс. 451-470; Павло Роберт Магочій, *Формування національної самосвідомості: Підкарпатська Русь...* сс. 138-141; Маріан Токар, *Політичні партії Закарпаття в умовах багатопартійності (1919-1939)* [Political Parties of Transcarpathia in a multi-party system], Ужгород, 2006, сс. 167-240.

¹⁷ Дмитро Злепко, *Українське питання у 1938–1939 роках і Третій Райх* [Ukrainian Issue during 1938-1939-s and the Third Reich], in *Записки наукового товариства імені Шевченка*, Том ССХХVIII: *Праці Історично-філософської секції*, Львів, 1994, сс. 249-308.

preferred the Bolshevik Soviet Union (that promised help and refuge to the “political emigrants” on its territory). All of these changes in the ethno-political identification of the eastern Slavic population of Carpathian Ruthenia were used – in different speculative and hybrid forms – by Czechoslovakia and the USSR, from September 1939 till June 1945.

EDVARD BENEŠ OPINIONS ABOUT CARPATHIAN RUTHENIA

Even before becoming the country's president, E. Beneš created his own vision of Transcarpathia, joining the position of the famous Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk. As Minister for Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia (1918-1935), he and his wife, Anna, left Prague and went to Carpathian Ruthenia to celebrate the 15th Anniversary of the population of this land and its decision to live with the Czechs and Slovaks in the Czechoslovak Republic (May 8, 1919). At a cinema in Uzhhorod, Beneš held a speech on the “*Problems of Transcarpathia and its belonging to the Czechoslovak Republic*”¹⁸, stating that “the fate of Carpathian Ruthenia has been finally decided. Carpathian Ruthenia belongs to you: Transcarpathian people and Czechoslovak Republic”.¹⁹ He considered Carpathian Ruthenia as a “bridge between East and West”, understanding that nationally and linguistically, it was stretching to the East, to the Russians and Ukrainians, although its political and social institutions were based on the principles of western democracy. For this reason, Carpathian Ruthenia could not see Czechoslovakia as a single national and cultural landmark.

However, the political aspect of the Transcarpathia issue had to be separated from the cultural particularities of the local population: the Russians, Ukrainians (*Little Russians*) or Rusyns (*Carpathian Rusyns*). From the political point of view, Carpathian Ruthenia belonged to the Czechoslovak Republic, eventually; “for centuries, its political affiliation had been decided”, so it could no longer return to Hungary, nor came under the domination of Ukraine or Russia because of the new status of Poland. Furthermore, considering the language, education, and religion, it should not have been ignored that the Russian citizens accounted for nearly 70% of the population (according to the 1930 census, when 447,000 of 727,000, or 63% were declared “Rus” and “Rusyns”). This fact was supposed to be emphasized in the discussions on the autonomy of Carpathian

¹⁸ Jaromír Horec, *Význam Benešovy cesty* [The meaning of Benes' path], in *Edvard Beneš a Podkarpatská Rus*, Užhorod, 2006, s. 40.

¹⁹ Apud: *Edvard Beneš a Podkarpatská Rus*, Užhorod, 2006, s. 22.

Ruthenia. Even so, from the international point of view of Eastern Europe, on behalf of Russia and the Republic of Czechoslovakia, all Rusyns and "little Russians" were really less important than they seemed to be.

Regarding its historical development, geographical, and political possibilities and common European obligations on national particularities, renewal and liberation, Carpathian Ruthenia could benefit from the unification of states such as Czechoslovakia, Poland and Yugoslavia. In the view of E. Beneš, Carpathian Ruthenia had the mission to connect Czechoslovakia with Romania in such a way as to make possible the policy of the "Small Treaty".²⁰ At the end of his speech, the Czechoslovak politician stated that Carpathian Ruthenia is the example of how "a small country and a small part of a nation can speak loudly about its problems and about their solutions".²¹

In January 1939, living in London as a *persona non grata*, but tolerated as a political emigrant by the British authorities, the former Czechoslovak president painted for himself and for his inner circle the image of the post-war Central Europe: "Russia will play a great role ... [Hitler] will help us become neighbors [of Russia]. Thinking of all future catastrophes, Russia should be in Uzhhorod at last, [and] Prešov as nearest to Russia as it can be possible... The border with Russia should be as long as possible".²²

STALIN AND THE CARPATHIAN UKRAINE QUESTION

If the president Beneš had reacted promptly to solve the problem of Carpathian Ruthenia by granting its autonomy in 1919, maybe Stalin's plans might have been different. Unlike the Czechoslovak politician, Stalin was not so prolix upon the territory of Transcarpathia. Following the Munich Agreement, Moscow could not bear to react to rumors spread in the West about Germany, which was promoting among Ukrainians a policy similar to that in the Sudetenland. Western

²⁰ *Ibidem*, s. 37-38. This is so called the Little Entente (Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia) created in 1926 for the opposition to Hungary and its policy concerning revision of borders after the Treaty of Trianon in 1920. Details about this direction of Beneš' foreign policy, see: Milan Hauner, *The Quest for the Romanian Corridor: The Soviet Union, Romania and Czechoslovakia during the Sudeten of 1938*, in Fritz Taubert (Ed.), *Mythos München*, Mnichov, 2002, pp. 39-77.

²¹ *Edvard Beneš a Podkarpatská Rus...*, s. 39.

²² Аруд: Иван Поп, *Подкарпатська Русь - Карпатська Україна - Kárpátaljai terület - Закарпатська Україна (1938-1945 гг.)...*, c. 57-58.

scholars wrote that Hitler, by manipulating the people's right to self-determination, was ready to help the Ukrainian separatist movement from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union, intending to create an independent Ukraine.²³ As a matter of fact, Stalin expressed his point of view in his report to the XVIIth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, on March 10, 1939: "A typical agitation, propagated by the Anglo-French and North American press about the Soviet Ukraine. The activists of these newspapers screamed that the Germans are moving to the Soviet Ukraine, that they have already occupied the so-called Carpathian Ukraine – with about 700,000 inhabitants – to which, no later than this spring, they will join the Soviet Ukraine, with a population of over 30 million people [...] Of course, it is absolutely possible to find in Germany some brainless who will join the elephant that is the Soviet Ukraine, to the puppy, which is the so-called Carpathian Ukraine". Talking seriously about it, in Stalin's opinion, was "ridiculous and ignorant".²⁴

HITLER'S VIEW ON CARPATHIAN UKRAINE

As it is known, before the attack of the USSR on June 22, 1941, the Third Reich used the Ukrainian map with the goal of enforcing the policy of "Thrust toward the East" (*Drang Nach Osten*), widening the "living space" (*Lebensraum*). At first, from autumn 1938 to spring 1939, Nazi Germany drew a separate project of Carpathian Ukraine, on the Carpathian Ruthenia autonomous territory of the sovereign Czechoslovak state, using the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the local Ukrainian nationalists.

However, neither on March 15, 1939 in Khust, nor on June 30, 1941 in Lviv, the Nazis proclaimed the creation or re-establishment of the Ukrainian state.²⁵ In the first case, the "Ukrainian map" (as well as the Slovak) was used against the official regime in Prague, after Czechoslovakia was dismembered and the former

²³ The point of view of Western Europeans and North Americans before the Second World War on the Ukrainian issue, see Іван Патріляк, *Перемога або смерть! Український визвольний рух у 1939-1960 роках* (друге видання) [Victory or Death! Ukrainian Liberation Movement in 1939-1960. Second edition], Харків Клуб сімейного дозвілля, 2015, с. 10-24.

²⁴ Й. В. Сталин, *Вопросы ленинизма* [Questions of Leninism], Москва, 1947, с. 571-572; В. В. Марьина, *Закарпатская Украина (Подкарпатская Русь) ...*, р. 6-13.

²⁴ Володимир П. Стахів, *Про українську зовнішню політику*, с. 163-225; Дмитро Злепко, *Українське питання.*, с. 249-308.

²⁵ Іван Патріляк, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-22, 68-79.

authorities did not think to cooperate with the Ukrainian nationalist power. In the second case, the Ukrainian nationalist movement, consisting of former Polish and Czech citizens and some citizens of the USSR, was used by the Third Reich against Moscow. This time, Stalin lost: together with the remains of the former "pug" (Carpathian Ukraine) the Germans attacked "the elephant" (the USSR) on June 22, 1941.

CARPATHIAN RUTHENIA ISSUE IN THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN BENEŠ AND MAISKY

While he was in the USA, in his Chicago speech of June 8, 1939, E. Beneš called Carpathian Ruthenia as a part of Czechoslovakia: "We do not recognize and will not recognize either legally or politically any *fait accompli*. We will not recognize any occupation; that is why, at present time, our state continues to exist *de jure* for us. We do not recognize the Vienna Award concerning Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia, which was an unfair blow from Hungary".²⁶

The first meeting between Beneš and Maisky was held on September 22-23, 1939. The recordings made by interlocutors or their secretaries contain essential differences concerning the Carpathian Ruthenia issue. According to Maisky's affirmation of September 22 on "Ruthenia", Beneš would have suggested that its territory "will be a future part of the USSR". A day later, the Czechoslovak politician would have confirmed the USSR intervention in Poland, calling for regulation within the Western Ukraine problem and supporting the idea of a common border for USSR and Slovakia (which, at that time, was a puppet-state of Germany). He would not have been against the Soviet power in Czechoslovakia, as long as his country could be relieved from the German pressure. Regarding Carpathian Ukraine, he reaffirmed that it was supposed to be a part of the USSR, recognizing that, as President of Czechoslovakia, he considered it a "future part of the USSR"²⁷. Such information comes from a document sent by Molotov to Beneš in Moscow, in March 24, 1945. This text suggest the positive attitude of the Czechoslovak president towards the future of Carpathian Ruthenia, by including its territory in the USSR²⁸.

However, in Beneš' records of September 22, 1939 on the negotiations with Maisky, the approach is quite different. Speaking about the attack of the Red Army

²⁶ Milan Hauner, *op. cit.*, p. 31-35.

²⁷ *Документы внешней политики*, [Foreign Policy Documents] Т. XXII, Кн. 2, Москва, 1992, с. 122.

²⁸ В. В. Марьина, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

on Lviv, Maisky emphasized that the Ukraine problem could be solved once and for all by including of the region in the Soviet Union. As he just smiled, but did not answer the question about Carpathian Ruthenia, Beneš declared: "it is our land and we have right over it... We can solve it in two ways: it will remain our or, eventually, if it (the USSR) will be our neighbour and required it, we would not be against it. But neither Poles, nor especially Hungarians should have it".²⁹

Thus, having two opposite versions of the dialogue between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union it is very important to investigate them and to identify their accuracy. Milan Hauner (an American historian, of Czech origin) and Valentina Maryina (a researcher from Moscow) trust Beneš version. Both historians credit the diary of Beneš secretary, Yaromir Smutnyy who witnessed those events. He affirmed that in one of the Beneš orders on the resistance movement it was written: "We insist to see Carpathian Ruthenia as a republic, if Russia is not the neighbour".³⁰

From October to November 1939, the rumours about Carpathian Ruthenia joining the USSR were spread in Western Europe. Diplomatic missions and special services in France and Great Britain found out that Russia was planning or at least was trying to occupy Carpathian Ruthenia within one month.³¹ While he was in Paris, in October 1939, Beneš was excited about the spheres of influence distributed between the USSR and Germany. Following the Berlin decision, Carpathian Ruthenia, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia were recognized by Moscow.³²

²⁹ *Československo-sovětské vztahy v diplomatických jednáních. 1939-1945, Dokumenty* [The Czechoslovak-Soviet Relations at Diplomatic Meetings. 1939-1945, Documents], Díl. 1. *Brezen 1939 - červen 1943*, Praha, 1998, s. 87.

³⁰ L. Otáholová, M. Cervinková (Ed.), *Dokumenty z historie československé politiky 1939-1943* [Documents on the History of Czechoslovakian Policy 1939-1943], Sv. 1. *Vztahy mezinárodno-diplomacie k politice československé emigrace na západě* [International and Diplomatic Attitude to Czechoslovakian Policy Concerning Emigration in the West], , Praha, 1966, № 69, № 288; *Češi a sudetoněmecká otázka. 1939-1945. Dokumenty* [The Czechs and Sudeten German Issue. 1939-1945. Documents], Praha, 1999, s. 20.

³¹ *Zápisy ze zasedání Československého národního výboru. 1939-1940* [The Minutes of the Session of the Czechoslovakian National Committee. 1939-1940], in *Dokumenty československé zahraniční politiky. Od rozpadu Česko-Slovenska do uznání československé prozatímní vlády. 1939-1940* [Documents of Czechoslovakian Foreign Policy. Since the Split of Czechoslovakia until the Recognition of Czechoslovakian Provisional Government], Praha, Příloha, 1999, ss. 83, 128.

³² J. Néměček, *Československá diplomatická mise v Moskvě (březen-prosinec 1939)* [Czechoslovakian Diplomatic Mission in Moscow (March-December 1939)]. Příloha 2,

During the next meeting with Ivan Maisky, on November 21, 1939, in London, E. Beneš complained about the unwillingness of England and France to support his plans, confirming that he could not imagine the existence of his country without the USSR as its neighbour, with the inclusion of Carpathian Ruthenia in Czechoslovakia or in the USSR.³³ Obviously, these discussions did not result in any legal measures.

THE SLOVAK STATE AND THE ISSUE OF CARPATHIAN UKRAINE

On September 16, 1939, the Soviet Union recognised *de facto* and *de jure* the Slovak Republic and established diplomatic relations with it. After the Slovak Ambassador's visit to Moscow, the Embassy of Czechoslovakia was closed in December 1939 and the Czechoslovak diplomat, Zdenek Firlinger, stopped his diplomatic relations with E. Beneš.³⁴ From that time to July 1941, Beneš and Maisky had no other meetings.³⁵

As it has been recently investigated, on September 19, 1939, Firlinger met the head of the Central European Department of the National Commissariat of Foreign Affairs (later, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), A. M. Aleksandrov, and expressed his hope that the Carpathian Ukraine will be occupied by the Red Army, which corresponded to the "interests of future Czechoslovakia": a common border with USSR. According to his words, the "Czechoslovak government wanted this joining earlier, but the Polish territory prevented it".³⁶ On this issue, Firlinger did not talk with Beneš.³⁷

On February 2, 1940, the Soviet Ambassador, G. M. Pushkin, visited Bratislava and said that Slovakia is full of rumours about how the USSR would wish to "take Carpathian Ruthenia". These comments were spread even by the representatives of the highest authority of Slovakia. In particular, on May 9, 1940, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, F. Dyurchanskyy, talked about this problem during his meeting with the Soviet diplomat. He declared that his acquaintances were afraid of a full

in "Moderní dějiny", Praha, 4, 1996, s. 53.

³³ *Документы внешней политики...*, [Foreign Policy Documents] T. XXII, Кн. 2, с. 327.

³⁴ Milan S. Durica, *Dejiny Slovenska a Slovákov* [The History of Slovakia and the Slovaks], Bratislava, Slovenské pedagogické nakladateľstvo, 1996, s.151; Валентина Марьяна, *Закарпатская Украина (Подкарпатская Русь) ...*, с. 19.

³⁵ Валентина Марьяна, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

³⁶ J. Němeček, *op. cit.*, s. 20-42.

³⁷ Валентина Марьяна, *op. cit.*, с. 19.

transformation of Slovakia into a Berlin's puppet, supporting instead a common Soviet-Slovakian border.³⁸ This last proposal was raised again, on July 16, 1940, in the dialogue between Dyurchanskyy and Pushkin.³⁹ However, according to the discussion of the German Ambassador in Moscow, F. Schulenburg, with the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, V. Molotov, on June 25, 1940, the USSR claimed just an insignificant part of "the only Ukraine" – Bukovina: "The Bukovina issue, a land where the predominant population is Ukrainians, was considered by the Soviet government as a correct one and timely, since the whole Ukraine was united; but the Soviet Union does not associate the Carpathian Ruthenia question with Hungary, considering that it is not actual".⁴⁰

EDVARD BENEŠ AND THE IDEA OF A RECONSTRUCTED POST-WAR CZECHOSLOVAKIA

From autumn 1939 till summer 1941, E. Beneš talked about Carpathian Ruthenia, emphasizing its natural appurtenance to Czechoslovakia. For example, in the Memorandum entitled *Czechoslovakia after war*, published in March 1940, he referred to the breach of Vienna Award (November 2, 1938) and annexation of Carpathian Ruthenia (March 1939) that led 500,000 Rusyns to join Hungary: "We leave the Carpathian Ruthenia issue for the future and wait for the development of events in Central Europe, suggesting that the Rusyns should manifest their will and opinion about it, as it was in 1918, when they were free to express their desire to be a part of Czechoslovakia".⁴¹ This idea was repeated in his lecture delivered at Oxford University, in March 1940: "The issue about

³⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 14-15.

³⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 16. See: В. В. Марьина, *Словаки в политике СССР и Германии* [The Slovaks in the Policy of the USSR and Germany], in *Восточная Европа между Гитлером и Сталиным. 1939-1941 гг.* [Eastern Europe between Hitler and Stalin. 1939-1941-s], Москва, 1999, сс. 198-240; В. В. Марьина, «Ворота на Балканы». *Словакия в геополитических конструкциях СССР и Германии. 1939-1941 гг.* ["The Gates to the Balkans". Slovakia in Geopolitical Constructions of the USSR and Germany. 1939-1941-s], in *Война и политика. 1939-1941* [The War and Policy. 1939-1941], Москва, 1999, с. 472-479.

⁴⁰ *СССР-Германия. 1939-1941 гг. Документы и материалы о советско-германских отношениях с сентября 1939 г. по июль 1941 г.* [Documents and Materials about the Soviet-German Relations since September 1939 until July 1941], Москва, Telex, 1983, с. 61; Валентина Марьина, *Закарпатская Украина (Подкарпатская Русь) ...*, с. 15.

⁴¹ *Češi a sudetoněmecká otázka. 1939-1945. Dokumenty* [The Czechs and Sudeten German Issue. 1939-1945. Documents], Praha, 1999, s. 46-47.

Carpathian Ruthenia will be solved, after the war, on free vote".⁴² We should underline the choice made by E. Beneš to use the ethno-historical term "Rusyns" in his lectures for the foreign audience.

The Czechoslovak leader compensated for the lack of dialogue with the USSR with the active relations with the West. In July 21, 1940, in London, E. Beneš founded an "advisory body of the President of the Republic" and an "auxiliary control body". As Ivan Pop affirms, Beneš' appointment was connected with the problem of his citizenship after the split of Czechoslovakia. For instance, the Hungarian diplomacy considered Beneš to be a citizen of Hungary, demanding his extradition as he led an "anti-Hungarian activity" on the territory of France (until June 25, 1940) and Great Britain. The above mentioned historian believed that the "requirements of Hungary were legal because, at that time, there have been no war between Hungary and Great Britain".⁴³

Consisting of 40 persons (later it was extended to 50 persons), the State Council created by Beneš existed till October 11, 1944.⁴⁴ On October 12, 1940, Pavlo Tsibere was appointed to represent the interests of the Slavonic population of Carpathian Ruthenia in the State Council. Russophile of the pro-Czechoslovak orientation, Rusyn by nationality, holding a Doctorate in Law (1936), he was the former head of the Agrarian Youth Union of Carpathian Ruthenia and the General Secretary of the Central Rusyn National Council (established on December 11, 1938).⁴⁵ In the State Council, Tsibere was responsible for "the financial and economic sector" (transformed, in 1942, into "the economic and social sector"),⁴⁶ while Yaromir Nechas – an old friend of the Rusyns – was invested as a Minister of State for Carpathian Ruthenia.

⁴² *Dokumenty z historie československé politiky 1939-1943, Sv. 1. Vztahy mezinárodno-diplomacie k politice československé emigrace na západě...*, [Historical Documents about Czechoslovakian Policy during 1939-1943. Vol. 1, International Diplomatic Relations to the Policy of Czechoslovakian Emigration to the West...], s. 84.

⁴³ Ivan Pop, *Djiny Podkarpatské Rusi v datech* [History of Carpathian Ruthenia in Dates], Praha, Libri, 2005, s. 406.

⁴⁴ Vojtěch Šustek, *Státní rada v Londýně v letech 1940-1941. Sborník archivních prací* [State Council in London during 1940-1941. Collected Archive Works], Č. 2, 1994, s. 241-244; David Hubený, *op. cit.*, cc.181-182.

⁴⁵ *Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture...*, p. 501; *Енциклопедія історії та культури карпатських русинів...*, c. 795-796.

⁴⁶ *Zprávy Státní rady* [State Council Reports], č. 1, roč. 2, 1942, s. 1, 4; David Hubený, *op. cit.*, c. 183.

THE CARPATHIAN RUTHENIA ISSUE IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE

While, in London, Tsibere assumed the role of protector of the Carpathian Ruthenia interests, this territory became a target for the Soviet diplomats in Europe. On November 4, 1940, Kulikov, the General Consul of the USSR in the capital of the German Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia informed Moscow about the Prague Department delegation visit to the Rus' (in his interpretation "Russian") National Council of Carpathian Ruthenia. The delegation passed him the manifest *About Joining Carpathian Ruthenia to Russia*, signed by "the leader of Carpathian Ruthenia", I. Shlepytskyy, who asked to submit the text to "the Council of Ministers of the USSR".⁴⁷ However, before Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union, Moscow adopted an officially neutral attitude toward this issue.

As for the Czechs, during the negotiations with the Poles on the creation of the Czechoslovak-Polish Conference (at the end of 1940), they rejected the idea that the Carpathian Ruthenia could be part of Hungary or Poland. Trying to conceal their interest in this territory, they declared: "We do not turn down Carpathian Ruthenia; but it is not because of the prestige. Carpathian Ruthenia joined us freely and we pledged to save this poor Slavonic people from being taken by Hungary by force. We fulfil this obligation. Secondly, Carpathian Ruthenia is the only land for us, which unites the Republic with Romania and the Black Sea region, in the South".⁴⁸

On January 12, 1941, all questions about Carpathian Ruthenia in the State Council were separated and submitted to the "Office dealing with problems of Carpathian Ruthenia" of which P. Tsibere was the head of for two years. Every month he received £75 as a member of the State Council and £10 as the Head of "Carpathian-Rus Office". Being supported in his work by Georgiy Falkovych (a Russian emigrant, Kuban by origin),⁴⁹ Tsibere founded, in London, the "Association of friends from Carpathian Ruthenia", tightening the relationships with the Carpathian-Rus emigration in the USA, Canada, and the Soviet Union.

On February 1-2, 1941, at the request of B. Lockhart, the British representative to the Provisional Czechoslovak Government in London, E. Beneš prepared a Memorandum entitled *Czechoslovakia's goals and the period of peace*. In that

⁴⁷ Валентина Марьина, *Закарпатская Украина (Подкарпатская Русь)...*, с. 18-19.

⁴⁸ *Dokumenty z historie československé politiky 1939-1943, Sv. 1. Vztahy ...*, s. 205-206; Валентина Марьина, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

⁴⁹ Роман Офіцинський, *Політичний розвиток Закарпаття...*, с. 130.

document, he stated that: "The Czechoslovak Republic considers Carpathian Ruthenia as an integrated (!) part of its territory and will never give it up. There was no information about this territory in the Munich Agreement. Some regions were taken from this autonomous part of the republic*. The Hungarian government signed it and recognized this territory to be a part of Czechoslovakia".⁵⁰

Article 2 of the Memorandum stipulated that, according to the Vienna Award, the following three main regions and cities were taken from Carpathian Ruthenia: Uzhhorod, Mukachevo, and Berehovo with all their suburbs. Therefore, "Carpathian Ruthenia cannot refuse either Uzhhorod or Mukachevo. Uzhhorod was always the capital of this province and a cultural centre of all Carpathian Rusyns and never had a Hungarian majority. Mukachevo was Rus' and Jewish, but never Hungarian; it was the economic centre of the whole province. Berehovo region, where the Hungarian majority lived, can be agreed".⁵¹

Finally, article 3 stated that "during the military entry into Carpathian Ruthenia, the Hungarian army occupied eastern Slovakia adjoining Carpathian Ruthenia, but which did not belong to this autonomous province. The Hungarian government, with the aim of annexation of these regions, joined them to Carpathian Ruthenia. And these regions should be returned back to Czechoslovakia".⁵²

However, until June 1941, the former President E. Beneš was going to redefine his belief that "Carpathian Ruthenia should belong to Czechoslovakia or Russia", as he had previously declared. In other words, he needed to take into account the "senselessness" but "friendly" relations of USSR with Germany, as well as the ability of the Soviet Union to conceal its interest in the Carpathian area.⁵³

* On the first Vienna Arbitration of Germany and Italy on November 2, 1938, to Hungary were transferred the southern parts of Slovakia and Subcarpathian Rus', the majority of which were Hungarians.

⁵⁰ *Češi a sudetoněmecká otázka. 1939-1945. Dokumenty* [The Czechs and the Sudeten German Issue. 1939-1945. Documents] Praha, 1999, s. 88; Валентина Марьяна, *op. cit.*, p. 23. The text of the document, see: *Československo-sovětské vztahy v diplomatických jednáních. 1939-1945, Dokumenty*, Díl. 1. Brezen 1939 - červen 1943..., Doc. № 75, ss. 181; Валентина Марьяна, *op. cit.*, p. 184.

⁵¹ *Československo-sovětské vztahy v diplomatických jednáních. 1939-1945, Dokumenty*, Díl. 1. Brezen 1939 - červen 1943..., Doc. № 75, s. 181-182; Валентина Марьяна, *op. cit.*, p. 184-185.

⁵² *Československo-sovětské vztahy v diplomatických jednáních. 1939-1945, Dokumenty*, Díl. 1. Brezen 1939 - červen 1943..., Doc. № 75, s. 182; Валентина Марьяна, *op. cit.*, p. 185.

⁵³ *Československo-sovětské vztahy v diplomatických jednáních. 1939-1945, Dokumenty*, D. 1, ss. 181-182.

CONCLUSIONS

The analysis of events unfolded between 1938 and 1941 leads to the following conclusions: 1) after the Munich Conference (September 1938), the critical diplomatic and political decisions towards the territories of Czechoslovakia led to its dismemberment. Unofficially supported by Germany, the Autonomous Carpathian Ruthenia would become the object of international negotiations, playing an interesting role in the bilateral discussions and statements between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia; 2) even if the Soviet Union representatives claimed they were not interested in the fate of this territory (called “pug” by Joseph Stalin, in jest), E. Beneš has upheld the right of Czechoslovakia over Carpathian Ruthenia; 3) since the beginning of the informal relations between the former Czechoslovak president, E. Beneš, and the Soviet ambassador in London, I. Maisky, it was not excluded that Carpathian Ruthenia could have become a future part of the USSR.

ROMANIA'S POSITION TOWARDS THE 1967 ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

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Abstract: *The present study focuses on the way Romania decided to stand in regard to the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict. The government in Bucharest took a number of decisions during this period which at first did nothing but to increase the degree of political isolation of Romania among the Soviet states. Gradually however, the decisions taken by Nicolae Ceausescu both during the hostilities in the Middle East and after the ceasefire, showed that the position of the Romanian state was right, and in regard to the principles of an assumed foreign policy and worthy of a sovereign state. Moreover, the attitude of the Romanian president to this issue allowed him later to assume the role of mediator of a conflict in one of the most "hot" areas in the world. The 1967 conflict was a turning point for the Bucharest administration, and Romanian diplomats knew how to exploit in the benefit of the Romanian foreign policy.*

Keywords: *Romania, Arab-Israeli conflict, Nicolae Ceausescu, foreign policy, Middle East*

Rezumat: *Poziția României față de conflictul arabo-israelian din 1967. Tema abordată în cadrul acestei lucrări are în vedere modul în care România a ales să se poziționeze în timpul conflictului arabo-israelian din 1967. Guvernul de la București și-a asumat, în această perioadă, o serie de decizii care, la prima vedere, nu au făcut nimic altceva decât să crească gradul de izolare politică a României în rândul statelor sovietice. Treptat însă, deciziile luate de Nicolae Ceaușescu atât în timpul desfășurării ostilităților în Orientul Apropiat cât și după încetarea focului au demonstrat faptul că poziția statului român a fost una corectă, respectând principiile unei politici externe asumate și demne de un stat suveran. Mai mult decât atât, atitudinea avută de președintele român față de această problemă i-a permis ulterior acestuia să își asume rolul de mediator al unui conflict situat într-una dintre cele mai „fierbinți” zone de pe glob. Momentul 1967 a reprezentat un moment de cotitură pentru administrația de la București, moment pe care diplomații români au știut să-l exploateze foarte bine în folosul politicii externe a statului român.*

Résumé : *La position de la Roumanie vis-à-vis le conflit arabo-israélien de 1967. Le thème qu'on aborda dans l'ouvrage ci-joint fait référence à la manière dans laquelle la Roumanie choisit se positionner pendant le conflit arabo-israélien de 1967. Le gouvernement*

de Bucarest prit pendant cette période une série de décisions qui, à la première vue, firent augmenter le degré d'isolation politique de la Roumanie parmi les Etats soviétiques. Mais au fur et à mesure, les décisions prises par Nicolae Ceaușescu pendant le déroulement des hostilités du Proche Orient, mais aussi après leur fin, démontrèrent que la position de l'Etat roumain fut correcte, respectant les principes d'une politique externe assumée et digne d'un Etat souverain. De plus, l'attitude du président roumain envers cette question permit ultérieurement à celui-ci s'assumer le rôle de médiateur d'un conflit situé dans une des plus "chaudes" zones du globe. Le moment 1967 représenta un moment de tournure pour l'administration de Bucarest, moment que les diplomates roumains surent exploiter très bien au service de la politique externe de l'Etat roumain.

INTRODUCTION

In a time when the Cold War was in full progress, the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict – known in the literature as “the Six-Day War” – led to further deepening of the division between the two political blocs and the states gravitating around them. For Romania, this war became a very important moment for redefining the position adopted by its officials, both in relation to the states directly involved in the conflict, but especially in relation to the policy promoted by the Soviet Union. Applauded by Israel and the West and blamed equally by the Arabs and the Soviets, the attitude of Romania demonstrated that it was trying to make the first steps to develop an independent foreign policy. Given the major impact of this conflict on international relations, the Romanian diplomats in the Middle East embassies and all around the world had constantly tried to obtain accurate information, at a time when many of the sources were corrupted. Thus, with their help, the Bucharest officials followed closely the progress of the Arab-Israeli conflict, leading us to the fact that Romanian Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs might provide us a wide range of information on the evolution of the situation in the Middle East, but also of the issues encountered by the Romanian diplomats. We find highly important information to determine the course of Romania, Israel and the Arab states relations, in the archival funds of Issue 224 (1967-1972, 32, 33, 40, 43, 45, 61, 69, 2608). Romanian National Archives and Department of Foreign Relations documents (files 43/1967, 114/1967) prove very useful as well.

PREPARATIONS FOR WAR

The tensions at the Arab-Israeli border were present since the beginning of 1967, when the UN General Secretary proposed Syria and Israel to form a discussion

framework to assist with the signing a truce between the two states. Meetings that took place on January 25 and 29, and February 2 failed to bring the parties to a common ground, leading to the suspension of negotiations¹. During that period, the attention of the entire international community had focused mainly on the Vietnam War, which had overshadowed the Near East situation. However, for the Arab leaders the Israel issue was more vivid than ever. The Egyptian president, Nasser, who wanted to be the leader and unifier of the Arab world, went through a moment when his authority and position among the Arabs were questioned. This drove him to a series of rushed decisions that later would justify the Arab army's failure, during the confrontation with the Zionist enemy².

On the May 2, 1967, President Nasser launched a statement in which he accused imperialism, in general, and United States, in particular. In response, Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol warned Syria that there would be very serious consequences if the Damascus government will not take any measure to stop terrorist incursions on Israel's territory, at the Syrian border. Shortly after these declarations, a series of rumours insinuated that Israel sent troops to the Syrian border to prevent an armed attack. These rumours proved untrue as long as Israel mobilized troops at its borders with the Arab states only after the launch of the Egyptian offensive. The origin of these rumours remained unclear. The Central Intelligence Agency sources showed that neither Israel nor Egypt spread them, but the Soviets³. Even so, there was a possibility that Israelis to proliferate this information, taken over by the Soviet Union and forwarded to the Arab side, with the aim that the Soviets persuade the Syrians to abandon their actions against Israel. The Soviet Union did not seem interested in denying this information and establishing the truth about the course of events. In the Egyptian president's speeches of June 9 and July 23, 1967, there are indicated sources pointing to the Soviet Union to be responsible for these rumours' dissemination.⁴ Apparently, the information was sent to an Egyptian official during his visit to Moscow. The information provided by the Soviets was accompanied by a warning to not take

¹ Cristina Nedelcu, *Politica României față de problema palestiniană, 1948-1979* [Romania's policy towards the Palestinian issue, 1948-1979], Târgoviște, Editura Cetatea de Scaun, 2013, p.166.

² *Ibid.*, p.166.

³ Central Intelligence Agency, Electronic Reading Room, *Soviet Policy and the 1967 Arab-Israeli War*, Colecția CAESAR, POLO, and ESAU Papers, 16 Martie 1970, p. 4, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001408643.pdf (Accessed on 14.08.2017).

⁴ *Ibid.*, p.5.

any action that would give Israel a reason to start an armed conflict. The Arabs seem to have taken into account the information they received, but have completely ignored the Soviet officials' warning⁵.

In the Israeli camp, the situation was equally tense. The information received from the neighbour countries created panic and hysteria among the population of Israel: "In the past two days there has been an increase in tension among the population, and military preparations have increased in intensity. Beginning on the evening of the May 22, the mobilization of reservists is intensely ... the population makes massive supplies of sugar, oil, flour..."⁶.

This explained the exemplary mobilization of Israeli troops and their capacity to defeat the Arab army in just a few days, despite their numerical superiority. The military leader and Israeli Defence Minister, Moshe Dayan, motivated the Israeli army's success of capturing the Egyptian army: "I thought the Egyptians were anxious to give the first shot ... we were losing the advantage of surprise ... we have limited forces, and every passing moment was against us because the Arabs have been organized" ⁷. The Israelis also claimed some evidences, demonstrating that the radar equipment had recorded movements of the Egyptian army that started on the morning of June 5, from Gaza and Sinai to the Israeli territory⁸.

ROMANIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST

On June 5, 1967, the day when the war broke out, the Romanian government addressed an appeal to the states involved in the conflict, asking the two sides to cease military operations and solve the conflict peacefully.⁹ A few days later, on June 9, 1967¹⁰, Nicolae Ceausescu attended a meeting of the Chiefs of Communist

⁵ *Ibid.*, p.5.

⁶ Dumitru Preda, Victor Boștinăru (eds.), *Romania-Israel. Diplomatic Documents*, vol. I: 1948-1969, București, Bruxelels, 2013, p. 168.

⁷ Moshe Dayan, *Istoria vieții mele* [History of my life], București, Editura Hasefer, 2001, p. 297.

⁸ Arhivele Ministerului Afacerilor Externe al României [Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives; hereinafter – MFAA], Problema 224/1967, *Orientul Apropiat* [Issue 224/1967, the Near East], Direcția a V-a Relații, Dosar 33, *Informații de la oficiile diplomatice române* [Information from the Romanian diplomatic offices], f. 62.

⁹ *Ibid.*, Problema 224/1969, *Orientul Apropiat*, Direcția a V-a Relații, Dosar 69, *Aprecieri asupra situației din Orientul Apropiat* [Assessments on the situation in the Near East], f. 119.

¹⁰ Arhivele Naționale ale României [National Archives of Romania; hereinafter – NAR], Fond C. C al P. C. R., Secția Relații Externe, Dosar 43/1967, f. 3.

and Workers' Party and the Socialist Governments, which took place in Moscow. The purpose of this meeting was to condemn the Israeli aggression against the Arab states and to find a solution to solve the conflict in the area, a solution that had to satisfy the interests of the Soviet Union in the region. During the meeting, the socialist states condemned – by a common document – the Israeli aggression, identifying Israel as the only one to blame for the conflict outbreak. We owe to specify that the statement was not pleasing Romania's delegation, who tried to propose another approach according to which Israel was not to be condemned as an aggressor state¹¹. At the same time, it was underlining the fact that the Israeli army had to withdraw from occupied territories and both sides must take responsibility for the conflict outbreak. In addition, Nicolae Ceausescu demanded that the name of Romania be cleared from the joint statement¹² of the socialist states following a disagreement over the condemnation of Israel, preferring to make a separate statement. Although the joint declaration of the socialist states condemned the Israeli aggression –which was “accomplished with the help of the American imperialism”¹³ – in his discussion with Nicolae Ceausescu, L. I. Brezhnev admitted his dialogue with the Soviet representative on the Security Council, with Johnson, Wilson, and de Gaulle. He also confirmed that the US Armed Forces have avoided intervening in the conflict, supporting the Israeli offensive. The Soviet leader even reported a story according to which Israelis accidentally bombarded an American ship, and Soviet ships panicked, believing that it was an Egyptian attack. Immediately after the incident, Brezhnev contacted the US president who explained that Americans sent those planes in order to help the ship's crew and not to intervene in the conflict.¹⁴ Brezhnev acknowledged that the only to blame for the Arab defeat was the president Nasser, who had taken a series of rushed decisions, such as the blockade of the Akaba Bay, the withdrawal of the UN troops, and an offensive against Israel without consulting its Soviet allies¹⁵. Although Brezhnev was worried about the announcement (made under the pressure of others Soviet leaders)¹⁶ on Israel as an aggressor state¹⁷, the final declaration was one in which Israel became accountable for the whole situation in the region, not recognizing the guilt of the Arab states. The Romanian declaration was seen as

¹¹ *Ibid.*, f. 27.

¹² *Ibid.*, f. 29.

¹³ *Ibid.*, f. 28.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, f. 34.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, f. 34.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, f. 35.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, f. 34.

“elusive”, many of the Soviet leaders present at the meeting considering that its adoption could provoke a very aggressive reaction from the Arab states¹⁸. The Romanian president thought that the adoption of a statement condemning exclusively the Israeli state could lead to isolation of the socialist states from the progressive movement in the West, as Communist parties in the Western countries made statements in which they avoided identifying Israel as being the only one responsible for triggering the war¹⁹.

A very sensitive point on which Nicolae Ceausescu tried to draw attention was that through the unique condemnation of Israel, the Arab states could understand that the policy they have pursued up to that point was the best possible. In the Romanian president’s opinion, this attitude would eventually turn against them due to Arab states’ lack of maturity in decisions making and to the uneven outcomes that could not lead to long-term benefits²⁰.

Despite the arguments presented by the Romania's delegation to Moscow, on June 11-14, all states that signed the Soviet Union's declaration broke relations with Israel. A few days later, on June 17, the Soviet Union called for an extraordinary session of the UN General Assembly. During this reunion, Romania was one of the states that tried to have a conciliatory position, appealing once again to the non-intervention of the great powers in issues that concern only the states directly involved in this conflict²¹. At the same time, Romania voted alongside the Arab states for the resolution of the non-committed countries for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied territories²². A few months later, in September 1967, the socialist countries held a meeting in Belgrade. Its purpose was to inform of the measures taken by each of them on the Near East conflict²³.

Throughout this period, Romania's position was steady, militating for the respect of the UN Security Council’s resolution from the November 22, 1967, a document that enjoyed the consensus of all Council’s members, and which was also agreed by the parties directly involved²⁴. Bucharest officials repeatedly stressed out that compliance with this resolution’s provisions is the only way to

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, f. 36.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, f. 37.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, f. 39.

²¹ *Ibid.*, f. 66.

²² *Ibid.*, f. 67.

²³ *Ibid.*, f. 93.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, f. 101.

bringing peace and understanding in the Near East²⁵.

The Romanian government position over this conflict was quite peculiar given that Romania stood among the communist states as one of the most anti-Semitic. Even so, we should notice that during the 1960s and especially after Nicolae Ceausescu came to power, the attitude towards the Jews and the state of Israel began to change. On one hand, this change of perception over Israel might come as well from Israelis isolation in the Near East, as Romanians were among the Soviet states. On the other hand, Nicolae Ceausescu had the intuition on the opportunities that could result from the agreements' conclusion with Israel²⁶.

The non-signing of the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict Joint Statement led to the tension between Romania and the Soviet states and the isolation of Romania among the East European countries²⁷. Romania's position also drew United States' attention, in particular, of CIA, which developed a series of documents about the Romanian government strategy and the consequences that might follow from it. According to the officials of Bucharest, the adoption of the Communist states' statement condemning exclusively Israel and, at the same time, assuring the Arab side of economic and military support could have engage the Soviet Union and the signatory states in an armed conflict that Romania could never manage²⁸. Moreover, in 1963, one year after the end of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Romanian representative at the UN, Corneliu Mănescu had a discussion with US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, assuring him that "in the case a conflict triggered by the USSR, similar to that of Cuba, Romania will stay neutral"²⁹. Thus, the continuation of relations with Israel was meant to assure Washington officials that Romania wanted to remain neutral during the Near East conflict, moving further away from the USSR's decisions.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ Central Intelligence Agency - Electronic Reading Room, *Weekly Summary Special Report, Impact of Arab-Israeli Conflict on Eastern Europe*, Colecția General CIA Records, 21 Iulie 1967, p. 6, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79-00927A005900050003-2.pdf> (Accessed on 20.08.2017).

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

²⁸ Isabella Ginor, Gideon Remez, *Foxbats Over Dimona, The Soviets' Nuclear Gamble in the Six Day War*, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 2007, p. 199.

²⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania, *150 Years of Modern Romanian Diplomacy (1862 – 2012)*, <https://www.mae.ro/en/node/16926> (Accessed on 16. 08. 2017).

THE ATTITUDE OF THE MIDDLE EAST STATES REGARDING THE POSITION OF ROMANIA

Romania's position has been quite heavily criticized by some Arab countries that perceived Romanian intervention as an announcing statement for its Israeli actions support. Charara Mohamed, the Ambassador of Saudi Arabia, said: "Romania has left the Arab countries! ... This factor is a surprise for the Arab countries and they cannot understand the position of Romania"³⁰. On the other hand, Romania's Declaration on the situation in the Near East received appreciations among UN diplomats. Samuel Prager, an international official in the UN Secretariat, thought that Bucharest government's declaration demonstrated political maturity and it was very balanced: "its impartial tone and the balanced position expressed are directed precisely to bring at the negotiations table the opposing parties. Words are carefully chosen so that they do not damage the parties and at the same time express an unequivocal position"³¹. The UN representative made a detailed analysis of the statement, believing that the document was drafted with great care not to harm any of the involved parties. Thus, the Declaration did not mention "the immediate withdrawal of Israeli troops", but only "their withdrawal".

Furthermore, in order not to create an unnecessary dispute with the Arab side, the text of the statement did not talk about the "peaceful coexistence" of the two parties, but about the Arab-Israeli "peaceful cohabitation"³². With its balanced and equidistant tone, Romania's statement presented a constructive position that sought to support the parties involved by formulating concrete solutions and respecting the principle of non-involvement in a state internal affairs³³. On the same time, Samuel Prager believed that Tel Aviv leaders were eager to sit down and negotiate a series of issues addressing the Israel position in the Near East, but they wanted the discussions to be held directly with the states involved, without the UN that could try to delay the negotiations. Israelis were motivated to discuss the Israel's access to the Tirana Strait and the Suez

³⁰ MFAA, Problema 224/1967, *Orientul Apropiat*, Direcția a V-a Relații, Dosar 40, *Informări în legătură cu evoluția conflictului din Orientul Apropiat și poziția altor țări* [Information on the evolution of the Near East conflict and the position of other countries], f. 37.

³¹ *Ibid.*, f. 45.

³² MFAA, Problema 224/1967, *Orientul Apropiat*, Direcția a V-a Relații, Dosar 32, *Informări trimise de la oficiile diplomatice române privind conflictul arabo-israelian* [Information sent from the Romanian diplomatic offices on the Arab-Israeli conflict], f. 45-46.

³³ *Ibid.*, f. 45-46.

Canal, as well as the Jerusalem area in Jordan³⁴.

Immediately after the conflict, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Corneliu Mănescu had a series of discussions with officials from the states directly involved in the conflict and with representatives of the great powers. On June 12, 1967, UAR Ambassador in Bucharest, M. F. Hamad, in a meeting with Corneliu Mănescu, accused a group of young people aged between 18 and 20 years, who left Romania by plane with destination Israel, on June 8, to join as volunteers. He also described this gesture as an unfriendly one, expressing his concern about Romania's attitude³⁵. Corneliu Mănescu denied the allegations and assured that such an action did not take place with the support of the Romanian authorities. More than that, he was of the opinion that this information was false, spread by malicious persons³⁶. According to him, Romania was militating for the definitive cessation of hostilities, as it was revealed in the discussions with the Israeli Minister³⁷.

Another complaint of UAR Ambassador regarded Romania's documents and statements, which do not identify Israel as an aggressor state and no mention the rights of the Arab population in Palestine³⁸. To these remarks, the Romanian Foreign Minister stated that Romania was supporting the struggle for independence of the Palestinian people, which could be noticed in the statements of Romanian officials from different Arab states, while moreover Romania voted UN resolutions, which were also approved by the Arab states and aimed a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict³⁹. From the Romanian state's policy perspective, Arab states had the right and obligation to reach an agreement with Israel without the interference of foreign powers, while taking into account the right to independence and sovereignty of all states in the region⁴⁰. Although the UAR Ambassador admitted that Romania's position was as balanced as possible, he considered that a settlement with Israel would be the equivalent to the recognition of this state by the Egyptians, which the other Arab states would never accept⁴¹.

In the same spirit, the Romanian officials had discussions with the Israelis, through Minister Eliezer Doron. The Romanian side was concerned about Israel's intentions to annex the occupied territories by force. This was seen by the

³⁴ *Ibid.*, f. 47.

³⁵ NAR, Fond C. C al P.C.R, Secția Relații Externe, Dosar 114/1967, f. 8.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, f. 9.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, f. 9.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, f. 11.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, f. 12.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, f. 13.

Romanian authorities as an obstacle to find a peaceful solution for both sides⁴². The Israeli Minister was very pleased with the position adopted by the Romanian government and tried to convince Romanian diplomats that Israel had no intention to keep the annexed territories, though the constant threat issued by the Arabic side determined Israelis to do all their best not to return to the situation of 1948⁴³. Eliezer Doron also shared Romania's position concerning the belligerent parties that had to sit at the negotiations table and find solutions as soon as possible. Because of this, and given the position of the Arab side, the Israeli Minister considered that Romania could play the role of mediator between the two parties, as one of the few states that had a balanced attitude towards the conflict in the Near East⁴⁴.

The President of the Council of Ministers, Corneliu Mănescu presented the Romanian S.R.'s position on the Arab-Israeli conflict to the UN General Assembly, stressing out that "the force does not create the right", thus showing that the Israeli troops had the obligation to withdraw from the occupied territories as soon as possible⁴⁵. While criticizing Romania's position on the situation in the Near East⁴⁶, the Arab states had supported the election of Minister Corneliu Mănescu as president of the 22nd session of the UN General Assembly⁴⁷.

In December 1967, another meeting of foreign ministers from 8 East European countries, including Romania, took place in Warsaw. During this meeting, a series of issues related to the events in the Near East were discussed. The real purpose of the reunion was to remove the disagreements between the socialist states since the last meeting from June, in Moscow. The final release of the Conference on December 22 adopted a more balanced position of the socialist states in relation to the Arab-Israeli war. In order for this statement to be accepted by Romania, no mention was made of Israel's status as an aggressor state, the final text referring only to the immediate withdrawal of the Israeli troops and to the compliance of the UN resolution by all the states involved⁴⁸.

⁴² *Ibid.*, f. 22.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, f. 24.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, f. 24.

⁴⁵ MFAA, Problema 224/1967, *Orientul Apropiat*, Direcția a V-a Relații, Dosar 40, *Informări în legătură cu evoluția conflictului din Orientul Apropiat și poziția altor țări* [Information on the evolution of the Near East conflict and the position of other countries], f. 11.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, Dosar 43, *Conflictul din Orientul Apropiat din 5 iunie 1967* [Near East conflict from June 5, 1967], f. 23.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, Dosar 45, *Informări de la misiunile diplomatice privind conflictul din Orientul Apropiat* [Information sent from the Romanian diplomatic offices on the Arab-Israeli conflict], f. 90.

⁴⁸ Jerry Goodman, *Communist Bloc – Rumania*, in *American Jewish Year Book*, 1968, p. 196-197.

The 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict also represented an opportunity for the Romanian government to clarify its position on the international stage, both in relation to the Soviet states and in relation to the Western powers and the states of the Middle East. Besides the determination shown during the Moscow Conference – which left the impression that Romania was protecting Israeli interests – Nicolae Ceausescu started an entire campaign among the Arab states in order to ensure their leaders of Romania's willingness to mediate the conflict and to help Palestinian population fulfil their dream of national sovereignty and independence. Thanks to the Romanian diplomats accredited in the Near East, Ceausescu tried to convince the Arab leaders that the most appropriate solution to resolve the conflict is to convene a UN General Assembly. At that moment, an aggressive policy could only bring disadvantages for the Palestinian population and for the states involved in the confrontation. Beyond the diplomatic approaches, the Romanian government also decided to support UAR government in a solid way, by sending 50,000 tons of wheat⁴⁹ and 15,000 tons of corn⁵⁰. On this occasion, a Romanian delegation led by Minister of Commerce, Gogu Rădulescu, travelled to Egypt for several meetings with officials in Cairo, expressing the interest in opening an informal line of communication between Egypt and Israel and trying to prevent drawing the disapproval of the other Arab states. According to Egypt's UN representative, Mohammed Hassan El-Zayyat, this action's purpose was to know and understand the position of Israel, and eventually to start some negotiations⁵¹.

This meeting offered Romania the occasion to organize the first Arab-Israeli mediation materialized as a dialogue between Abba Eban, Mircea Malița and Mahmoud Riad. As Mircea Malița remembered, the first meetings between the two parties were extremely clumsy, their representatives trying to avoid formulating any kind of concrete ideas and sending clear messages⁵².

ROMANIA'S INVOLVEMENT IN SOLVING THE CONFLICT

After the shameful defeat of the Arab troops, a number of accusations appeared about the poor preparation of the Arab armies and more than that, a sabotage of the military operations within the Arab coalition. In a statement sent

⁴⁹ Cristina Nedelcu, *op. cit.*, p. 186.

⁵⁰ MFAA, Problema 224/1967, *Orientul Apropiat*, Direcția a V-a Relații, Dosar 32, *Informări trimise de la oficiile diplomatice române privind conflictul arabo-izraelian* [Information sent from the Romanian diplomatic offices on the Arab-Israeli conflict], f. 24.

⁵¹ Cristina Nedelcu, *op. cit.*, p. 187-188.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 188.

to the Foreign Ministry by the Pekin Business Charge, I. Istrate, was described a discussion with the Yemeni ambassador, in which he talks about how it was possible for UAR armies to be removed from the field by the Israeli forces so quickly. According to the confidential information reported by him, Egyptian vice president Zakaria Mohieddin was accused of betraying the interests of UAR by its approach to the United States and FRG. He was also known in Egypt as a fierce opponent of communism⁵³. Subsequently, the diplomats sent to Cairo confirmed the betrayal of the Egyptian Vice President Zakaria Mohieddin⁵⁴. I. Istrate also informed about the sabotage of military operations during the conflict⁵⁵. Along with Zakaria Mohieddin there were other generals who betrayed Arab cause; one of them was married to an Englishwoman and his daughter was part of the English espionage service. Many of these militaries have chosen to end their lives following the Arab defeat and the discovery of their betrayal⁵⁶. This information strengthens Nicolae Ceausescu's position at the Moscow meeting, where he was wondering how was possible such a quick defeat of the Egyptian army, which was preparing for months to attack Israel⁵⁷.

After the end of the conflict, Romanian diplomats made considerable efforts to be well informed on the evolution of events in the region. According to the information provided by the Iraq Foreign Ministry to all the embassies, there were serious doubts about Israel's actions to disclose the Palestinian population in the occupied territories of Gaza and move them to the East Bank region of Jordan. The 50,000 Palestinians removed from Israeli actions were to be replaced by the Jews, thus violating the terms of the Security Council resolution of July 4, 1967⁵⁸. Therefore, the Iraqi government called on all governments, including Romania, to intervene to stop Israeli actions. Because of this request, the Romanian government assured that it would continue to militate for the implementation of the UN resolution that bound Israel to ensure the well-being and security of the population in the occupied areas. In fact, all states involved in the conflict were compelled to respect the humanitarian principles regarding the treatment of prisoners of war

⁵³ MFAA, Problema 224/1967, *Orientul Apropiat*, Direcția a V-a Relații, Dosar 32, *Informări trimise de la oficiile diplomatice române privind conflictul arabo-izraelian* [Information sent from the Romanian Diplomatic Offices on the Arab-Israeli conflict], f. 19.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, f. 21.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, f. 19.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, f. 20.

⁵⁷ NAR, Fond C.C al P.C.R, Secția Relații Externe, Dosar 43/1967, f.16.

⁵⁸ MFAA, Problema 224/1968, *Orientul Apropiat*, Direcția a V-a Relații, Dosar 61, *Situația din zonă* [Situation in the area], f. 20.

and the civilian population⁵⁹. On the same time, the Romanian government avoided having a public position on this situation, in order not to give rise to undesirable interpretations regarding the state's position⁶⁰. This attitude stemmed from the fact that the information received from Iraqi and Syrian officials could not be ascertained by UN representatives. Israel had conditioned the approval of a UN investigation into the occupied territories to the extension of this investigation to the Jewish communities in Syria, UAR, Iraq, and Lebanon⁶¹. Therefore, Romania's position was a reserved one, not wanting to give rise to situations that could subsequently endanger the relations with Israel, but also with the Arab states.

On September 11, 1969, at a session of the UN Security Council on the conduct of actions that resulted in the arson of the Al-Aqsa mosque, the Saudi Arabian representative made a series of remarks on the policies adopted by the Romanian state. He said that during a visit through European countries, he came into possession of information that some East European states are buying modern military aircraft in order to send them to Israel. He did not want to give the names of the states, but it was clear from his remarks that he was referring to Romania⁶². Although such comments from Arab officials were quite common, the Bucharest officials maintained their position on the need to solve the conflict in the Near East by peaceful means and not by arms.

During the period between the two major Arab-Israeli conflicts, 1967-1973, Romania participated in many conferences and discussion forums initiated by the UN Security Council or other entities with attributions in the field, always calling for peaceful negotiations and respect for the security and sovereignty of all the states involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The resolution adopted by the UN Security Council and voted by the Romanian delegation, on November 5, 1970 reiterated some essential principles for solving the conflict: the withdrawal of the Israeli army from the occupied territories, following the 1967 conflict; 2) the recognition of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the states in the Near East; 3) the recognition of the right of states to live in peace, within secured and acknowledged borders⁶³.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, f. 23.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, f. 28.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² MFAA, Problema 224/1969, *Orientul Apropiat*, Direcția a V-a Relații, Dosar 69, *Aprecieri asupra situației din Orientul Apropiat* [Assessments on the situation in the Near East], f. 60.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, Dosar 2608, *Criza arabo-israeliană din Orientul Apropiat* [The Arab-Israeli crisis in the Near East], f. 40.

These ideas were presented by the Romanian delegation at the 26th session of the UN General Assembly, in 1971. The Minister Corneliu Mănescu had an intervention in which he drew attention to Israeli troops' obligation to withdraw from the occupied territories, considering that a peace agreement should have been signed in accordance with Resolution no. 242 of 1967⁶⁴. The speech of Mănescu revealed another very important aspect for the Arab states, namely the problem of the Palestinian population, which, in the view of the Romanian minister, had to be resolved in "conformity with its national interests"⁶⁵.

CONCLUSIONS

During the 1960s, the world witnessed an almost desperate attempt of Israel to impose its supremacy among its neighbours. One of the greatest aspirations of Israeli leaders was to secure borders and obtain political support from the international community in order to counter Arab military aggression. This register also included the "Six-Day War" of 1967, a confrontation that not only redefined the borders of the Near East, but also gave foreign leaders the opportunity to make their own plans for solving the conflict. For the Romanian Government, it represented an opportunity to strengthen its foreign policy. The retention of diplomatic ties with Israel – at a time when the main allies of Romania suggested to Nicolae Ceausescu to revise his attitude – was a moment of political force and a real test for him who, in just a few years, would assume the role of negotiator in one of the hottest conflicts on the globe. Although the role played by the Romanian President in this matter was quite controversial, we must acknowledge that Ceausescu had, at least, the credit of trying to solve an extremely complicated problem through diplomacy rather than conflicts.

⁶⁴ United Nations, General Assembly, *Twenty Sixth Session, Official Records, Plenary Meeting*, October 6, 1971, New York, p. 8, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NL7/404/74/PDF/NL740474.pdf?OpenElement> (Accessed on 18.08.2017).

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

THE PREMIERE OF THE POST-COLD WAR CRISIS IN BALKANS: CIA DOCUMENTS ON THE DISINTEGRATION OF FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (1989-1992)*

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Abstract. *As the Cold War came to an end, many revisionist powers predicted the disintegration of Yugoslavia, an uneasy alliance of seven nations that had been held together only by Josip Broz Tito's iron fist. Chief amongst the interested parties was the United States, hegemon of the new unipolar world order. For years, American intelligence agencies warned of the dangers threatening the Bosnian Muslims, a secessionist ethno-religious minority in the center of the former Yugoslavian borders; and yet, the United States did not act to protect the Bosnian Muslims. Tensions in the region boiled over into civil war, and the world was shocked as the Bosnian Muslims were the target of attempted genocide, most notably at Srebrenica.*

This paper will focus on the CIA estimate reports written by field officers on the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the US foreign policy towards the probable crisis in the region. The ethnic cleansing efforts targeting Bosnian Muslims, the awareness of US field officers of this process, and whether there were any pre-emptive measures to stop such brutal acts against humanity will also be analyzed during this paper.

Keywords: *Post-Cold War, Balkans, CIA, Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegović, Srebrenica, Muslims*

Rezumat. Premiera crizelor post-Război Rece în Balcani: documente CIA despre dezintegrarea fostei Iugoslavii (1989-1992). *În perioada de sfârșit a Războiului Rece, multe puteri revizioniste prevedeau dezintegrarea Iugoslaviei, o alianță dificilă a șapte națiuni ce au fost ținute laolaltă numai de pumnul de fier a lui Josip Broz Tito. Lider al părților interesate de dezmembrarea Iugoslaviei erau Statele Unite, hegemon al ordinii noi lumi unipolare. De ani*

* This article is the extended and reviewed version of the paper that was presented at the "International Alija Symposium, Od 1983 do 2013, Sarajevski Proces", Simpozij Međunarodni, on the date of 23-24 November, 2013 in Sarajevo. Special thanks to Exchange Student of IR, Frédérick Lavoie from Canada, for his reviewing and proof reading of the text.

de zile, serviciile de spionaj americane avertizau asupra pericolelor ce-i amenințau pe bosniacii musulmani, o minoritate etno-religioasă secesionistă din centrul granițelor fostei Iugoslavii. Și totuși, Statele Unite nu au acționat pentru a-i proteja pe bosniacii musulmani. Tensiunile din regiune au expandat într-un război civil, iar lumea a fost șocată de faptul că bosniacii musulmani au fost ținta unei încercări de genocid, mai ales la Srebrenița.

Această lucrare se va focaliza pe rapoartele estimative ale CIA, scrise de ofițerii din teren, despre dezintegrarea Iugoslaviei și despre politica externă a Statelor Unite față de criza probabilă din regiune. Eforturile de epurare etnică ce-i vizau pe bosniacii musulmani, conștientizarea acestui proces de către ofițerii din teren ai Statelor Unite și chestiunea dacă ar fi existat măsuri preventive pentru oprirea unor acte brutale împotriva umanității vor fi, de asemenea, analizate în lucrare.

Résumé : La première de la crise d'après la Guerre Froide dans les Balkans : documents CIA sur la désintégration de l'ancienne Yougoslavie (1989-1992). Dans la période de fin de la Guerre Froide, plusieurs puissances révisionnistes ont prévu la désintégration de la Yougoslavie, une alliance difficile de sept nations qui ont été tenues ensemble seulement par la poignée de fer de Iosip Broz Tito. Le leader des parties intéressées par la destruction de la Yougoslavie était les Etats Unis, hégémon de l'ordre du nouvel monde unipolaire. Depuis plusieurs années, les services d'espionnage américains ont averti sur les dangers qui avertissaient les Bosniaques musulmans, une minorité ethno-religieuse sécessionniste du centre des frontières de l'ancienne Yougoslavie. Et pourtant, les Etats Unis n'ont pas agi pour protéger les Bosniaques musulmans. Les tensions de la région ont évolué vers une guerre civile et le monde a été choqué par le fait que les Bosniaques musulmans ont représenté le but d'un essai de génocide, surtout à Srebrenica.

L'ouvrage ci-joint se focalisera sur les rapports estimatifs de CIA, écrits par les officiers de terrain, sur la désintégration de la Yougoslavie et sur la politique externe des Etats Unis vis-à-vis la crise probable de la région. Les efforts d'épuration ethnique qui auraient visé les Bosniaques musulmans, le fait que les officiers de terrain des Etats Unis ont réalisé cela et la question s'il y avait été des mesures préventives pour stopper des actes brutaux contre l'humanité seront, aussi, analysés dans l'ouvrage ci-joint.

INTRODUCTION

The Balkans, a bridge and a barrier on the border between Asia and Europe, take their name from the Turkish word *Balkanlar* – meaning “mountainous, marshy lands”. For much of recorded history, this region served as a buffer zone between the polities of Central Europe and the Turkish lands. This gave the region a unique character, with numerous religions, languages, and ethnicities were packed into a relatively small territory. While efforts were made to ensure

peaceful coexistence, such diversity almost invariably leads to sectarian tensions. The Balkans are such a perfect example of this rule that they have become almost synonymous, with the word *balkanized* referring to a region divided into mutually hostile groups. During this period, one of the most important components of Balkan nationalism was its close connection with the national churches.¹

This division is both a cause and a consequence of the region's history -from Antiquity onwards, the Balkans have continuously been occupied by foreigners, its internal tensions stoked by competing empires. The Roman and Byzantine Empires both ruled over the region before the Ottoman Turks conquered it. After approximately four hundred years of Ottoman rule, the Balkan countries were beginning to break away from a collapsing empire.² The 19th century in Balkans was the age of nationalism. The traditional Ottoman *millet system* in which Christian or Jewish religious communities/nations could be existed inside Ottoman State structure. During the 19th century onwards Balkan Wars (1912-1913), Ottoman rule was replaced step by step by newly independent national states. Greece, Serbia, Romania, Montenegro and Bulgaria emerged during this period. The 19th century disintegration of the Ottoman Empire promised to be a messy affair, and indeed it saw the flare-up of border disputes, ethnic conflicts, and numerous other problems.

Because of widespread nationalist ideas and external interventions, the Balkans were largely in turmoil at the beginning of the 20th century. One year after the dramatic battle of 1877-78 against Tsarist Russia, Ottomans almost loosing major parts of its lands in Balkans, provisionally left Bosnia-Herzegovina to Austria in 1879. It was not an easy decision for Sublime Porte (*Bâbiâli*) because the population of Bosnia was overwhelmingly Muslim when annexed by Austria. About three decades passed after Austrian annexation, in 1908 Vienna benefitting from the disorder in Istanbul, declared that Bosnia-Herzegovina is an inseparable part of Austria. One year after, in the year of 1909 the occupation was accepted by Ottomans. After WWI, by the Treaty of St. Germaine (1919), Austria had to left some lands to newly established Serbian-Croatian-Slovene Kingdom, Bosnia-Herzegovina also was included this new Kingdom. In 1921 the new state was named as Yugoslavia. After Nazi occupation during WWII in 1941, the multi-ethnic state of Yugoslavia was re-formed in 1945 by Joseph Tito.

By the beginning of the Cold War, the Balkans had been divided between the

¹ Lora Gerd, *Russian Policy in the Orthodox East. The Patriarchate of Constantinople (1878-1914)*, Warzaw-Berlin, De Gruyter Publication, 2014, p. 70-72.

² *Ibid.*, p. 69-70.

Capitalist and the Marxist Blocs. Yugoslavia was a microcosm the Balkans, consisting of seven major and two minor ethnic groups. This country could only be surviving as a united entity under an iron fist, and perhaps even then only under Cold War conditions. And survive it did, with Joseph Tito keeping Yugoslavia united until the 1980s. Yugoslavia, as mentioned previously, contained many different ethnic groups. Below is a table indicating their relative shares of the population and their absolute numbers in the 1990s, when the country imploded.

Table 1. Population of Yugoslavia in 1990, broken down by ethnic group³

No	Ethnic Group	Number of Individuals (millions)	Percentage of Yugoslav Population
1	Serb	8.6	36.3
2	Croat	4.7	19.7
3	<i>Bosnian Muslim</i>	2.1	8.9
4	Slovene	1.8	7.8
5	Albanian	1.8	7.7
6	Macedonian	1.4	5.9
7	Montenegrin	0.6	2.5
8	Albanian	1.8	7.7
9	Hungarian	0.5	1.9
10	Other	0.4	1.6
Total population		27.70	100

Each of the seven main ethnic groups ruled under autonomous republics, which formed the central Yugoslav Government. Thus when the Cold War came to an end, Yugoslavia was like a seven-pieced mosaic-it had never managed to build a nation-state, and remained so fragile that the slightest blow to it threatened disintegration.

The blow came in the form of the death of Tito. The iron fist rule of Tito had forced reluctant groups to submit, but society remained dangerously fragmented. Thus, when Tito died a decade before the end of the Cold War, the artificial unity disappeared. In the resulting turmoil, the risk of the Balkans collapsing into an ethno-religious civil war and possibly drawing in neighbouring countries was as high as it had been in the first decade of the 20th century.

The United States had such influence at the beginning of the crisis that a peaceful solution could be reached only with their contribution. Case reports of

³ CIA Documents, *National Intelligence Estimate 15-90: Yugoslavia Transformed*, 18 October 1990 (hereinafter – Yugoslavia Transformed), p. 13-14, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1990-10-01.pdf> (Accessed on 12.09.2017).

the era mostly prepared by the CIA field agents deserve close attention because US foreign policy regarding former Yugoslavia during the crisis years was based on such reports.

The United States, the leader of the Capitalist camp, had paid close attention to the Balkans since the beginning of the Cold War for three basic reasons: 1) Balkans were the most vulnerable side of the western democracies. At the beginning of the Cold War, possible Soviet penetration towards the Western democracies could only be blocked in the Balkans. Otherwise, Soviet-supported Communist ideology would have a chance to spread over Europe. 2) The Balkans had immense military value, serving as a flank to the Eastern Mediterranean, Aegean and Black Seas. The immensely-important Turkish Straits could also be threatened by the Soviets through the Balkans. 3) The Balkans have long been one of the world's most sensitive regions, where a quarrel could easily break out and threaten world peace.

Bearing those factors in mind, US field officers during the Cold War had been preparing estimate reports analyzing Yugoslavia. Because the crisis took place approximately 25 years ago, the relevant official documents belonging to other nations are mostly unavailable. Fortunately, some select CIA documents on Yugoslavia during the crisis years were published recently.

THE DISINTEGRATION OF YUGOSLAVIA AND THE VULNERABILITY OF BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA

Rarely-cited documents raise serious doubts that the Nationalist Socialist Serbian aggression towards Bosnian Muslims and the disorder in Balkans could have been prevented before the terrible events. Estimate reports prepared by CIA field agents in 1989 informed Washington that Yugoslavia would cease to function as a federal state in 1990, if not earlier. If that happened, the Serbian reaction would most likely be to oppose the secession of the Bosnian, Slovene, and Croat ethno-states.

The Yugoslav National Army (JNA) was a Communist Party-led military organization and, while Yugoslavia was a federation, the army was an essentially Serbian institution, with almost all officers were ethnic Serbs. If Serbs, seeking to block any independence attempt, used the JNA, such an act would not have tolerated by the newly enfranchised and nationalistic electorates of the breakaway republics of Croatia and Slovenia. Another problem for Yugoslavia was the Serbian repression in Kosovo and probable armed uprising of the Albanian population.⁴

⁴ *Yugoslavia Transformed*, p. V.

The report, claiming that "...within a year the federal system will no longer exist; within two years Yugoslavia will probably have dissolved as a state"⁵, clearly predicted that, within one year, the Balkans would be in turmoil. Almost each European country, especially former rulers Russia and Turkey, had ties towards one or another of the ethnic groups of Yugoslavia (for example, US intelligence reports predicted that Russia and Germany would discretely support the disintegration of Yugoslavia), and the turmoil could easily inflame the region one more time. Nevertheless, the Bosnian Crisis was one of the first extended and complex crises that US foreign policymakers had to deal with at the threshold of post-Soviet World policy.⁶

As it is seen in the population break-down, Serbs were the dominant ethnic group of Yugoslavia. In addition, the JNA was under their control. In case of disintegration, it was clear that racist Serbians such as Chief of Staff Ratko Mladić and President of the Republic Slobodan Milošević would use all kind of weaponry, including heavy artillery, against other ethnic groups to preserve the union. In that case, a civil war, or ethnic cleansing, would be inevitable.

The US, due to field reports written the previous year, was very aware of coming catastrophic events. To prevent mass killings and oppression, they called for urgent pre-emptive measures to be put into place. For instance, in 1989, they urged the creation of safe havens to protect unarmed civilians of targeted ethnic groups from any possible ethnic cleansing or ill-treatment. Unfortunately, the focus of the 1990s was the collapse of the Communist Bloc, and Bosnian Muslims, after almost a half-century under Communism, were trying to re-emerge as a new entity. Aliya Izetbegovic, the wise man of the era, was the leader of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, had foreseen the looming civil war. He sought to keep Bosnians out of any kind of ethnic clash, working with the Yugoslav Parliament to avoid any kind of Serbian aggression. Those efforts would be fruitless.

Interestingly, the reports argue that the United States – the hegemonic power of the post-Cold War era – had little to no capacity to preserve Yugoslav unity. The reports proposed that the consequences of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina dissolving would be unforeseeable and could easily spiral out of control, much as had happened during the First and Second World Wars. As it is very well known both of the world wars had started in the Balkans. Because the

⁵*Ibid.*

⁶ Yehudith Auerbach, Yaeli Bloch-Elkon, *Media Framing and Foreign Policy: The Elite Press vis-à-vis US Policy in Bosnia, 1992-95*, in "Journal of Peace Research", Vol. 42, No. 1 (Jan., 2005), p. 84-85.

Republic had a majority-minority population, its disintegration would could dramatically escalate ethnic tensions in the rest of Yugoslavia, notably between Serbs and Croats. Bosnian Muslims made up more than 40% of the population, though there were significant Serb (32%) and Croat (18%) minorities. This mixture had always been potentially dangerous.⁷ The risk of large-scale communal violence was as high as it had been during the Great War.

Field agents' assessments of the situation were important because, until the eruption of the Bosnian Crisis in March 1992, their reports did not spend much time on the Bosnian Muslims, largely ignoring them despite the possibility that they would be the victims of ethnic cleansing. Instead, agents focused on the likelihood that the Serbians and the Croatians would intervene to steer the results of the general election to be held in Bosnia in November 1990.

Estimate reports in the year of 1989 minced no words in saying that Yugoslavia was a powder keg ready to explode. In these reports, field officers successfully predicted what would happen in one or two years, as well as where the first clash would take place. Despite this, the Bush Administration, the only power strong enough to intervene, took no measures to prevent the rapes, ethnic cleansing, and other brutal acts. Because CIA estimate reports had spent the past years warning of the coming humanitarian crisis, the Bush Administration should have taken measures between the years of 1989-1991 to protect civilians, regardless their religion or their ethnic identity.

The collapse of Yugoslavia was all but taken for granted in 1989, three years before the emergence of the widespread conflict. There was a kind identity crisis in Yugoslavia escalated by Nationalist Serbs.⁸ Although the field reports were very detailed and well-prepared documents, the officers preferred to turn a blind eye to the Bosnian Muslims who, in case of a civil war, would be the most vulnerable group. This allowed for the terrible crime of genocide to be committed against this people three years after. It is dramatic that such detailed reports ignored Bosnian Muslims and, worse that no measures were taken to prevent such brutal Serbian aggression. Yugoslavia consisted of seven federal republics and, given its command of JNA forces, it was obvious that Serbia had a military advantage over the other the six republics. In total, Serbia and its close ally Montenegro controlled almost 110 000 men in 1991. The armies of the Slovenian and Croatian Republics, though they had begun building up viable military forces equipped with small

⁷ *Yugoslavia Transformed*, p. 3.

⁸ David Campbell, *National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity, and Justice in Bosnia*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1998, p. 25-28.

arms, light anti-armour and air defense systems,⁹ were no match for the JNA, a conventional force consisting of naval, ground, and air branches. Furthermore, the hardliner attitudes of ex-communist Serbian leaders, including Chief of Staff Ratko Mladić, were a very well-known fact.

In world politics, everything is intertwined. To understand the Balkans policy of the United States and other powers requires careful consideration. The conflicts in Yugoslavia overlapped with flashier and more attention-grabbing issues in the international arena, for example the tearing down of the Berlin Wall or the slow dismantlement of the Soviet system. The US was the only hegemonic power of the period, meaning that any intervention to prevent genocides or mass killings needed to be spearheaded by a US-led coalition. Despite clear evidence that such horrors were impending, neither measures taken nor were safe havens for innocent civilians established. George H. W. Bush held the American presidency and fellow Republicans held Congress, and they focused their attention on the Saddam Hussein's seizure of Kuwait's rich oil fields and the resulting threat to the international petro-economy.

Serbian leaders benefitted from these international 'distractions', which kept the world spotlight off their attempts to keep the union together at any expense. Serbian leaders were acutely aware of the fact that allowing one republic to secede would set off a chain effect leaving Yugoslavia only a shadow of its current self. For that reason, no matter whether localized in Slovenia and Croatia or nationwide, a civil war in Yugoslavia would be bloody, desperate, and protracted. Any conflict would be an ethnic quarrel and could inflame nationalist tensions in neighbouring republics, quickly transforming it into an existential threat to Yugoslavia requiring a firm response.¹⁰

By early 1991, deep ethnic tensions, a faltering economy, political paralysis, and Serbian leaders' clear scepticism towards democratization defined Yugoslavia's political landscape.¹¹ Given the potential for the conflict to be exported to neighbouring countries, a Yugoslav civil war would rapidly become a security concern for all nearby nations.¹² Serbia, the Republic dominating and

⁹ CIA Documents, *CIA Directorate of Intelligence Memorandum: Yugoslavia Military Dynamics of a Potential Civil War, 01 March 1991* (hereinafter - Yugoslavia Military Dynamics), p. 2, in <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1991-03-01.pdf> (Accessed on 14.09.2017).

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. III.

¹² David P. Auerswald, *Disarmed Democracies. Domestic Institutions and Use of Force,*

leading the Yugoslav Federation, had decided to prevent any kind of separatist movement by force, and so had ensured the Yugoslavian infantry troops were trained in guerilla warfare. The better-armed national forces would unsurprisingly enjoy pronounced military advantages against the Republics of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is important to note that, barring the Bosnian Muslims, almost all parties had long been preparing for a civil war, arming themselves with foreign weaponry that had been entering the Yugoslav republics since mid-1990s.

Despite the accelerating militarization of the six other republics, Bosnia-Herzegovina did not expect the outbreak of war. Interestingly, CIA field officers had determined that, in case of Serbian Army aggression against the Bosnian Muslims, the JNA as a whole would not follow policy to defend the victims.¹³ If ethnic warfare had already broken out, however, the Federal Army would splinter across ethnic lines, sapping morale and destroying unit cohesion. This assessment clearly shows that Bosnian Muslims were deliberately excluded from the JNA, leaving no armed power to protect Bosnian Muslims against eventual Nationalist Socialist Serbian aggression.

As mentioned previously, the Croatian and Slovenian Republics had begun arming themselves in the 1990s. Both countries organized new army units and acquired substantial numbers of weapons. Despite a lack of overt support from European countries, some countries discretely armed their preferred republics. For instance, CIA reports show that Germany was supplying Croatia with arms.¹⁴ From the early 1990s onward, American field agents in Yugoslavia started sending continuous warnings to Washington that, in case of unrest or a civil war, the Serbian-controlled JNA would commit a brutal ethnic cleansing. Surprisingly, the Bush 41 Administration in the White House chose to ignore towards this moral imperative. The power balance between JNA and the Republics was so asymmetrical that the Bosnian Muslims facing off against the JNA can be compared to a Biblical story, an almost defenceless David waving a stone at a towering Goliath armed to the teeth.¹⁵

In addition to the Gulf War, the crisis in Bosnia overlapped with the collapse of Communism and efforts to establish a new world order in which the United States would be the undisputable hegemonic power. This crisis was the premier test of the new international system. It has also been a sample of structural nation-

University of Michigan Press, 2000. p. 67.

¹³ *Yugoslavia Military Dynamics*, p. 2-3.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

¹⁵ *Old Testament*, Samuel, 17:41-47.

building theories and a demonstration of Washington's post-Cold War neo-realistic priorities. New opportunities and new anxieties were propelling the new American hegemon to explore new interests. These developments proved that the new world order was more realist and Machiavellian. It also showed that the post-WWII period had undermined confidence between nations, and that offensive neo-realism had exposed weaknesses in international institutions. All of this meant that no neutral actor could be found to act as mediators in case of a crisis. Moreover, the conflicting interests of big powers made the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) ineffective in determining whether or not international law had been violated, in this case by the use of force. This paralysis allowed the systematic killing of thousands of innocent defenceless people in Yugoslavia to continue unsanctioned. After these mass killings, rapes, ethnic cleansing, and torture had gone on for far too long, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the August of 1995 voted to disregard its lack of UNSC mandate and stop the brutal Serbian war crimes.

As it was mentioned in previous pages, the Bosnian leader, Aliya Izetbegovic, had initially tried to keep the Bosnians out of armed conflict. But when Izetbegovic noticed that the Serbian Nationalist Socialists' attitudes towards Bosnia made it almost impossible to prevent a confrontation, he began following Croatia and Slovenia's example and started to seek possibilities to arm his population. It was, however, too late, and the largest Bosnian cities had already been occupied by Serbia.¹⁶

While this was not a goal of Aliya Izetbegovic's, some believed that a confrontation between Bosnians and Serbs would lead to Sandjak, Montenegro, Kosovo, and Macedonia also leaving the Yugoslav Federation.¹⁷ No doubt, such a breakup was a serious risk, but if the Bosnian Muslims did not defend themselves, they would systematically be assimilated or expelled from their native lands. Meanwhile, Serbian paramilitary gangs armed by the JNA were prepared to obey any orders given to them by Ratko Mladić.¹⁸ Bosnian leaders, most probably including Aliya Izetbegovic, were initially unaware that the JNA was arming

¹⁶ CIA Documents, *CIA Directorate of Intelligence Memorandum: Bosnia-Herzegovina on the Edge of the Abyss 19 December 1991* (hereinafter – Bosnia-Herzegovina on the Edge of the Abyss), p. 3-4, in <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1991-12-19.pdf> (Accessed on 14.09.2017).

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

¹⁸ R. Craig Nation, *War in the Balkans, 1991-2002*, Published by Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2003, p. 157.

Serbian militias. Because of this, when armed conflict broke out, Bosnian Muslims and their cities were mostly defenceless.

At the end of 1991, Bosnia-Herzegovina remained in dire straits. Bosnia, both militarily and economically, was the most vulnerable republic, and thus was likely to fall under the sway of either Serbia or Croatia. One possibility was for the fledgling country to seek economic and military support from Muslim countries outside the Balkans, with Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, or Libya being likely candidates. Turkey, the uniquely secular and democratic Muslim state of the region, was a particularly appealing ally, given its historical ties with the Balkans and the fact that it would not take advantage of Bosnian weakness to export radicalism and fundamentalism. The other Muslim countries would likely have helped Bosnia, but the cost would have been widespread radical Wahhabi or Shia ideas among Bosnian Muslims.

The rise of religious radicalism was a natural result of the 'Green Belt' policies employed by the United States in the early 1980s to limit the influence of the fiercely atheistic Soviet Union. So-called political Islam, funded by Gulf dollars, and Salafi or Wahhabi fanaticism had an accelerated development among desperate crowds. Post-Cold War Balkan Muslims were an ideal target for such radical groups, and there was a high risk of such penetration into Bosnia. Both Croatian and Serbian leaders deliberately exaggerated this danger to justify seizing more land from Bosnia and to legitimize the brutality and inhuman acts they committed against Bosnian Muslims. Field reports show that there were worries in Washington about the rise of radicalism.¹⁹

Actually in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the exaggerated threat of terrorism was not exclusively linked with any radical, extremist groups such as Al-Qaeda or with terrorist organizations so-called having "Islamic background". If such kind of logic is followed by which nation building efforts is attached to certain groups that commit terrorist violence, same logic naturally could also be used to claim that violence was committed by Christian Serbs in the aggression against Bosnian Muslims.²⁰ Actually, the situation was a kind of nation building effort in disintegrating Yugoslavia, both Christianity and Islam had been put in use. Therefore, the Serbian Orthodox Church Bosnia-Herzegovina had been providing overt support for the extreme Serb

¹⁹ *Bosnia-Herzegovina on the Edge of the Abyss*, p. 2.

²⁰ Edine Bećirević, *The Bosnian Approach to the Fight against Terrorism*, in Iztok Prezeli (ed.), *The Fight against Terrorism and Crisis Management in the Western Balkans*, Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop on Crisis Management and Counter-Terrorism in the Western Balkans, Ljubljana, Slovenia, 20-21 April 2007, Amsterdam – Washington, DC, IOS Press, 2008, p. 78-79.

nationalist leader Radovan Karadžić, while Bosnian Muslim clergy had been backing Muslims and Izetbegovic was using Islam both as the vehicle of popular mobilization and the key component of the newly emerging Bosnian national identity.²¹ Despite grave contradiction with the realities of the actual situation, the success of the propaganda confirms that some success had been achieved by Islamophobic fear-mongering, even a decade before the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

The civil war in Yugoslavia quickly engulfed the entire nation, with European-sponsored peace talks during April and May bearing no result. The UN peacekeeping operation in Croatia proved ineffective. International efforts, whether by the UN or by European nations, failed to resolve the nearly irreconcilable territorial claims and growing animosities in the country. Although the Bosnian crisis was escalating a widespread conflict, the American government remained reluctant to take another step forward to facilitate a peaceful solution. One should keep in mind that even the US was incapable of solving the problem entirely, and it was the only country which had the necessary capacities to save civilians. Field officers had continuously been reporting the need for an American intervention – given that UN forces would not be sufficient to prevent clashes, a decisive stance by the US was vital.²²

Special attention here must be paid to the Bosnian Muslims. Despite the fact that there were different Christian sects in Yugoslavia, Bosnians were the only different faith group of the country. Because there is a strong correlation between nation-building and religion in the Balkans, the outlier religion of Bosnian Muslims meant they were particularly vulnerable to Serbian aggression. Serbian nationalists depicted Bosnians as apostatized Slavs and had decided to force them to “re-convert” back to into the mainstream Christianity of Yugoslavia. Thus it was clear that, when widespread armed conflict broke out, Bosnians would face the most dangerous threat. In 1991, during the Bush Presidency, there were clear warning signs for a Yugoslavian civil war, even for genocide in Bosnia. Unfortunately, the pleas for help from Bosnian Muslims were ignored in that chaotic atmosphere, the American focus instead on petrol and hegemony.

As it had long been expected, civil war broke out in Yugoslavia and, by the

²¹ Vjekoslav Perica, *Balkan Idols. Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 141-142.

²² CIA Documents, *National Intelligence Estimate 29/15-92: A Broadening Balkan Crisis: Can It Be Managed? 1 April 1992* (hereinafter - A Broadening Balkan Crisis), p. III, in <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1992-04-01.pdf> (Accessed on 20.09.2017).

end of the 1991, the clashes between Croat groups and the JNA reached Bosnia-Herzegovina's doorstep.²³ The declaration of independence by Croatia and Slovenia on June 1991 had brought about a chain of hostility acts in Balkans. The independence declaration by Bosnia in March 1992 triggered the crisis for US foreign policy making process in post-Soviet Balkans.²⁴ Worried since 1989 by the very real possibility of a civil war, Bosnian President Aliya Izetbegovic had worked to maintain Bosnia's neutrality. If Bosnia too descended into violence, the large number of factions (when compared to neighbouring Croatia) would make it harder to negotiate peace. Bosnia-Herzegovina was a small Yugoslav Republic where Muslims (43%), Serbs (31%), and Croats (17%) were living together. The Republic's Government was a coalition of those three ethnic groups. In October 1991, Serb representatives withdrew from the Republic's Assembly, leaving only the two other groups in government.²⁵

Serb paramilitary groups armed by the JNA soon afterwards started to terrorize Bosnia-Herzegovina. The situation was tense: travel at night was impossible, roadblocks were established at night, and night time shootings were regular occurrences in Croat and Bosnian Muslim villages and neighbourhoods. Ignoring Bosnian Muslims' right to self-determination, both Croatia and Serbia intended to annex Bosnia-Herzegovina.²⁶ That policy closely mirrored the 1908-1913 period when, as Turkish influence in the region weakened, Bosnia-Herzegovina had become the target of an expansionist Serbia and of Croatian nationalists in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The latter group's annexation of Bosnia in 1908, taking advantage of Ottoman disarray after the Young Turk Revolution, sparked Serbian nationalist terrorism and led to the Great War.²⁷ 83 years later, Serbian Nationalist Socialists were one more time raring to annex Bosnia, and they were ready to use all means of destruction to achieve their aims.

SERBIAN AGGRESSION AND THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN BOSNIA

At the end of the Cold War, the developments in Yugoslavia closely mirrored the well-known pre-WWI period. The Balkans, throughout history, have hosted an

²³ Tom Gallagher, *The Balkans After the Cold War. From Tyranny to Tragedy*, London – New York, Routledge, 2003. p. 54-56.

²⁴ Yehudith Auerbach, Yaeli Bloch-Elkon, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

²⁵ *Bosnia-Herzegovina on the Edge of the Abyss*, p. 2.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

²⁷ *A Broadening Balkan Crisis*, p. 8.

incredible variety of ethnic groups, cultures, religions, languages, and ideologies. Nevertheless, this cultural, ethnic, and religious richness was not always an advantage. During the Cold War, Tito's dictatorship had established a relative yet unsustainable stability in the area. When the iron fist and the security threats disappeared, the stability came under serious strain. The crisis in Yugoslavia, in which Bosnia-Herzegovina was the most vulnerable party, broke out under these conditions –and, as it had been predicted by CIA field reports in 1989, less than two years after the conflict broke out, Yugoslavia was no more.

The disintegration of Yugoslavia also caused widespread domino effects as it had during WWI and WWII. Long-standing US allies, including Turkey, Germany, Greece and other European countries were entangled in the crisis, and such disputes amongst its allies began hampering US efforts to create consensus in NATO's post-Cold War security approach. In early 1992, the European Commission (EC) recognized Slovenia and Croatia as newly independent republics, *de facto* endorsing the demise of Yugoslavia. However, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia were not recognized by the EC, and so this recognition did not change the situation much. Still watching the situation but not acting, the US was hesitant to recognize the newly-independent republics. Field officers argued against such a move, because it would seriously damage ties between Washington and Belgrade, already weakened by American complaints on human rights violations by Serbians and accusations against specific members of the leadership. This loss of influence would also harm the UN peace initiative spearheaded by Washington²⁸. Not recognizing the new republics also had downsides, though – since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disappearance of the security threat it had posed, Germany and France had grown suspicious that the United States was withdrawing from Europe.

Nationalist Socialist Serbians begun to wage an ethnic war against Bosnian Muslims. Sarajevo, Mostar, Tuzla, and Gorazde were the principal cities in which Serbians committed ethnic cleansing. By the middle of 1992, the official number of displaced Bosnians was 1.3 million, and 9000 dead. The actual death numbers were much higher, and could have doubled had the Serbians not been stopped. Later, some 60 000 people who had been declared missing were found in mass graves, executed by Serb forces. At least 80% of the casualties or displaced

²⁸ CIA Documents, *CIA Assessment: Implications of US Posture on Recognition of Former Yugoslav Republics 15 January 1992* (hereinafter – Implications of US Posture on Recognition), p. 2, in <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1992-01-15.pdf> (Accessed 13.09.2017).

persons were Bosnian Muslims. The situation was worsening in Bosnia, with medical supplies and food in besieged cities reaching life-threateningly low levels and critical infrastructure either destroyed or blocked by Serbians.²⁹ While these crimes were not immediately labelled such, the International Criminal Court (ICC) would later refer to the Serbian mass killings as “genocide” and the inhumane crimes as “ethnic cleansing”.

As previously mentioned, when Bosnia-Herzegovina decided to rearm its population, Turkey was the most convenient natural ally. Turkey had indeed been covertly supplying Bosnian Muslim forces with arms and advisers since the beginning of the crisis, but providing more direct assistance was not possible due to the lack of a common border with Bosnia or Macedonia.

Another important aspect of the 1990s is the replacement of ideologies by faiths and the rise of religious terrorism. At the beginning of the conflict, radical sectarian ideologies supported largely by Iran and the Gulf Countries had an opportunity to penetrate the Balkans. Both Miladić and Milošević, deliberately exaggerated the threat of Islamic fundamentalism to legitimize their brutal assaults to a wide audience. An unexpected consequence of this new slogan was the role it played as a rally point for extremists. Serbian nationalists who sought to discredit the Bosnian struggle and even to justify their inhumane policies in Bosnia used propaganda alleging Bosnians were radical terrorist supporters. Mass graves were a genocide attack on Bosnians physically, but Serbian propaganda was a new kind of genocide, targeting the faith and reputation of that desperate people.

Piercing through the Serbian leadership’s attempts at propaganda, the April intelligence reports offer two interesting insights:

1) Turkey’s historical role in Balkans and peace-facilitating status had drawn field officers’ attention.

2) The estimate reports showed that, without decisive action to protect them, the violent partition of Bosnia would inevitably radicalize a largely secular Slavic Muslim community. Islamist states such as Libya and Iran would be able to strengthen their influence on Bosnian Muslims – and indeed, there were already some signs that this was happening.³⁰ Turkey, as a mediator and the only secular Muslim country in the region, could assist Bosnia in reversing course.

By the August of 1992, as it had been predicted in CIA reports for the past two

²⁹ CIA Documents, *BTF Assessment: The Humanitarian Situation in Bosnia: Problems and Outlook*, 19 August 1992, pp. 1, 7, in <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1992-08-19.pdf> (Accessed 26.09.2017).

³⁰ *A Broadening Balkan Crisis*, p. 4.

years, the disintegration of Yugoslavia was inevitable. Serbs had been committing an unnamed genocide against Bosnian Muslims. At the threshold of the 21st century, there was a humanitarian crisis unravelling steps from Middle Europe, and public pressure on European nations and the US to act was rising day by day.³¹

Major European powers such as Britain and Germany remained reluctant to use force. France, due to the region's mountainous topography, feared that Bosnia would be a second Vietnam. Italy also was not in favour of the use of force.³² Here, some words ought to be said about the German position, given that Germany had been supporting Croatia from the first day of the crisis. At the beginning of 1992, Serbian aggression had focused on Bosnians and, for that reason, Germany was not in favour of the use of force. In contrast with the major European countries, Turkey was in favour of the use of force to stop Serbian brutality, to the point where there was a domestic pressure on Ankara for intervention. Turkey was also prepared to contribute to the UN Peace Force as necessary.³³

Croatia had been supporting Bosnian Muslims in order to further its own goal of tying down Bosnian Serb forces in the Bosnian territories. According to CIA reports, in 1992, the Bosnian Army relied almost exclusively on Croatia and Bosnian Croats for arms and supplies. Some of the major problems with which the Bosnian Army had to cope were the short falls of its training, its insufficiently-trained officers, and its lack of logistical support. In addition, Bosnian soldiers were for the most part incapable of effectively using armour and heavy artillery.³⁴ But Croatia had not been willing to sponsor such training and, worse, the major European countries contributing to UN peacekeeping efforts were reluctant to provide such obvious support to the Muslims.³⁵ The implications of this estimate report are dramatic because, were Bosnian Muslims not trained how to use heavy arms, Serbians would occupy the whole of Bosnia and, most probably, they would not leave any Bosnian man alive or any woman unmolested. Nonetheless,

³¹ CIA Documents, *BTF Assessment: European Views on the use of Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 10 August 1992* (hereinafter – European Views on the use of Force), in <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1992-08-10.pdf> (Accessed on 25.09.2017).

³² CIA Documents, *CIA Responses to Clinton Transition Team Questions on the Balkans, 28 December 1992* (hereinafter – CIA Responses to Clinton Transition Team Questions), p. 34, in <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1992-12-28.pdf> (Accessed on 26.09.2017).

³³ *European Views on the use of Force*.

³⁴ *CIA Responses to Clinton Transition Team Questions*, p. 14.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

Realpolitik took precedence over humanitarian priorities.

From the very beginning of 1989 until 1992, the disintegration of Yugoslavia turned into a Bosnian humanitarian crisis, with – worse – a genocide being committed mostly against Bosnian Muslims. Balkan and European countries, as well as the US, ended up intervening in the crisis, while former rulers Turkey and Russia were in favour of a peaceful settlement. Especially the hegemonic power of post-Cold War era, the US was under public pressure for humanitarian aid to Balkans and protecting UN peacekeepers in former Yugoslavia. About 49% of Americans were thinking that intervention in Bosnia, like Gulf War, would be a convenient means to overcome with Vietnam Syndrome.³⁶ In addition, a number of European countries were looking for an opportunity to demonstrate their capability of operating of a common foreign policy.³⁷ However, Russia's historical ties with Serbs and pan-Slavic policies made this country a natural ally to Milošević, while Turkey's historical ties to Bosnia made it a natural ally to Aliya Izetbegovic. The crisis was the first foreign policy challenge for the post-Soviet Russia. It was not easy for newly formed Russian leadership to establish their foreign policy toward the crisis.³⁸

Estimate reports show that Turkey wanted to avoid a Balkan war, but military and civilian leaders saw it as inevitable. Turkey supported the use of military force against the Serbians from the very beginning, fearing that the violence would spread to Kosovo and Macedonia with time. The US attaché to Turkey reported that the Turkish Army would support Macedonia if it were attacked by Greece and Serbia. This calling-in of allies would create a chain reaction, a kind of butterfly effect similar to the one responsible for the First World War.³⁹

Interestingly, published CIA esteem reports do not include comprehensive analysis about Russia's position. In those years, Russia was faced with transition problems and administrative disorder. In Russia's Chechen territories, there was an ongoing civil war, and it could argue that Moscow's level of attention to the Balkans was at its lowest level since the beginning of the 19th century. Russia had long feared that a war in Kosovo would spark a Balkan-wide conflagration, and because its capabilities for an active intervention were limited, Russia was in

³⁶ Richard Sobel, *Trends: United States Intervention in Bosnia*, in "The Public Opinion Quarterly", Vol. 62, 1998, No. 2, p. 251-252.

³⁷ Tom Gallagher, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

³⁸ John Scott Masker, *Signs of a Democratized Foreign Policy? Russian Politics, Public Opinion, and the Bosnia Crisis*, "World Affairs", Vol. 160, 1998, No. 4, p. 179-180.

³⁹ *CIA Responses to Clinton Transition Team Questions*, p. 33-35.

favour of a peaceful settlement acceptable to Serbians.⁴⁰ Another challenge for post-Soviet Russian foreign policy in Bosnia Crisis was that it has been collided with extreme nationalism, right of ethnic minorities and Russia's new role in Balkans and international arena after its loss of hegemonic policy making status.⁴¹

Any possible use of force necessitated the destruction of airfields in Batajnica, Nis, and Pristina. The Serbian air forces consisted solely of MiG-21 and MiG-29 fighter aircraft, numbering about 400. Serbian air superiority was a crippling disadvantage for Bosnians and Croats. The December estimate report shows that the most important targets in Serbia were the principal military airfields and a few power plants. Attacks on airfields would paralyze the Serbian army, and attacks on power plants would weaken the Serbian economy. Interestingly, the estimate reports at the end of 1992 show that, despite European countries' reluctance, the United States had intended to use force to stop, or at least slow down, Serbian brutality. However, Serbian infantry units were mostly located in downtown urban areas.⁴² Thus, any air strike against land forces would cause heavy civilian casualties. Reports show that there were 144 suspected prisoner camps, with the total number of captives in these camps being at least 30 000, with other estimates reaching as high as 70000. The camps were similar to Hitler's concentration camps, with life conditions almost as dreadful as those in Nazi camps.⁴³

The prisoners in the camps were mostly Bosnian Muslims. CIA reports clarify that the camp conditions were uniformly bad, with many prisoners denied access to even rudimentary medical and sanitary facilities. Human rights abuses in the smaller camps were also routine. There were no guidelines for running these camps, allowing Serbian guards to abuse prisoners. Muslim cultural elite, political and economic leaders, and prominent civil servants were picked out from lists and were imprisoned and tortured, and later systematically executed in the camps. According to reports, some Serb officials viewed rape as a tool of ethnic cleansing. There were numerous accounts of rape and other sexual abuses from refugees and former detainees. Captured Serbian soldiers confessed that rape was accepted and encouraged by high commanders. For instance, in the Trnopolje camp, rape was a regular occurrence. There were also numerous reports that Bosnian Muslim women were abused at the Brčko "Port" prison. In addition, there were credible allegations that abuses at the Galil and Westfalia hotels in Brčko

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 35-36.

⁴¹ John Scott Masker, *op. cit.*, p. 179.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ *Ibid.*

were a daily routine. Reports show that the Serbian high command and leaders were quietly encouraging such abuses and were unwilling to stop such inhumanely brutal behaviour.⁴⁴ These dramatic events, unacceptable acts, abuses, ill-treatments, and inhumanity were committed at the doorstep of the 21st century, before the eyes of the modern world. The ghosts of the terrible events invoked by Serbian aggression during that years would be one of the main obstacles in Balkans during coming years.⁴⁵

The scope of this paper was to analyse the Bosnian crisis between the years of 1989 and 1992, in light of the CIA declassified documents. The result of the crisis was, according to official reports, two million displaced persons, over 50 000 rape victims, and thousands of cases of abuse and murder. On July 11, 1995, in Srebrenica – a safe haven declared by the UN on the borders of Europe – more than 8000 unarmed and innocent Bosnian men and boys were executed by Serbs. The international community did not intervene to stop the crisis until the August of 1995, when Bill Clinton, President of the United States, at last decided to stop Serbian brutality. With that sea change, a NATO intervention against the Serbians was quickly approved. By the end of 1995, the Dayton Agreement came into force and a fragile peace was established in Bosnia.

CONCLUSIONS

As CIA field reports show, Bosnia-Herzegovina was the most vulnerable republic during the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Bosnian Muslims and, to some extent, Croatian Christians who were living together with Serbians were murdered, raped, and tortured by their neighbours. Today, that unfortunate people must forget what happened in the past and live together with their ex-rapists. If a case study on nation-building or mediation is needed, Bosnian women are the perfect candidate. They lost their children and their husbands, were subjected to systematic rapes, ill-treatment, and abuse, but they agreed to forget and even forgive what happened in the name of peace.

After my presentation of this paper during the Aliya Symposium in Bosnia, the audience told me that; they prefer not to remember or talk about the rapes, torture, and abuse they endured. This confused me. However, I later understood a simple truth of the Balkans: people cannot live together without forgiveness in

⁴⁴ *CIA Responses to Clinton Transition Team Questions*, p. 31.

⁴⁵ Kenneth Morrison, *Bosnia: The Crisis Averted*, in "The World Today", Vol. 67, 2011, No. 6, p. 29-30.

this region. Because Bosnians have to live together with their ex-aggressors, they do not want to remember the bad days. Generally, when nation-building must overcome historical hatreds, disagreements are escalated and publicly resolved. In Bosnia, though, the nation is built on forgiveness and the forgetting of the past. This is a unique characteristic deriving from the geography and demographic structure of the Balkans.

This paper does not intend to blame the Serb people as a whole. While some were the aggressors, others were generous people. Wars are chaotic situations, however, and there is a limit to what generosity can do in such times. Also, the aim of my presentation was not to revive the memories of what happened between the years of 1989 and 1992. The basic aim was to determine whether or not the genocide in Bosnia could have been prevented. As CIA estimate reports clearly show, by early 1989, US Government was very much aware of the coming events. Despite this, President Bush prioritized wars over oil. Luckily, President Clinton had much more humanist feelings and did not hesitate to use force to stop an ongoing genocide.

There are some who say that efforts to resolve ethnic conflicts are meaningless. According to this view, the Serbs, Croats, Bosnians, Slovenes of the formerly Yugoslav Balkans could never coexist peacefully. The current situation, as fragile as it may be, disproves this claim. Former Yugoslavia, because of its multi-nation structure became the first failed state of the post-Cold War era.

Including Serbs, all ethnic groups had a dramatic experience and noticed that at what scale an ethnic clash could be harmful for all sides. Bosnia and Serbia, as a two independent states could survive in a peacefully manner. If Serbia put its imperialistic attitudes aside and the process of integration into EU democracies could be achieved peace may come into Balkans. In this case because democracies prefer not to fight a long-lasting peaceful structures could be established in the Balkans without iron fist. Such an experience if could be achieved, Bosnia-Herzegovina could have a chance to exist as an independent state.

Democratization, rule of law, human rights, freedom of speech and economic developments are the antidotes effectively could be used towards aggression and extremist nationalism. This formula could be put in use in Bosnia and a developed, democratized Serbia would be less aggressive. Thus, peace making process and salvation of ethnic problems could have a chance between Bosnia and Serbia.

I would like to take this opportunity to express my condolences to the innocent and unprotected people of former Yugoslavia, regardless to their ethnic origin or identity, who lost their lives at the threshold of the 21st century and on the doorstep of Europe, birthplace and home of humanist ideals.

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